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Cultúr, Ealaíona, Spórt agus Meáin**
Conraitheoireacht Torthaí Sóisialta i Spórt na hÉireann
Aibreáin 2023

**Joint Committee on Tourism,
Culture, Arts, Sport and Media**
Social Outcomes Contracting in Irish
Sport
April 2023

MEMBERSHIP

- Deputy Niamh Smyth T.D., Fianna Fáil, *Cathaoirleach*
- Deputy Alan Dillon T.D., Fine Gael, *Leas-Chathaoirleach*
- Deputy Ciarán Cannon T.D., Fine Gael
- Deputy Peter Fitzpatrick T.D., Independent
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- Deputy Johnny Mythen T.D., Sinn Féin
- Deputy Christopher O’Sullivan T.D., Fianna Fáil
- Senator Malcolm Byrne, Fianna Fáil
- Senator Micheál Carrigy, Fine Gael
- Senator Shane Cassells, Fianna Fáil
- Senator Annie Hoey, Labour Party
- Senator Fintan Warfield, Sinn Féin

Joint Committee on Tourism, Culture, Arts, Sport and Media



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Fianna Fáil



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Fine Gael



Senator Shane Cassells
Fianna Fáil



Senator Annie Hoey
Labour Party



Senator Fintan Warfield
Sinn Féin

FOREWORD

It has long been the aim of the Irish sporting sector to serve the wellbeing of all. From the perspective of the Joint Committee on Tourism, Culture, Arts, Sport and Media, we have launched a preliminary investigation of an innovative funding model to achieve this very objective. The use of social outcomes contracting models is generally sparse, and, in sport, even more so.

Having consulted with the pioneers of social outcomes contracting in Ireland and abroad, the Joint Committee, conscious of the effort that went into producing the submissions, wishes to express, to all concerned, its gratitude for the work and effort that was made in their preparation.

This report publishes and puts in the public domain, in a non-partisan way, the views of those who made submissions.

Again, I wish to thank all stakeholders involved for their contributions to the proceedings of this report. I also wish to express my gratitude to my fellow Members of the Committee, as well as to the Committee's Secretariat for its assistance in compiling this report.



Niamh Smyth T.D.

Cathaoirleach

April 2023

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Social outcome contracts (SOCs) are a mechanism in public service procurement that aim to harness the resources of the public, private, philanthropy, and civil society sectors, with the goal of jointly implementing effective interventions in the public domain.

With a view to examining the feasibility of applying social outcome contracting models to sport in Ireland, the Joint Committee on Tourism, Culture, Arts, Sport and Media held one (1) public oral hearing and considered eight (8) written submissions, details of which can be accessed in [Appendix 1](#) and in [Appendix 2](#).

Stakeholders discuss benefits, limitations, appropriateness, and feasibility considerations in relation to the use of SOC models in Ireland, and particularly in Irish sport. It appears, from stakeholder contributions, that there is evidence to suggest that SOC models can result in positive outcomes for a number of targeted interventions and groups while still preserving value-for-money.

However, stakeholders emphasise that the use of SOC models can be based on misconceptions of its potential benefits, that evaluating the results of SOC models may be challenging, and that evidence supporting the use of SOC models, particularly in sport-based interventions, is highly limited.

Stakeholders highlight the potential for a pilot SOC in the domain of Irish sport, and outline relevant appropriateness and feasibility considerations to support the application of such a model in the Irish context.

The Joint Committee, in consideration of the many views expressed, agreed that the best way to add value to the consideration of this potentially innovative funding model was to publish the submissions received. In publishing the submissions as a report, the Joint Committee is not making any recommendations; rather, the Joint Committee considers that any debate on this matter is best served by open access to the divergent views received.

BACKGROUND

WHAT ARE SOCIAL OUTCOMES CONTRACTS (SOCs)?

Social outcome contracts (SOCs) are a mechanism in public service procurement that aim to harness the resources of the public, private, philanthropy, and civil society sectors, with the goal of jointly implementing effective interventions in the public domain. Models linked to social outcome contracting include payment-by-results (PbR), social impact bonds (SIBs), pay-for-success (PFS), development impact bonds (DIBs), results-based financing (RBF), performance-based financing (PBF), and pay for performance (PFP).

