

Pre-legislative scrutiny of General Scheme of the
Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Bill 2021.

1. Introduction

*Raisea*concern works with private sector employers and public bodies in the prevention, detection, investigation and remediation of workplace wrongdoing. Under an Office of Government Procurement Framework Tender, we are currently the only approved outsourced service provider of the role of '*Confidential Recipient*' to the Irish public service. Part of this service involves protecting the identity of the '*worker*' making a disclosure of wrongdoing ('the Discloser'). We send the disclosure of wrongdoing to the public service employer for investigation but do not reveal the identity of the Discloser.

We also undertake independent workplace investigations of allegations of employee wrongdoing where we are not involved as Confidential Recipient, particularly in the area of allegations of bullying, harassment and sexual harassment.

As our name suggests, we specialise in the area of whistleblowing.

We have already made a submission to the consultative process undertaken the by Department of Public Expenditure & Reform on the transposition of the EU Whistleblowing Directive into Irish law¹. We are pleased to note that a number of our recommendations have been adopted into the General Scheme for the Bill.

¹ file:///C:/Users/Philip%20Brennan/Downloads/88090_2b3627f6-866a-4fe4-b4ec-65ba329a9092.pdf



25 2. The policy rationale for the Bill

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27 The Bill will give effect to *Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the*
28 *Council of 23 October 2019 on the protections of persons who report breaches of Union*
29 *law, and to provide for related matters* ('the EU Whistleblowing Directive'). The EU
30 Whistleblowing Directive, which must be transposed into Irish law by 17 December 2021,
31 sets common minimum standard across EU Member States for the protection of persons
32 who report information about threats or harm to the public interest obtained in the context
33 of their work-related activities. To this end, the adoption of many (but not all) of the
34 provisions into Irish law is non-discretionary. Ireland already has what is generally regarded
35 as comprehensive legislation in this area in the form of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014.
36 This already incorporates many of the provisions of the EU Whistleblowing Directive.
37 Ireland is of course free to go beyond the provisions of the EU Whistleblowing Directive in
38 the Amendment Bill but, by reason of Article 25 of the Directive, is not permitted to regress
39 from the provisions and protections already contained in the 2014 Act.

40

41 The focus on this submission is on those areas where Government has choice either with
42 regard to implementation of certain limited aspects of the EU Whistleblowing Directive or
43 with regard to taking the opportunity to go beyond its provisions.

44

45 The Bill (as initiated) has not been published at this point. This submission is based on the
46 General Scheme of the Bill published on 12 May 2021.

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48 In this submission, we have not commented on every Head in the Scheme of the Bill. We
49 have done so by exception and only in circumstances where we have a comment or
50 recommendation to make.



3. The technical, legal and drafting aspects of the Bill

3.1 Head 5 Material Scope

It is proposed that [Section 5](#) of the Principal Act is amended by the insertion of the following after subparagraph 8:

“(9) A matter is not a relevant wrongdoing if it is a matter concerning interpersonal grievances exclusively affecting the reporting person, namely grievances about interpersonal conflicts between the reporting person and another worker and the matter can be channelled to other procedures designed to address such matters.”

The Explanatory Note to Head 5 clarifies that it inserts a provision that matters concerning interpersonal grievances are not relevant wrongdoings, in accordance with Recital 22 of the Directive.

The intent here is to eliminate from the protection of this legislation disputes between employees and members of management and suchlike. Raiseaconcern agrees that this should be the case, unless the interpersonal grievance is something that already comes within the provisions of Section 5 (3) by reason of being a ‘*relevant wrongdoing*’.

Of most concern is that claims of bullying, harassment and sexual harassment are often regarded by employers as being personal grievances between employees and dealt with accordingly under a grievance procedure. However, bullying, harassment and sexual harassment can also be breaches of Health & Safety, Employment and Equality legislation. The threat of penalisation for bringing forward a disclosure of bullying, harassment or sexual



77 harassment is a very real one and, absent protection from it under the Protected
78 Disclosures Act, can be a deterrent to those suffering such fate from coming forward and
79 disclosing it. We believe that this would be a regressive step.

80

81 We recommend that it is made unequivocally clear that disclosures of a reasonable belief
82 of bullying, harassment and sexual harassment by the party who claims to have endured
83 such behaviour are not excluded from the protections provided by the Principal Act, as
84 amended by the proposed Section 5 (9). Section 5 (9) should only apply to interpersonal
85 conflicts of a more general nature, such as regarding performance assessment, promotion,
86 reward, employment terms and conditions or differences of an operational work-related
87 nature.

