asked the Minister for Industry and Commerce whether his Department has information in regard to any project for the establishment of the manufacture of waxed papers in the Saorstát; and, if so, if he will state in what district the factory will be situated and when it will be likely to commence operations.

Preliminary proposals have been received by my Department in the matter of a project for the manufacture of waxed papers. Final details have, however, not yet been submitted by the promoters, and, in the circumstances, I am not in a position to say in what district the factory, if established, is likely to be situated, or when it will commence operations.

asked the Minister for Industry and Commerce if he will state whether he intends to maintain the aerodrome at Rhynana, County Clare, or to lease the aerodrome to Aer Rianta Teoranta, and in either case if he will state who is to be responsible for payment of the rates on the lands and buildings of the aerodrome.

No decision has yet been taken as to the arrangements to be made for the operation of the Shannon airport. In these circumstances I am not in a position to give the Deputy any information as to the liability for rates.

asked the Minister for Industry and Commerce if he will state when payment will be made for the lands acquired for the purposes of an air port at Rhynana, County Clare.

Payment has already been made to a number of the owners concerned. In the other cases investigation of title is proceeding. There will be no avoidable delay in completing all the legal formalities so that payment may be made in every case as soon as possible.

asked the Minister for Finance whether his attention has been called to the statement made recently that the Banking Commission has completed its report, and whether the statement is correct.

My attention has been drawn to the statement referred to, and I have made inquiries from the Chairman of the Banking Commission on the matter. As a result of these inquiries I am satisfied that there is no truth whatever in the statement.

asked the Minister for Finance if he will state whether, and if so, when it is proposed to make regulations under Section 21 of the Superannuation Act, 1936, in respect of the pensionable service of inspectors in the Department of Education.

Regulations have been made under Section 21 of the Superannuation Act, 1936, providing for the reckoning, under certain conditions, of former service as national teacher rendered by inspectors and organisers of the Department of Education, for the purposes of pension under the Superannuation Acts. The question of framing regulations under the section to provide for cases where teaching service was rendered in a capacity other than national teacher is at present being examined.

asked the Minister for Finance if persons arriving at Dublin from England have had Coronation souvenirs appropriated by the customs officials, and if be will make inquiries as to what allowance is made to passengers to bring back small souvenirs of trifling value.

I am not aware of any seizures at Dublin by customs officials of goods coming within the description "Coronation souvenirs." If the Deputy has any definite information regarding any particular case and will supply me with details I will have full investigation made.

Coronation souvenirs might or might not be liable to duty, and if they are liable, or if the importer is in any doubt as to whether they are liable to duty or to restriction on importation, the souvenirs should be declared and produced to the customs officers by passengers on arrival.

As regards the second part of the question, while, strictly speaking, duty is exigible in respect of all dutiable goods imported, where the amount of duty involved is trifling payment may be waived provided the goods are declared and produced to the officers.

asked the Minister for Education if he is aware that the arrangements for transport of children to city schools from the new Crumlin township is so inadequate that (1) buses are overcrowded; (2) there is danger of serious accidents to children; (3) that numbers of children have been ordered by teachers not to come to school; and, if so, will he arrange for an immediate resumption of building of school accommodation in the locality, or in the alternative have a sufficient transport service supplied.

I am not aware that the transport service from the new Crumlin township is so inadequate that the buses are over-crowded. As the numbers of children eligible for conveyance increase additional buses and trams are made available.

Every precaution is taken to ensure that the risk of accident to the children is reduced to a minimum. Though the scheme has been in operation since the middle of February there has been no accident to any child so far as I am aware. I believe the measures which are being taken to ensure their continued safety to be satisfactory in the present circumstances.

No instruction has been issued by my Department which would prevent eligible children from being conveyed to school.

With regard to the last portion of the question, I can assure the Deputy that no effort is being spared by my Department, by the Commissioners of Public Works, and by the architects and builders to have the new schools in Crumlin ready for occupation at the earliest possible date.

asked the Minister for Lands if he will state what steps have been taken by the Land Commission to take over the Rice estate, Derrylusking, Fethard, County Tipperary; if he is aware that two years ago these lands were offered by the owner, and also that a petition was signed by the uneconomic holders and landless men of the district calling for the division of this estate, and if he will state when these lands will be acquired for division.

The lands in question appear to comprise the holding of Richard Joseph Rice, deceased, in Derryluskan, on the estate of Mary Hume Gore, County Tipperary, Record No. S.11243. The late Mr. Rice offered a portion of these lands containing, approximately, 100 acres, to the Land Commission in November, 1934, in order to help him to clear his arrears of annuity. The lands have been inspected and the question of resuming portion is under consideration at the moment. A petition has been received from uneconomic holders and landless men in the district requesting the division of the lands.

asked the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs if the further consideration which is being given to the question of the erection of a short wave broadcasting station in the Saorstát has yet concluded; and, if so, what decision has been reached in the matter; and, if not, when he hopes to announce a decision.

The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. I hope, however, to be able to announce a decision in the near future.

Could the Minister give any definite time, in view of the near approach of the election?