Social outcome contracting is the procurement of services based on **outcomes** rather than **outputs**. In such contracts, the commissioner (central or local government) and service provider agree on the pre-defined desired end results (i.e. **outcomes**) of an intervention, on which the final payment is based. Once completed, an intervention based on a social outcome contracting scheme is considered successful if the service provider achieves the pre-defined outcomes, and the commissioner therefore pays the agreed amount in return for these results. In this way, SOC's offer a way to share risk.

The process can be summarised as follows:

1. A social need is identified (e.g. physical inactivity in certain demographics);
2. An outcome payer is identified (e.g. a public body/department with responsibility for the area/sector/social challenge);
3. An evaluation tool determines the cost of the social challenge/problem to society, and proposes a rate card to the outcome payer;
4. An outcome payer agrees on a rate card and commits to contract with a service provider;
5. Investment is sought to provide the capital required to start the intervention;
6. The SOC is put to tender, and the service provider(s) identified; and

7. An entity is selected to oversee the SOC, verify the delivery of outcomes and manage the financial transactions.




Figure 1: Diagram of social outcomes contracting [Source: Social Finance NL written submission]

EU countries may take social considerations into account when setting out a public procurement tender. The social considerations may be set out in the technical specifications, selection criteria, award criteria, or in contract execution clauses. However, such clauses must always be linked to the subject matter of the contract and comply with the EU Treaties' fundamental principles, including transparency and non-discrimination.

STAKEHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS

BENEFITS OF SOCIAL OUTCOMES CONTRACTING

The GAA notes that, insofar as SOC's relate to the contribution of sport and physical activity to non-health outcomes, there is a role for sport in combatting challenges related to antisocial behaviour, either as part of broader personal development programmes or in conjunction with community and youth services. The GAA also states that the benefits of sports participation are not limited to “performers”; volunteering in sport is also a potential route for improving wellbeing; the GAA states that volunteers are essential to community sport and physical activity programmes, and that their engagement with you participants influences the potential for lifelong participation in physical activity, and, consequently, the current and future health profiles of young people.

Ecorys notes that there is evidence to suggest that SOC's are largely successful in terms of achieving agreed-upon outcomes, including several qualitative studies that it has carried out; Ecorys proposes that this could be as a result of stronger performance management that is built into the SOC mechanism, and the impetus provided by linking payment to outcomes. From the interviews it has conducted with relevant stakeholders in relation to the success of SOC's, Ecorys states that any additional costs incurred as a result of the choice of the SOC mechanism are seen as value-for-money—though there is the possibility that the simplification of contracts could improve cost effectiveness.

In addition, from an evaluation of SOC's use in international development, Ecorys found that the combined elements of attaching payments to outcomes, financial risk-sharing, and involving a broader range of stakeholders led to a stronger focus on outcomes across all organisations, heightened performance management over delivery, and introduced a high-stakes environment. Ecorys notes that there is evidence that these changes led to improved outcomes.

The Government Outcomes Lab states that, from its 2018 review of the use of SOC's, such a contracting mechanism may aid in overcoming public sector challenges in relation to collaboration, prevention, innovation, and resilience:

- Collaboration: Social service provision is often fragmented both across the complex provider landscape and among commissioners; by making collaboration the centrepiece of contractual relationships through a shared focus on outcomes, SOC's can coordinate effort among multiple providers and/or commissioners.
- Prevention: A key manner of improving social outcomes is to prevent issues from arising at all or to prevent existing problems from deteriorating. However, commissioners often face challenges in running preventive interventions alongside existing services. Resources are often fully committed to meeting current needs and reacting to crises. SOC's can alleviate such budgetary pressures through "double-running" of budgets; social investment can be used to fund a preventive intervention, and, if successful, can decrease the reliance on further services in future, thereby freeing up core funding for prevention.
- Innovation: SOC's may create room for innovation by transferring financial risk to the investor and away from the commissioner and service provider; such innovation may take the form of innovation in provider selection, choice of intervention, and types of performance management.
- Resilience: Structural resilience is commonly driven by governance and resources; service adaptations were driven by a combination of embedded relationships among project partners, and flexible, re-deployable financing facilitated information-sharing and collective decision-making as a result of the use of the SOC mechanism.