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89 3.2 Head 8 Anonymous Disclosure

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91 It is proposed that the Principal Act is amended by the insertion of the following section
92 after Section 5:

93

94 *"Anonymous disclosures*

95 **5A.** (1) *A worker who makes an anonymous disclosure in the manner specified by this*
96 *Act but is subsequently identified and suffers penalisation shall qualify for the*
97 *protections set out in this Act.*

98

99 (2) *Without prejudice to any other enactments that provide for anonymous*
100 *reporting of wrongdoing, nothing in this Act shall impose an obligation on any of*
101 *the legal entities within the scope of this Act to accept and follow up on*
102 *anonymous disclosures."*



103

104 Raisea concern supports the explicit inclusion of anonymous disclosures under the
105 Principal Act in the manner specified and affording persons who make such disclosures, if
106 subsequently identified, the protections of the Act if they subsequently suffer penalisation.
107

108 The Explanatory Note to Head 8 explains that this transposes Article 6(2) of the Directive,
109 which provides that recipients of anonymous reports are not obliged to accept and follow
110 up on anonymous reports.

111

112 Article 6(2) states:

113

114 *“Without prejudice to existing obligations to provide for anonymous reporting by virtue of*
115 *Union law, this Directive does not affect the power of Member States to decide whether*
116 *legal entities in the private or public sector and competent authorities are required to*
117 *accept and follow up on anonymous reports of breaches.”*

118

119 This does not mean that recipients of anonymous reports are not obliged to accept and
120 follow up them. It means that Ireland is free to choose in adopting the EW Whistleblowing
121 Directive whether or not it requires that anonymous disclosures are followed up.

122

123 For reasons already put forward in the consultative process, it is the view of Raisea concern
124 that Ireland should avail of the leeway afforded to it to impose a requirement for employers
125 to accept and follow up on disclosures made by anonymous Disclosers.

126

127 A key focus of the EU Whistleblowing Directive is to encourage and protect those who wish
128 to disclose to others concerns they have about possible work related wrongdoing and to



129 facilitate them in doing so safely. It is the experience of Raisea Concern that concern over
130 their identity being revealed is the single biggest fear that Disclosers have and is the most
131 significant deterrent to disclosure². This is why we feel that the service of '*Confidential*
132 *Recipient*' is so important. While it is to be welcomed that it is proposed to afford
133 anonymous Disclosers the protections of the legislation if subsequently identified, it makes
134 little sense in our view to then afford legal entities within the scope of the legislation the
135 latitude to ignore and not follow up on them.

136

137 Disclosers can be concerned about their identity being revealed for any one of a number
138 of reasons. The obvious ones are the potential for penalisation by management or
139 detriment (which can potentially be serious detriment in the case a material disclosure)
140 caused to them by impacted persons, colleagues or others. However, it is also the
141 experience of Raisea Concern that Disclosers' reluctance to come forward can simply arise
142 from fear that the process will involve being challenged by superiors, from a fear of being
143 mistaken, or from a fear that they will be made to feel that blame for the consequences of
144 their disclosure rests with them, rather than with those involved in the reported
145 malpractice or those who should have but did not call it out. Employee disclosure is a
146 stressful process and some Disclosers, understandably, are unwilling to subject themselves
147 to any level of possible personal stress or risk. If the Act presents recipients of such
148 anonymous disclosures with the right not to accept them and to ignore them, then this is
149 likely to act as a deterrent.

150

² This is why we feel that the service of '*Confidential Recipient*' is so important. In so doing, Raisea Concern offers protection of identity, or effective anonymity, but with the capability of intermediation between Discloser and Employer to assist in evaluating and investigating the wrongdoing disclosed.



151 There has traditionally been a nervousness amongst many employers and advisers about
152 acting on anonymous disclosures. This is understandable, as any employee focused on
153 knowingly and maliciously making claims against others that they know to be untrue can
154 hide behind the veil of anonymity. Equally, the level or generality of information disclosed
155 may be such that investigation is impossible or impractical. However, some level of
156 evaluation is always possible.

157

158 The Heads of Bill introduce for the first time an obligation on legal entities within the scope
159 of the Act to follow up on worker disclosures. *"Follow up"* is helpfully defined in Head 2 as:

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161 *".....any action taken by the recipient of a protected disclosure to assess the accuracy of the*
162 *information contained in the protected disclosure and, where relevant, to address the*
163 *relevant wrongdoing reported, including, but not limited to, actions such as an internal*
164 *inquiry, an investigation, prosecution, an action for recovery of funds or the closure of the*
165 *procedure."*

166

167 We see no logic or justifiable reason why a requirement to follow up should apply to all
168 other disclosures of relevant wrongdoing, but not to anonymous disclosures, particularly
169 where protection of anonymous Disclosers is now provided for.