We are having it considered.

If the House is agreeable, since this is a non-controversial Bill, perhaps we could take the Second Reading to-morrow during some break in the business.

Is this the Bill to provide for the difficulties in connection with Morgan Place?

Yes. The Bill will be circulated immediately.

Second Stage to be taken Wednesday, 26th May.

Perhaps, Sir, I might be permitted to say a few words on a question of procedure. It seemed to me that the best course to pursue in connection with this matter would be to get the intentions of the House by discussion of the English text in Committee, and that then, when that is done, when it comes to the Report Stage, we could, if necessary, recommit the measure for the purpose of a close examination of the two texts, both Irish and English. The intention, however, is to ask the Dáil to pass the Irish text as the authoritative text. I think that, if that procedure could be agreed upon, it would probably lead to the most convenient way of working.

Will the President say what will be the machinery for examining the two texts on the Report Stage? Will the Irish text be examined first, or will the English text be examined first, and what exactly will be the machinery for examination?

I think I have already said that the intention was to get here, in the best form we could, in English, the intentions of the Dáil, and that then, on the Report Stage, the Irish text will be examined. There will be people on both sides of the House who will be able to compare the two texts and who will be able to examine the texts so as to see whether the Irish text produces faithfully the intentions of the Dáil as expressed in the English text. I think that that is the best way to do it. I suppose we could get a more expert body than the members of the House itself to certify that, in so far as the language was concerned, the two texts did mean the same thing. However, I do not favour that procedure myself.

I am afraid I do not yet understand what the President means. I understand that we are talking about the Report Stage, and that, on Report, we would have to examine both texts to see if they were satisfactory.

On recommittal into Committee Stage on the Report Stage?

Yes. We take the Report Stage after the Committee Stage, and the procedure will be that each section will have to be examined in English and Irish.

Yes. We take each section, and, when a particular section has been agreed upon, we then discuss the Irish version in order to see if it does faithfully carry out the intention of the Dáil as indicated by the English text. That is, there will be a criticism of the Irish text on the basis that the intention of the Legislature, as agreed upon in the English text, was not being carried into effect.

I am still not quite clear. First, when we reach the Report Stage, there will be a recommittal, and each clause will have to come before the House separately Do I understand that the question in Committee on Report will be that the Dáil agrees that the Irish version here is a true version of the English version?

No. I do not think that would be quite the question. I should say that the question would be that the Dáil would be asked to take each one of these sections and pass it.

In both languages?

No — passing the Irish text. The English text, presumably, will have been agreed upon in Committee as indicating the intentions of the Legislature. Then, when we come to the recommittal on the Report Stage, the question will be, on each section, that this section is passed, and it will be a passing of the Irish sections.

It may be desirable, after this Constitution comes from the Committee, to introduce further amendments, for the Report Stage, in the light of discussions that will take place on the Committee Stage. Will the recommittal have effect with regard to these further amendments, if there are any?

Yes. If it should prove that there will be further amendments, then we would start the recommittal of the Report Stage by first discussing any English sections there until we had the intentions of the Legislature on the whole of the Report Stage. Then, after finishing the English text, we would say: "We are going to take it now and see if the Irish text, which we are going to pass Article by Article, is definitely carrying out, in the Irish language, the intentions of the Dáil as made clear in the English version." In other words, we take the Irish text of each of the sections with a view to seeing whether, for instance, somebody has any objection on the ground of the Irish text not carrying out faithfully the intentions of the Dáil as revealed in the English text. I think that that is the best way.

There are a few things we should like to be clear about. First, we are going to discuss it in English now?

Yes.

Then, the first Report Stage will be dealt with in Committee. It is quite clear, however, that there may be a number of further amendments in English. Do I understand that they will be dealt with as amendments first?

Yes.

Before proceeding to consider the Irish text?

Yes.

Well, let us say that the English text will be taken on date "A," and the Irish text on date "B." Will there be an interval of time between date "A," when we are discussing the English version, and date "B," when the Irish version will be gone through clause by clause?

That will depend exactly on what amendments we have. It is quite clear that if the Dáil were to accept a large sheaf of amendments without getting the Irish text to correspond with them, it might lead to difficulties. If we should be able to get through and find on the Committee Stage that there is not a sheaf of amendments, or that an amendment passed affected, say, Article 40, 41 or 42, then we could go ahead until we came to the particular Article. In other words, we hope to conclude the consideration of the English text and to be sure that all the amendments are incorporated before we start on the Irish text. It might be necessary to have a short interval.

Are we to understand that amendments to the Irish text are not to be of a material nature, in other words, that they are to be of a literal or grammatical nature only?

Yes.

May they be discussed in English?

Perhaps we may have to talk in English and Irish. If we are comparing the two texts it may be necessary to talk perhaps in English to explain a nicety of definition between the amendment of the Irish text and the amendment of the English text. I do not think we need bind ourselves to that, but the intention would be when we come to discuss the Irish text, to discuss and pass it in Irish, and those who do not understand the Irish language——

Will not vote.