Rethink Ireland states that the overarching objective of SOC use is to promote service delivery that centralises the needs of its beneficiaries, and that its benefits include convening different types of expertise into a single partnership, reduced financial risk for Governments when investing in social interventions, the use of private resources for positive social change, the strengthening of an evidence base for effective interventions, the enabling of flexibility in service provision, and the creation of longer-term partnerships for service providers.

UEFA remarks that there are various benefits to the use of SOC as a financing model for sport, including the use of contracts to design interventions at the local level to address key challenges that have not already been addressed by existing services or public funding, the requirement of a cross-sectoral approach from design stage through to delivery and training, the fulfilment of the Irish National Sports Plan 2018—2027 in exploring new forms of investment from the private sector, and access to cheaper capital to enhance human resources in local sports clubs.

UNESCO notes that implementation of interventions is linked to clear impacts through the use of SOC, which symbiotically builds and uses data, and that a principal benefit is that governments will only have to pay for an intervention after it has taken place and after the beneficiaries have experienced specific outcomes, which could include improvements in health, well-being, inclusion, or empowerment; SOC thereby lower the risk of investing in sport.

UNESCO also states that it is possible that SOC could contribute to:

- The prioritisation of marginalised individuals and communities in all sports-related planning;
- Investment in robust, outcome-oriented, disaggregated data to inform evidence-based policymaking, advocacy, and impact assessment across policy in Ireland that focus on or use sport, physical activity, health, education, and inclusion of specific groups;
- The establishment of participatory approaches to cross-sector sports policy and planning at all levels of sport;
- The prioritisation of capacity-building and workforce development;
- The expansion of cross-sectoral funding access and allocations to support the elimination of barriers for marginalised and underserved groups; and
- Investment in public awareness and education campaigns related to the value and role of sport in society.

LIMITATIONS TO SOCIAL OUTCOMES CONTRACTING

Ecorys warns that there are several misunderstandings as to the operation of SOC in practice:

- Though governments and other outcome payers can often be initially attracted to SOC's due to the idea that private investment is involved, public sector expenditure and value-for-money is not necessarily improved; governments ultimately pay for the outcomes if the service is successful, and it is rare for investment in SOC's to be private investment—it more often comes from philanthropic sources;
- Investors may not always bear all of the financial risk involved in SOC's; contracts may include de-risk elements for investors, such as attaching some payments to activities, or protecting some of the investor's capital; and
- It is rare that cashable savings are generated that would cover the cost of outcome payments.

The Government Outcomes Lab outlines that there are additional transaction costs associated with designing the “contract” element of the SOC partnership, that complex multi-stakeholder partnerships are difficult to form, and that the process from initial idea to service delivery can often be costly and time-consuming. The Government Outcomes Lab emphasises that stakeholders should be able to clearly articulate why they are pursuing a SOC approach over alternative commissioning mechanisms. It also states that the overarching evidence base on the added value of a SOC model over alternative commissioning approaches is limited, and remains to be developed in terms of the accessibility and quality of data.

UEFA states that some caution should be exercised in exploring the use of SOC's generally, as:

- There can be difficulties in relation to bottom-up and cross-sectoral planning arising from the SOC mechanism, as well as a need for ongoing flexibility over the course of the contract;
- Target groups may not necessarily be defined with the requisite clarity to prove that actual outcomes are achieved—there is the danger that certain cohorts of a targeted group may be “cherry-picked” for the purpose of easily achieving given outcomes; and

- Cross-departmental investment, multiannual funding, and public-private partnerships can cause difficulties in the formation of contracts and the operationalisation of financing.

The GAA note that the assessment of the achievement of outcomes can be challenging, and, without strong, independent assessment of same, government funding may be misplaced as a result of the SOC mechanism.

APPROPRIATENESS OF SOCIAL OUTCOMES CONTRACTING

Ecorys observes that SOC's are most appropriate when:

- Performance could be enhanced through a stronger focus on outcomes, buttressed by performance management;
- The overall system/culture needs an external “disruption” to bring about change;
- Service providers are not able to tolerate high levels of financial risk; and/or
- Providers would benefit from external expertise and support.