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171 3.3 Head 9 Internal Reporting Channels

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173 Section 6 of the Principal Act is amended to include all employers and public bodies with
174 50 or more employees. Raiseaconcern repeats the point made in the consultative process
175 undertaken the by Department of Public Expenditure & Reform. While it may sound
176 attractive from the point of view of reducing the compliance burden on micro or small



177 enterprises, we feel there is no logic in exempting employers with less than 50 from the
178 requirement to establish internal reporting channels and procedures.

179

180 Setting a minimum standard requiring that employers with more than 50 employees
181 establish internal reporting channels and procedures was an expedient well-intentioned
182 compromise, amongst EU member states, to address the prospect of countries who
183 currently have no domestic legislation in this area, having to introduce it right down to
184 micro and small enterprises.

185

186 65% of member states currently do not have overarching legislation protecting
187 whistleblowers. Ireland, on the other hand, has operated very progressive legislation
188 granting such protection for seven years now. We are a leader in this area and the Irish
189 Protected Disclosures Act was used as an important reference point when drafting the
190 Directive.

191

192 The key consideration, leaving aside the matter of the cost of compliance (dealt with later)
193 is whether there are coherent principled reasons why employers with less than 50
194 employees should not be subjected to the same provisions as those with more than 50.
195 Are such small enterprises any less prone to wrongdoing? Is the seriousness of any
196 potential work related wrongdoing they encounter likely to be proportionate to the number
197 of employees they have? Are they less likely to penalise Disclosers? Would implementing
198 such provisions seriously impede their operations or act as a disincentive to setting up or
199 to competing with other EU countries who may not adopt such provisions?

200

201 Raise a concern's view is that the answer to all of those questions is 'no'.

202



203 In the operation of other aspects of legislation, Ireland does not operate exemption or '*lite*
204 *touch*' provisions for micro or small enterprises. They must all adhere to the same tax
205 administration provisions, health and safety provisions and environmental protection
206 provisions (to name but a few) as medium and large enterprises.

207

208 If enterprises with less than 50 employees are (as currently) subject to the provisions of
209 the Protected Disclosures Act, but simply not required to put internal reporting channels
210 or procedures in place, would the Prescribed Persons/Competent Authorities on whom
211 the responsibility for implementing and facilitating such reporting and other procedures
212 would default be equipped or resourced to deal with all such cases? Would the micro or
213 small enterprises want the reporting or other provisions vested in the Prescribed
214 Persons/Competent Authorities – would a small employer prefer that an employee
215 reported poor tax compliance by their manager to the Revenue Commissioners or to a
216 designated person within the firm?

217

218 Unlike many EU countries, the notion of disclosure of work related wrongdoing has become
219 far more socially acceptable in Ireland over recent years since enactment of the Protected
220 Disclosures Act. Our legislators should promote an environment where all enterprises,
221 small as well as big, act legally and properly. The reality is that the cost of setting up and
222 operating an employee disclosure process should be low. The Government of Ireland is
223 required under Article 20 of the Directive to provide support on the design of policies and
224 procedures and on their operation. There is nothing to prevent government bodies, trade
225 associations, voluntary bodies and others making template policies, procedures and
226 processes available at no or low cost to micro or small enterprises. Equally, a Government
227 sponsored public awareness process would educate employees of enterprises of all sizes
228 on their rights and protections. After that, the only imposition on micro or small



229 enterprises would be to examine and, if necessary, address any reasonable belief of
230 wrongdoing brought to their attention by workers. This should be part of everyday
231 business and something that would be in their interest to do.

232

233 The view of Raisea concern is that Ireland should not differential between sectors in
234 adopting the Directive. All sectors, private and public, irrespective of size, should be
235 required to operate to the same provisions.

236

237 Government should actively promote the updating of the Protected Disclosures Act as
238 something that is positive and good for business and other enterprises, micro and small
239 as well as medium and large and indeed positive for citizens as a whole.

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241 **3.4 Head 11 Ministerial Reporting Channels**

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243 Section 8 of the Principal Act permits Disclosers who are employed by a public body to
244 make disclosures to a Minister of Government on whom any function relating to that public
245 body is conferred or imposed by or under any enactment. In other words, by way of
246 example rather than a Revenue employee making a disclosure to the management of
247 Revenue, that employee can make such a disclosure directly to the Minister for Finance.

248

249 Head 11 proposes to replace Section 8 of the Principal Act and in so doing to introduce a
250 range of conditions that must be met. Head 11 provides that such disclosures shall be
251 referred to the new Protected Disclosures Office.