I take it that if there is agreement as to the text, there will be no difficulty. If we have not agreement some experts may have to be brought in.

Suppose on the second Report Stage, which is to be arranged for the purpose of testing the accuracy of the translation, that the President says he has been assured by certain authorities whom he has consulted that this translation is an absolutely faithful representation of the intentions of the Legislature, and that somebody, taking a different point of view, says that he also has consulted authorities who have definitely assured him that it is no such thing, what is to be the position of those members of the House, even members of the President's own Party, who are not in a position to pass judgment on a terminological matter of that kind?

It will be quite obvious, I think, that it is not the Irish text, absolutely in Irish, which will have been passed, but the Irish text after the intentions of the House are made clear in the English text. If a court were asked to place an interpretation upon an Article which was consistent with the English text and which was not consistent with the Irish text, it is quite obvious that the interpretation consistent with the English text as given would be accepted. The only alternative, as I say, would be to pass it in Irish and English. That even could not get rid of the difficulty, because some Deputies may not understand the Irish language sufficiently to be able definitely to say: "I am quite satisfied that that expresses our intentions." There is a difficulty there, but I think it is a difficulty which, with reasonable goodwill on the part of Deputies, can be remedied and got over.

In order that we may be clear on the matter I should like to ask that a memorandum should be circulated from you, Sir, indicating what the procedure is going to be, or, alternatively, that a resolution would be put before the House on which the House could say: "This will be the procedure in connection with the Report Stage."

The Chair will bear that in mind.

In that case we should proceed to discuss it on the basis of the English text so as to get the intentions of the House. I formally move Article 1.

ARTICLE 1.

I presume that the Preamble is, by order of procedure, only to be taken after the Article?

Yes.

You will remember that on Second Reading in regard to Article 1, I asked for a statement as to what was Eire and the President said: "The State is defined in the first part." Under the heading of "The State" here I find: "The name of the State is Eire; Eire is a sovereign, independent democratic State," and various other things. I should like the President to tell me what he had in mind when he said that the State was defined in the first part. If he says that it is defined as a sovereign, independent democratic State, if that is the definition, England is Eire and so is France and every other country. It seems to me that if one actually had a definition of a State one would know what Eire is. In this Article we are told that "the Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible and sovereign right to determine," etc. Personally, I do not know whether that entity, which here, in Article 1, making an affirmation is the Eire referred to in Article 4. If the President was right when he informed me on Second Reading that, "The State is defined in the first part," would he kindly indicate where is the definition to which he refers?

I do not know how the words "the first part" got in. It may have been due to some verbal mistake. What I meant is that there is at present here a certain State. That State comprises a certain community. I have separated quite clearly, in the two parts, the nation from the State, because at the present moment, as I indicated elsewhere, the State is not co-terminous with the whole of the nation. The first part here refers to the nation, and the nation and the State are not the same thing. If they were, there would be no question of having this part about the nation and the part about the State because we would have then a national State. With regard to Eire, Eire is the name of the State which is being set up by this Constitution or for which this is the Constitution, if you object to the words "being set up." Eire is the name of the State of which this will be the Constitution.

The President agrees that his statement that the State was defined in the first part——

The words "first part" may have been a verbal error. What I have in mind was in the earlier part of this Draft.

Where is what he considers the definition?

Article 4. It is purely a nominal matter. This question of name is purely a nominal definition. We have a Draft Constitution for a certain State. That State is being named, and the name of the State is to be Eire. That is what Eire is. It is a purely nominal definition, the name of the State for which this is to be the Constitution.

The President will agree that to say that the name of the State is Eire does not give a definition of the State. In Article 1 it is laid down "the Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible and sovereign right," etc. I do not know whether we are to go into the Irish text now, but the Irish text of that Article says: "Deimhnigheann náisiún na hÉireann leis seo," etc.

I asked that by this procedure we should take the English text and get on with the English text. If we are certain, as far as the English text is concerned, we can deal with the Irish text. I would suggest to Deputies that we should confine ourselves at this stage to the English text. Then if we find afterwards that the Irish text does not correspond with the English text, we can examine that in detail.

The President will agree then that the Irish nation referred to in Article 1 is a different entity from what it is in other clauses of this Constitution referred to as Eire? I think it is very important that we should get this perfectly clear in the beginning. Here is a reference to the Irish nation. That is one entity. Later on there are references to Eire, which entity is not identical with the entity referred to in Article 1.

That can be made clear when we come to the Irish text.

We can discuss it on the assumption that they are different entities?

There is, for instance, the territorial area which is called Eire in Irish, and there is the State. It is easy to distinguish between the two territories if you say Stát na hEireann or Oileán na hEireann.

I think that is going to be pretty difficult. We are told that the national area is Eire, and that the State is Eire.

That is purely an Irish question.

I would agree it is purely an Irish question, except that in English this Irish word — which does not exist in the English language — is incorporated. In dealing with the English text, we speak of the Irish nation, we speak of Eire and we speak of the national territory.

Wherever it occurs in the English text Eire is referring to the State.