Social Finance NL outlines that there are a number of particular situations that suit the use of SOC's:

- Where there is an “ownership” problem arising from the sharing of responsibility over a certain social issue across multiple (governmental) agencies;
- Where the costs of a certain social issue and benefits of potential solutions are within the gift of distinct actors—for instance, where one body is responsible for addressing the problem, but another actor is a beneficiary;
- Where multidimensional approaches are required to adequately address a certain social issue—focusing on outcomes may serve to concentrate the efforts of actors of different dimensions; and
- Where innovative approaches are required, but effectiveness is not proven or only tested on a small scale—private capital can finance these risks and, when or if the approach delivers outcomes, the government can pay for those outcomes in confidence.

FEASIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS

In order for SOC's to be successful, the Government Outcomes Lab states that there must be the following conditions in place:

- A stringently defined eligible cohort: the cohort eligible for support under a SOC should be defined by clear, objective data;
- Alignment between payable outcomes and policy objectives: there should be a logical link between the activity, outputs, and outcomes articulated in the “theory of change” of the SOC;
- Accurate price-setting of outcomes: outcomes must be accurately priced, including a robust estimate of the likely level of benefit exceeding the type of benefit that would have happened without the intervention, as well as means of ensuring that any achieved outcomes arose, in fact, as a direct result of the intervention.

Rethink Ireland notes that well-defined outcomes indicators, agreed between all parties, are key to successful SOC's, and suggests that indicators for a proposed SOC pilot could be clustered into categories of “health” (e.g. proposed health and wellness benefits), “employment” (e.g. involvement of trainers, educators, and interns), “social inclusion” (e.g. levels of community and civic engagement), and “education” (e.g. improvement in specific skills).

Social Finance NL highlights that, in the initial stages of a SOC, there are several crucial factors:

- That there is a clear set of outcomes agreed by all stakeholders involved for the target population;
- That there is uncertainty about the outcomes of the intervention, as this can lead to an innovative service delivery concept;
- That there is a need for upfront capital and/or the inclusion of a new actor within an intervention; and
- That the issue to be addressed is a high priority for government, so as to drive change in the relevant area.

Social Finance NL highlights that, while the use of the SOC model is applicable to sport, budgets relating to sports-related programmes and long-term health benefits or improvements in social cohesion as a result of sports participation often fall under the responsibility of different agencies. As a result of this fragmentation, the primary challenge for SOC in sport is its practical feasibility, including agreeing on a clear set of outcomes for all stakeholders involved and a potential lack of priority status being attributed to sport by governments, particularly for the use of an innovative funding model.

Social Finance NL, the GAA, Rethink Ireland, UNESCO recommend the use of a pilot SOC in Ireland—in sport, if it is feasible. Social Finance NL states that:

- A specific feasibility study of the use of SOC in Irish sports should be conducted;
- A design phase, where the SOC is to be outlined in detail and all partners commit to the use of the SOC, should occur, and include items such as the SOC’s governance, financial model, and contracting requirements; and
- A contracting phase should follow, whereby the SOC will be legally contracted, investments will be formalised, and final preparations will be made for the implementation of services as commissioned by the SOC.

The IRFU and the GAA outline how the use of the “Social Return on Investment” for the sporting sector in Ireland has been studied; the IRFU notes that this form of cost-benefit analysis to quantify social change caused by an intervention could be central to determining successful outcomes and value-for-money in the use of a SOC. The GAA notes that such a judgement on the value of sport, in attributing a monetary value to participation in sports and in physical activity, may not be palatable to all and may, indeed, lead to the commodification of social outcomes—particularly if there is to be a “for-profit” approach induced by the use of SOC.