252

253 Raisea concern can understand that there may be an argument to be made that there are
254 administrative benefits in having a central point, a Protected Disclosures Office, to which



255 Government Departments can refer worker disclosures for evaluation and handling.
256 However, introducing new hurdles for the Discloser to meet in order to make a disclosure
257 to a Minister would seem to us to narrow the ability of Disclosers to use Section 8 and,
258 therefore, to be regressive and contrary to Article 25 of the EU Whistleblowing Directive.
259 For example, using the same example, that employee of Revenue could under the Principal
260 Act decide to make his/her disclosure to the Minister for Finance simply by having a
261 reasonable belief of wrongdoing. Head 11 now introduces three conditions, one or more
262 of which must be met as follows:

263

- 264 (i) *“the worker has previously made a disclosure of substantially the same information*
265 *in the manner specified in [section 6](#) or [section 7](#) or both but no appropriate action*
266 *was taken in response to the disclosure within the timeframes for follow-up specified*
267 *in [section 6](#) or [section 7](#)”; or*
- 268 (ii) *“the worker reasonably believes the Head of the public body concerned is personally*
269 *complicit in the relevant wrongdoing reported”; or*
- 270 (iii) *“the disclosure contains information about a relevant wrongdoing that may constitute*
271 *an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest, such as where there is an*
272 *emergency situation or a risk of irreversible damage”.*

273

274 This will significantly impact the ability of public servants to use Section 8.

275

276 4. Possible areas where the Bill might be improved.

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278 The whole thrust of the Protected Disclosures Act is to avoid and prevent workplace
279 wrongdoing and to harness the assistance of diligent and responsible employees to assist
280 with this.



281

282 The Bill imposes a requirement (i) under Head 9 for all those covered by the Act to set up
283 an internal reporting channel staffed by competent employees; (ii) under Head 10, for
284 Prescribed Persons or Competent Authorities to set up independent and autonomous
285 reporting channels staffed by dedicated competent employees and (iii) under Head 11, for
286 an extensive new infrastructure in the form of a Protected Disclosures Office (Head 16-20)
287 to be set up to centrally manage all public service disclosures. All these channels and
288 functions will be charged at various levels with managing the disclosure process, evaluating
289 the disclosures, investigating or overseeing the investigation of the disclosure where
290 necessary, providing feedback to Disclosers and referring any adverse findings against
291 wrongdoers to the appropriate person or body.

292

293 However, there is one final step in this overall process on which the General Scheme is
294 silent. All of the aforementioned process should be considered as part of a risk
295 management system. The final step in any such a system, following investigation and
296 reporting back on the specific wrongdoing disclosed, should be a mandatory requirement
297 to undertake a root cause analysis to establish the broader underlying root causes that
298 prevailed which facilitated or enabled the wrongdoing to take place and did not identify it
299 before the whistleblower came forward. It is only by completing this final step and taking
300 remedial steps to address the root causes that similar future problems can be avoided at
301 a general level, not just in the entity or public body in question, but on a broader scale.

302

303 The provisions of the Act should not alone be to encourage disclosure, so as to identify and
304 address the wrongdoing and the wrongdoer, but also to identify and address the root
305 causes that permitted the wrongdoing to occur. This will mitigate the risk of recurrence in
306 the future. There should sharing of the learning and indeed, in the case of public bodies,



307 there may be scope to incorporate provisions in this regard into the Reporting Section 22
308 as amended by Head 26. The Protected Disclosures Office could play a key role in this at
309 public service level which would be in the public interest.

310

311 5. Possible implications/consequences arising from the Bill.

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313 The creation of a Protected Disclosures Office in the Ombudsman's Office to centralise and
314 co-ordinate public service disclosures is proposed. This is not a requirement of the EU
315 Whistleblowing Directive.

316

317 The success or otherwise of this proposal will be predicated on the availability of adequate
318 levels of trained resources and an adequate budget to operate and to outsource to
319 competent independent third parties work that cannot be undertaken internally.

320

321 Likewise, by reason of the Directive, the Act will impose significant additional
322 responsibilities on '*prescribed persons*' to establish independent autonomous channels for
323 receiving and handling protected disclosures. Again, the success or otherwise of this
324 requirement will be predicated on the availability of adequate levels of trained resources
325 and an adequate budget to operate and to outsource to competent independent third
326 parties work that cannot be undertaken internally.

327

328 6. Other comments on the Bill

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330 Subject to the aforementioned, it is the view of Raiseaconcern that the General Scheme of
331 the Bill is well considered and in addition to transposing the EU Whistleblowing Directive
332 takes the opportunity to introduce an appropriate level of additional provisions.