All I ask is that we will recognise, in this discussion on the English text, that the Irish nation referred to in Article 1 and the national territory referred to in Article 2 is a different entity from that which is referred to as Eire in other Articles of the Constitution. If that is accepted, I should just like to say this. Article 1 says: "The Irish nation hereby affirms...." In relation to other Articles we know that a certain procedure is going to be taken with regard to the Bill which is before us, but we state here: "The Irish nation hereby affirms." Now, this is legislation that we are indulging in here in the exercise of our authority, which is confined for the present to that area known as Eire. Here we affirm surely in the beginning that we are legislating for a different entity from the State of which we are the Government? I believe also that, in the implementation of this Bill which is before us, it is proposed to submit it to a plebiscite. Here we are purporting, in fact, we are saying, that not only are we doing something for the Irish nation, but that this entity, the Irish nation, for which we do not even claim jurisdiction at the moment, in the person of ourselves here performing a certain act, is itself doing a certain thing, or, if you like, when this matter is referred to a prebiscite or referendum, that the Irish nation is itself performing a certain act, although that referendum will be participated in only by a section of the community. I am just raising those points because I want the position to be quite clear in my own mind. Would the President say if I am right?

This debate would be interminable if I replied to every point raised immediately it is raised. It would be better to take a number of points together. It is true that this plebiscite will not extend to the whole of the Irish nation, and that, therefore, every person who has the right to regard himself as belonging to the Irish nation will not have an opportunity of expressing his will on this. That is true; there is no suggestion to the contrary. Apparently the point which Deputy Fitzgerald raises is that we, although we are the greater part of the Irish nation, have not the right to affirm on behalf of the nation as a whole. My opinion is that we have — that we, as constituting the greater part of the Irish nation, have, in the peculiar circumstances in which we are placed, the right of making this affirmation on behalf of the nation as a whole. That is the intention.

That would be all right if this Article read: "We, Dáil Eireann," or whatever we may call ourselves, "hereby affirm that the Irish nation...." But we are stating that the Irish nation is performing a certain act. Personally I do not think any such thing is happening.

If the Deputy had wanted to do so, he could have indicated his views by an amendment.

There were certain amendments which I wanted to put in, but first I had to know what was the meaning of the Bill.

I think the meaning is quite clear there.

While we are deciding the question of our right to speak for the Irish nation, I want to say a word in regard to the affirmation which we are making. That affirmation is apparently regarded by the Minister for Defence, and some others of the supporters of the Fianna Fáil Party, as strikingly novel. I just want to make the point that there is absolutely no justification for regarding it as novel — that this right of sovereignty, this right to choose our own form of government, to determine our relations with other nations, and to develop our life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with our own genius and traditions, is a right that has been claimed and exercised by the Irish Free State since its foundation, and it is also a right which is claimed and exercised by every one of the self-governing nations which compose the British Commonwealth.

Articles 1 and 2 agreed to.

ARTICLE 3.

On Article 3, I do not think this Article at all carries out what the President has just given as his explanation of the difference between the nation and the State. I certainly think it should be amended. On his explanation — of course his explanation will have no validity as far as interpretation goes — any person would take it that Eire, the State, and the national territory were co-terminous, but that the laws extended only as far as the area now comprised in the Irish Free State. It seems to me that that lands him in great difficulty when he is stating that the State comprises Ireland, is Ireland, and at the same time its laws extend only over a portion of Ireland. I think, if he wanted to make it clear, he should in Article 3 have put in something to the effect that the area comprised in the Free State is merely the Twenty-Six Counties.

I do not agree that that is correct. I think there is no doubt about it that the vast majority of the people in this island would claim that the nation and the State ought to be co-terminous. There is not the slightest doubt, in my opinion, that if there was a plebiscite taken to-morrow an overwhelming majority would take that view. We cannot prove that because we cannot take a vote, but I believe it is true. We have the moral right, under those conditions, to claim authority over the whole State. In only portion of it at the moment can we have effective jurisdiction, but we have the moral right to claim authority over the lot. The first portion of this is intended to assert that moral claim and that moral right, and I think that we have a duty to assert it on behalf of the nation. Article 3, which we are dealing with, acknowledges that although that moral right exists, and although the Parliament being set up in this would have a moral claim to exercise jurisdiction, yet, in the circumstances we have, we are not able to have effective jurisdiction over a certain portion of that area, and consequently to meet that practical difficulty of the existing situation, Article 3 says:

Pending the reintegration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government——

the moral right of the Parliament

——established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Eireann....

I am afraid the President has missed the point absolutely. My point is that if the State is Eire at the present moment, Eire will consist de facto of the State of Twenty-Six Counties.

De facto.

But when you come to speak of the people of Ireland, as you do in the Preamble, it will mean the people of the 32 Counties. I am on a drafting point purely, but it certainly appears to me that nobody could possibly cut down the people of Ireland, those mentioned in the Preamble, to the people of the State.

The Deputy will notice that in the Preamble we speak not of the people of Ireland but the people of Eire.

That will not be governed by your definition of the State.