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF PUBLIC ORAL HEARINGS

WITNESSES	DATE	
Football Association of Ireland	29th June 2022	Meeting transcript
David Courell [<i>Chief Operating Officer</i>]		
Ger McDermott [<i>Director of Grassroots Football</i>]		
Rethink Ireland		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opening statement 		
Deirdre Mortell [<i>Chief Executive Officer</i>]		
Mario Vottero [<i>Director of Strategy, Business Intelligence and Operations</i>]		
UEFA		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opening statement 		
Liam McGroarty [<i>Strategy Manager</i>]		
UNESCO		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opening statement 		
Catherine Carty [<i>UNESCO Chair MTU</i>]		
Daniel Greenways [<i>Consultant, Sport Section</i>]		

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

STAKEHOLDER
Ecorys
Gaelic Athletic Association
Government Outcomes Lab, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
Irish Rugby Football Union
Rethink Ireland
Social Finance NL
UEFA
UNESCO

APPENDIX 3

ORDERS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE

STANDING ORDERS 94, 95 AND 96: SCOPE OF ACTIVITY AND POWERS OF SELECT COMMITTEES AND FUNCTIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL SELECT COMMITTEES

Scope and context of activities of Select Committees

94. (1) The Dáil may appoint a Select Committee to consider and, if so permitted, to take evidence upon any Bill, Estimate or matter, and to report its opinion for the information and assistance of the Dáil. Such motion shall specifically state the orders of reference of the Committee, define the powers devolved upon it, fix the number of members to serve on it, state the quorum, and may appoint a date upon which the Committee shall report back to the Dáil.

(2) It shall be an instruction to each Select Committee that—

(a) it may only consider such matters, engage in such activities, exercise such powers and discharge such functions as are specifically authorised under its orders of reference and under Standing Orders;

(b) such matters, activities, powers and functions shall be relevant to, and shall arise only in the context of, the preparation of a report to the Dáil;

(c) it shall not consider any matter which is being considered, or of which notice has been given of a proposal to consider, by the Joint Committee on Public Petitions in the exercise of its functions under Standing Order 125(1); and

(d) it shall refrain from inquiring into in public session or publishing confidential information regarding any matter if so requested, for stated reasons given in writing, by—

- (i) a member of the Government or a Minister of State, or
- (ii) the principal office-holder of a State body within the responsibility of a Government Department or
- (iii) the principal office-holder of a non-State body which is partly funded by the State,

Provided that the Committee may appeal any such request made to the Ceann Comhairle, whose decision shall be final.

(3) It shall be an instruction to all Select Committees to which Bills are referred that they shall ensure that not more than two Select Committees shall meet to consider a Bill on any given day, unless the Dáil, after due notice to the Business Committee by a Cathaoirleach of one of the Select Committees concerned, waives this instruction.

Functions of Departmental Select Committees

95. (1) The Dáil may appoint a Departmental Select Committee to consider and, unless otherwise provided for in these Standing Orders or by order, to report to the Dáil on any matter relating to—

(a) legislation, policy, governance, expenditure and administration of—

- (i) a Government Department, and
- (ii) State bodies within the responsibility of such Department, and

(b) the performance of a non-State body in relation to an agreement for the provision of services that it has entered into with any such Government Department or State body.

(2) A Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order shall also consider such other matters which—

(a) stand referred to the Committee by virtue of these Standing Orders or statute law, or

(b) shall be referred to the Committee by order of the Dáil.

(3) The principal purpose of Committee consideration of matters of policy, governance, expenditure and administration under paragraph (1) shall be—

(a) for the accountability of the relevant Minister or Minister of State, and

(b) to assess the performance of the relevant Government Department or of a State body within the responsibility of the relevant Department, in delivering public services while achieving intended outcomes, including value for money.

(4) A Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order shall not consider any matter relating to accounts audited by, or reports of, the Comptroller and Auditor General unless the Committee of Public Accounts—

(a) consents to such consideration, or

(b) has reported on such accounts or reports.

(5) A Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order may be joined with a Select Committee appointed by Seanad Éireann to be and act as a Joint Committee for the purposes of paragraph (1) and such other purposes as may be specified in these Standing Orders or by order of the Dáil: provided that the Joint Committee shall not consider—

(a) the Committee Stage of a Bill,

(b) Estimates for Public Services, or

(c) a proposal contained in a motion for the approval of an international agreement involving a charge upon public funds referred to the Committee by order of the Dáil.

(6) Any report that the Joint Committee proposes to make shall, on adoption by the Joint Committee, be made to both Houses of the Oireachtas.

(7) The Cathaoirleach of the Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order shall also be Cathaoirleach of the Joint Committee.