I think everyone will have to take it as a whole. The difficulty between moral right and moral claim is the de jure position and the de facto position from the mere point of view of effective government. These two things have to be distinguished, and I think they will be distinguished here.

They are not clear.

I can only say that the Deputy had an opportunity of putting in amendments.

I did not understand the matter until I heard the President's explanation.

The Deputy can clearly take Eire as meaning the people of Ireland.

Amendment No. 1 is the first of a series of amendments which raise the issue of membership of the British Commonwealth and recognition of the King. The decision on amendment No. 1 should rule amendments Nos. 11, 57 and 102, of which the subject matter is included in the first amendment.

I would prefer to let the others stand on their own legs, and to let this amendment of mine stand by itself. It does not seem to me to be impossible to separate them. I do not propose to embark on a long discussion, but I think it would be open to the Dáil to reject the first amendment and to accept some of the others.

Is it accept amendment No. 5?

Amendment No. 11, for instance?

I do not press the point.

It seems to me the others will fall, but I shall give the matter further consideration in the meantime.

I propose amendment No. 1:—

Before Article 4, to insert a new Article as follows:—

"The Irish nation hereby declares its free and equal membership as a sovereign State of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and so long as such membership continues recognises King George VI and each of his successors at law as King of Ireland."

I have used the words the "Irish Nation" but I am not really interested in metaphysical subtleties as to whether it should be "the Irish Nation,""Eire" or "the Irish State." It is the thing which we are declaring I am interested in, rather than the particular capacity in which we declare it. In his old age Lord Carson confessed to a well-known London police magistrate, Sir Charles Biron, that he thought a mistake was made by the Unionists in not accepting Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill. I have the feeling that when we are introducing a new Constitution, which it is going to be pretty difficult to alter, and which will require elaborate machinery to alter, when we are going to have a plebiscite and a general election, and when a Fianna Fáil Government is still in power, I have, I say, the feeling that a similar opportunity to that of 1886 will be missed if we do not accept-an amendment such as this, and take our full place in the British Commonwealth on a level with other members of it.

I do not want to go over in detail the arguments in favour of membership of the Commonwealth, which I and others have frequently put before this House in the course of the last five years, but I propose to sum them up very shortly. Full membership of the Commonwealth has certain definite advantages. First of all, there is security. We are a very small and a relatively poor nation beside a very rich and powerful one, and we have an opportunity of having our liberty to manage our own affairs underwritten by each and every one of the nations that compose the British Commonwealth. It seems to me that if, starting outside the British Commonwealth, we found ourselves in the geographical and economic position that we are, we would have jumped at the opportunity of getting our liberty to manage our own affairs secured against encroachment from any quarter, either from foreign countries other than Great Britain, or from Great Britain herself, by this assemblage of nations.

Next to security, there is the question of our commerce. The British market is of such enormous and obvious importance to us that I need not labour that particular question. Any illusions that the old Sinn Féin movement had on the subject, any illusions that the Fianna Fáil Party a few years ago may have had on the subject, have disappeared. The Government realises now as clearly as everybody else the huge and permanent importance of the British market to this country. Our position in that market is only fully secure if we are full members of the British Commonwealth.

Thirdly, there is the problem of unemployment. Apart from the effect on our trade, membership of the Commonwealth, British citizenship; in addition to our own Irish citizenship, enables large numbers of labourers, harvesters, domestic servants, nurses, doctors, civil servants, administrators, lawyers——

And the Army and Navy.

Recruits to the Army and Navy if you like — to say nothing of priests and nuns — enables them to go out from this country and carry on valuable work all through the British Commonwealth, and, at the same time, relieves our problem of unemployed here at home. It is a mystery what we should do with our university graduates, especially those from the medical schools, if the opportunities open to them in the British Commonwealth were closed.

Next there is the question of our prestige and influence throughout the world. Our opportunities for spreading our ideas, for exerting a good influence in the affairs of the world, are greatly increased by membership of that Commonwealth. When one's mind goes back to the centuries of humiliation and oppression that this country suffered, one feels that really the best revenge for all that, the most Christian revenge for all that, is the joy that we can take in now exerting a good influence worthy of our past, worthy of our national genius, throughout the British Commonwealth and throughout the world. Every time that I read of the success of an Irishman abroad, of an Irishman becoming, shall we say, a judge in Canada or Australia, or becoming a president of a railway or a great business concern, or a prime minister or minister in some government within the Commonwealth, I confess that I glory in the fact that we are bringing shame on those who have calumniated us in past times. Thereby, without injuring anyone, we prove ourselves the equals, if not the betters, of our critics.

There was a time when the British connection meant nothing but injury to us. There was a time when it meant that the British ran Ireland, and ran it exclusively in their own interests. To-day the British connection, such as it is, means nothing of the kind. It comes much more near to meaning that Ireland runs the British Commonwealth. To a very considerable extent Ireland does that, and it could do it even to a greater extent. Any valuable culture or spiritual life has a missionary side. It is not purely for home consumption, it is capable of being exported. If we have anything to give the world, as I believe we have and shall increasingly have — anything wherewith to raise ourselves in the esteem of the world, our position in the Commonwealth makes it easier for us to do so.

Lastly, there is the most important consideration of all, and that is the consideration of Partition. I most firmly believe that the road, and the only road, to the reintegration of our national territory is by acceptance of the principle of this amendment. The Crown is the lynch-pin of the entire Empire, and the citizenship of that Empire depends, in the opinion of every part of it, upon allegiance to the Crown. That is why the notion of a sort of external association never had any attraction for me; because, while it might solve our relations with England, if we leave the North out of account, it cannot solve the question of the North. It is only by making the Crown an integral part of our Constitution that we can get started on the reconciliation of the North.

All these arguments have been set forth in this House many times, and I am not pretending to say anything unfamiliar to Deputies. But the curious thing is that since I have been a member of the House I have not heard one reasoned argument put forward against membership of the Commonwealth — not one — by Deputies on the opposite benches. If there is a case, it has not been put — at least within my recollection.

There are two quite different philosophies with regard to the British Commonwealth — two philosophies that cannot be reconciled. But what are they? One is a friendly, the other is an unfriendly philosophy, if philosophy is the proper word — point of view is perhaps better. I can understand, much though I disagree with it, the point of view of extreme separatists, people like that very honest and able lady, Miss Helena Molony, so closely associated with the Labour movement in this country, who says that to trade with England at all, send goods to England at all, is to sacrifice one's birthright for a mess of pottage, to lower oneself by making a few greasy pennies. There is the point of view expressed in an article in the Irish World, which I see quoted to-day in the Irish Press, which, apropos of this Constitution — it is curious that it should be apropos of this Constitution, because it is not what the Constitution does — says it is time that the citizens of Ireland should abolish every tie and association with Great Britain and her Godless régime.

That is the stuff Fianna Fáil would be talking about a year ago.

I can understand that point of view. I can understand people saying that they want to see the British Empire destroyed; that they hate it so much that that is the main consideration with them — to see the downfall of Great Britain, irrespective of any unpleasant consequences of a material character in our regard. That is not the point of the view of the Government. The Government realises now that the destruction of Great Britain would be an appalling catastrophe to us; that if Great Britain sank beneath the sea to-morrow, it would be an appalling disaster to us. I sometimes wonder if the Government received an offer to-morrow morning from the British Government of a 32 County republic, what they would reply. If Mr. Malcolm MacDonald wrote to the President of the Executive Council and stated: "We have decided to compel the Six Counties to go with you whether they like it or not and to turn you all out of the Commonwealth and treat you all as foreigners," what would be the state of the President's mind on receiving that communication? Would he beam with joy or faint from shock?

You would have a special meeting of the Dáil next day.

My opinion is that it would give him a terrible shock and he would find himself in the position of having to refuse that generous offer.

Let them try it.

The truth of the matter is that we cannot face the prospect of ruining the industries of the country not only agriculture, North and South, but the shipbuilding industry and the linen industry, nor can we face the appalling addition to our unemployment problem that would be created by shutting out our citizens from the Commonwealth of Nations as a result of being treated as aliens. As I say, I can understand the "damn the consequences" point of view. I certainly cannot admire it, but it is intelligible that people should have such a violent hatred of Great Britain that they are out for its destruction in defiance of every consideration. But if you once recognise that our prosperity and our welfare are bound up with the British Commonwealth of Nations, then where is the sense of halting short of the point where you get the full advantages of membership, always provided that there is no question of any interference with our own sovereignty, our own dignity, or our freedom from outside encroachment?

I have never heard, as I say, a reasoned argument put up by any member of the Fianna Fáil Party against the value of equal membership as a sovereign State of the British Commonwealth. The only sort of excuse I have heard has been a reference to tradition, a suggestion that we should be betraying our forefathers if we agreed to a cordial and full acceptance of the Commonwealth of Nations. Now that excuse will not stand examination. The larger part of Irish national tradition does not support any contention of that kind. As that is the only defence that has been made, I am compelled to trouble the House with quotations, some of which I have given the House on former occasions. Let us start with Sarsfield. Can it be denied that Sarsfield was a royalist? Let us turn to the Gaelic poets of the 17th and early 18th century. Examine the Gaelic poets and you will find that they were royalists. Come to the era of Grattan. No one will deny that Grattan was a patriot and that Grattan was a royalist. What about Wolfe Tone? Well, the brief quotations that I have read to the House already from Wolfe Tone will bear repetition. He said:—

"When I talk of English influence being predominant in this country, I do not mean to derogate from the due exertion of His Majesty's prerogative; I owe him allegiance, and if occasion should require it, I would be ready, cheerfully, to spill my blood in his service."

And again he says:

"It is, therefore, extremely possible for the most truly loyal subject in this kingdom, deeply to regret, and conscientiously to oppose the domineering of English influences, without trenching, in the smallest degree, on the rational loyalty, so long and so justly the boast of Ireland. His loyalty is to the King of Ireland.... His first duty is to his country, his second to his King, and both are now, and by God's blessing will, I hope, remain united and inseparable."