(8) Where a Select Committee proposes to consider—

(a) EU draft legislative acts standing referred to the Select Committee under Standing Order 133, including the compliance of such acts with the principle of subsidiarity,

(b) other proposals for EU legislation and related policy issues, including programmes and guidelines prepared by the European Commission as a basis of possible legislative action,

(c) non-legislative documents published by any EU institution in relation to EU policy matters, or

(d) matters listed for consideration on the agenda for meetings of the relevant Council (of Ministers) of the European Union and the outcome of such meetings, the following may be notified accordingly and shall have the right to attend and take part in such consideration without having a right to move motions or amendments or the right to vote:

(i) members of the European Parliament elected from constituencies in Ireland,

(ii) members of the Irish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and

(iii) at the invitation of the Committee, other members of the European Parliament.

(9) A Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order may, in respect of any Ombudsman charged with oversight of public services within the policy remit of the relevant Department consider—

(a) such motions relating to the appointment of an Ombudsman as may be referred to the Committee, and

(b) such Ombudsman reports laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas as the Committee may select: Provided that the provisions of Standing Order 130 apply where the Select Committee has not considered the Ombudsman report, or a portion or portions thereof, within two months (excluding Christmas, Easter or summer recess periods) of the report being laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas.

Powers of Select Committees

96. Unless the Dáil shall otherwise order, a Committee appointed pursuant to these Standing Orders shall have the following powers:

(1) power to invite and receive oral and written evidence and to print and publish from time to time—

(a) minutes of such evidence as was heard in public, and

(b) such evidence in writing as the Committee thinks fit;

(2) power to appoint sub-Committees and to refer to such sub-Committees any matter comprehended by its orders of reference and to delegate any of its powers to such sub-Committees, including power to report directly to the Dáil;

(3) power to draft recommendations for legislative change and for new legislation;

(4) in relation to any statutory instrument, including those laid or laid in draft before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, power to—

(a) require any Government Department or other instrument-making authority concerned to—

(i) submit a memorandum to the Select Committee explaining the statutory Instrument, or

(ii) attend a meeting of the Select Committee to explain any such statutory instrument: Provided that the authority concerned may decline to attend for reasons given in writing to the Select Committee, which may report thereon to the Dáil, and

(b) recommend, where it considers that such action is warranted, that the instrument should be annulled or amended;

(5) power to require that a member of the Government or Minister of State shall attend before the Select Committee to discuss—

(a) policy, or

(b) proposed primary or secondary legislation (prior to such legislation being published),

for which he or she is officially responsible: Provided that a member of the Government or Minister of State may decline to attend for stated reasons given in writing to the Select Committee, which may report thereon to the Dáil: and provided further that a member of the Government or Minister of State may request to attend a meeting of the Select Committee to enable him or her to discuss such policy or proposed legislation;

(6) power to require that a member of the Government or Minister of State shall attend before the Select Committee and provide, in private session if so requested by the attendee, oral briefings in advance of meetings of the relevant EC Council (of Ministers) of the European Union to enable the Select Committee to make known its views: Provided that the Committee may also require such attendance following such meetings;

(7) power to require that the Chairperson designate of a body or agency under the aegis of a Department shall, prior to his or her appointment, attend before the Select Committee to discuss his or her strategic priorities for the role;

(8) power to require that a member of the Government or Minister of State who is officially

responsible for the implementation of an Act shall attend before a Select Committee in relation to the consideration of a report under Standing Order 197;

(9) subject to any constraints otherwise prescribed by law, power to require that principal office-holders of a—

(a) State body within the responsibility of a Government Department or

(b) non-State body which is partly funded by the State,
shall attend meetings of the Select Committee, as appropriate, to discuss issues for which they are officially responsible: Provided that such an office-

holder may decline to attend for stated reasons given in writing to the Select Committee, which may report thereon to the Dáil;
and

(10) power to—

(a) engage the services of persons with specialist or technical knowledge, to assist it or any of its sub-Committees in considering particular matters; and

(b) undertake travel;

Provided that the powers under this paragraph are subject to such recommendations as may be made by the Working Group of Committee Cathaoirligh under Standing Order 120(4)(a).

Houses of the Oireachtas

Leinster House

Kildare Street

Dublin 2

Do2 XR20

www.oireachtas.ie

Tel: +353 (0)1 6183000 or 076 1001700

Twitter: @OireachtasNews

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