Tone was driven from that position by the French Revolution, by the panic of the British Government in England and the panic of the British ascendency in this country, in consequence of the war with France. With the consequent disappearance of liberalism, men were forced to align themselves as complete reactionaries or complete revolutionaries. Until the visit of Jackson to this country in 1794, Wolfe Tone was, quite definitely, not a complete separatist or republican. Similarly, in 1798, the House may remember that a large number of the leaders of the United Irishmen were seized by the Government before the rebellion broke out, a measure which broke the back of the rising before it took place. While they were in prison and awaiting trial, they produced a document that used to be very familiar to historians but which now has become rather forgotten. It was called the Prisoners' Memorial. In the course of that memorial, which, by the way, was so disagreeable to the Government that they suppressed it, the prisoners stated that the United Ireland Movement set out to reform Parliament and to abolish a corrupt ascendency, and that it was only when that corrupt ascendency had succeeded in forcing the British Government to deny justice that the United Irishmen had been driven into the path of separation.

Then we come to O'Connell. We all know what stress O'Connell laid on the golden link of the Crown, and how little he was of a revolutionary or separatist. What about Thomas Davis? He says:

"On an equality with England, and out of reach of her rapacity, there is nothing in the privilege of the monarch to which Ireland could be averse. The respective advantages of each country would compel from them mutual respect, and the throne would ever be the honourable medium of adjusting international differences."

Let us turn to Parnell. The year before the first Gladstone Home Rule Bill was introduced, Parnell was interviewed by a reporter of the New York Herald and asked what guarantees had he to give against separation if Home Rule were granted. Parnell answered with characteristic directness, honesty and courage, vide Mr. Barry O'Brien's Life:

"I refuse to give guarantees because I have none of any value to give. If I were to offer guarantees I should at once be told that they are worthless. I can reason only by analogy, and point to what has happened in our own time in relation of other States placed in similar circumstances to England and Ireland, but cannot guarantee absolutely what will happen if our claims are conceded. I have no mandate from the Irish people to dictate a course of action to those who may succeed us. When the Irish Parliament has been conceded, England will have a guarantee against separation in the presence of her army, navy and militia, and in her occupation of fortresses and other strong places in this country; but she will have far better guarantees, in my opinion, in the knowledge of the Irish people that it is in their power by constitutional means to make the laws, which they are called upon to obey, just and equitable."

Is there any doubt that we have that power to-day? When the 1886 Home Rule Bill was introduced Parnell spoke of it——

We had no Partition then.

I am not advocating Partition, and there never would have been Partition if this matter had been handled as it should have been handled, Parnell described it as a Bill that would "close the strife of centuries." Perhaps more impressive even than things said are things written. Written things are composed with more care. In a letter written by Parnell in 1888 to Cecil Rhodes he refers to the question of the exclusion of the Irish Members from Westminster in the 1886 Bill and to the question whether they should be so excluded in the next Bill, and he rather surprisingly expressed the opinion that their exclusion was a mistake. He says that.

"this proposed exclusion may have given some colour to the accusation so freely made against the Bill that it had a separatist tendency. I say this while strongly asserting and believing that the measure itself was accepted by the Irish people without any afterthought of the kind, and with an earnest desire to work it out with the same spirit with which it was offered — a spirit of cordial goodwill and trust, a desire to let bygones be bygones, and a determination to accept it as a final and satisfactory settlement of the long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Ireland."

A little further, down he says in the same letter that if Irish membership at Westminster is included in the next Home Rule Bill by Mr. Gladstone

"we should cheerfully concur with him, and accept them with goodwill and good faith, with the intention of taking our share in the Imperial partnership. I believe also that in the event I state this will be the case, and that the Irish people will cheerfully accept the duties and responsibilities assigned to them, and will justly value the position given to them in the Imperial system."

That was in 1888.

Was that the letter that brought the £10,000 cheque?

Is the Deputy suggesting that it was a lie? If that stood by itself, it would be possible to hold that Parnell had been guilty of a deliberate lie; but it does not stand by itself, for other quotations support it.

I do not suggest that it was.

Finally, after the Parnell split, after Parnell became thoroughly embittered against Mr. Gladstone by what had occurred, and against Great Britain, Mr. Barry O'Brien reports a conversation that he had with Parnell. Barry O'Brien was, of course, a Parnellite and he also felt bitterly, and he said to Parnell:—

"Every Irish Nationalist would go for separation if he thought he could get it."

There was a pause before Parnell spoke, and then he said:—

"I have never gone for separation; I never said I would. The physical force men understand my position very well. I made it clear to them that I would be satisfied with a parliament and that I believed in our constitutional movement; but I also said that if our constitutional movement failed I could not then stand in the way of any man who wished to go further and to try other means."

All that is as clear as can be desired, but I am not saying that the views of past leaders of the Irish race, however illustrious, are necessarily binding on us here to-day, not for one moment. On the contrary, I have always contended against that view. Each generation has its own responsibilities. It must look at things as they are. It must use its own reason and not submit blindly to prejudices, however distinguished their ancestry. It must use its own reason and make up its own mind as to what is for the interest and the honour of the country, and no depending on the utterances of past leaders can absolve it from that duty. I am giving the House all these quotations, because it is the habit of those who resist the logic of facts, of those who seek to prevent us from doing the thing that the honour and the interests of the country require, to defend their point of view simply and solely by allusion to the past and by suggesting that we should be untrue to those who had gone before us if we took the line that some of us — all of us, if we allow our reason to guide us — see to be the line most beneficial to the country.

The President once said that there is such a thing as a subject having been considered fully, fairly and calmly, and decided once and for all, and the suggestion was that that decision once and for all had taken place at the time of the 1918 Election. I asked the question then, as I ask it now, why that particular moment in the whole of Irish history should be singled out as the one that is binding upon us? I would supplement that question by another, and that is, do the Government really deceive themselves into thinking that the views that they now hold are identical with the views they held in 1918? Do they think that the policy they are now pursuing is identical with the policy decided upon by the General Election of 1918. The policy of 1918 was the policy of Miss Helena Molony, the policy of the extract that I read from the Irish World. It was the policy to destroy the British Empire if possible, and damn the consequences. There was no suggestion at that time that there were no alternative markets, that this country could not prosper without the British market. There was no suggestion at that time that we valued the privileges and opportunities conferred upon this country by membership of the Commonwealth, by the ability of our citizens to go freely, as British citizens too, into any part of the Commonwealth that they desire.

The truth of the matter is that the actual philosophy of 1918 does not correspond with facts, but, while the philosophy has been given up, the empty husk remains. The Fianna Fáil Party do not see that what remains is utterly worthless, and ought to be thrown away. The differences down here about the things that really matter seem to me to be minute. We are all intensely desirous to see Partition brought to an end. We are all agreed, apparently, that we should remain part of the British Commonwealth in one form or another. The trouble is that the form that the Government are wedded to under this Constitution is a form that blocks the way to the reintegration of the national territory. It is a form that is displeasing to all the other partners in the Commonwealth. Our stock has gone down heavily, even during the last few months. Our popularity throughout the Commonwealth has greatly decreased, even during the last few months. This coronation year — I am not one of those people who get wildly excited about such occasions — was a real opportunity; this Imperial Conference was a real opportunity; this year when we are introducing a new Constitution was a real opportunity; this last year of the Fianna Fáil term of office, before they again commit their fortunes to the uncertain verdict of the country, was a real opportunity. I am full of depression at the sight of that opportunity being let slip. Even at this eleventh hour, I appeal to the Government and their supporters to consider the acceptance of my amendment.

There is no need for me to follow the Deputy through all the arguments that he has just now adduced, because to my mind they are not in question here at all. I think the Deputy will admit that if he holds these views strongly there are sections of our people who hold the opposite point of view.

What is the opposite point of view?

The point of view such as the Deputy has expressed himself — the point of view, for instance, that he said was held by Miss Molony. There are in between various shades of opinion and why should we, in a Constitution which is to be the Constitution under which we are going to work, let us hope, establish in a fixed position the very thing which is the subject of so much controversy? Ought it not to be our business to put it in such a way as to allow it to be discussed and decided independently of this Constitution? Is it not more desirable to leave it so that we can discuss that question at any time apart from this Constitution? The position is that the connection is maintained by an Act of Parliament which can, if the people want to elect a Government to do it, be set aside and then one point of view can be established. On the other hand, if the people do not want that and if they want to continue the connection, they can do so, but neither position invalidates this Constitution nor should it prevent anybody from loyally accepting the Constitution as it is.

The main aim of this Constitution has been to try to put aside questions in which there is such a difference of opinion, to enable us to have a Constitution which can be loyally accepted by those who hold very different views. I think that is wisdom, and, just as later there is a solution being put forward from the other point of view — the Deputy wants to have it one way or the other — I say let him have this opinion, and if he wants to argue on either of these afterwards he can do so. There is nothing in this to prevent him. The whole point is to see that there is no barrier put forward to either point of view in this Constitution. I hold that that is what is done and done effectively. It is done as it stands, but if the Deputy's amendment were adopted, the whole question would immediately be brought back again to the position in which the Constitution would be violently opposed, and would not get the allegiance and the confidence of a large section of the people. Consequently, I am resisting it on the ground that we are unnecessarily trying to incorporate in a fixed position in the Constitution a matter which is a matter of policy in regard to external affairs.

With regard to amendment No. 2, the decision on it will govern amendments Nos. 3, 4 and, possibly, 149.

One of them deals with the mere name and the other with regard to the application of that name in a certain context.

The Deputy maintains that this is different from amendments Nos. 3 and 4.

Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 are different, I suggest.

I move amendment No. 2:—

To delete the word "Eire" and substitute the word "Ireland" and to make consequential amendments throughout the Bunreacht.

I want to make clear that this amendment is intended to apply only to the English text. I do not want to put the word "Ireland" throughout in the Irish text. I think that it is appropriate to have a Gaelic word in the Irish text, but I wish to see the country called in the English text by the name by which it is known to all English-speaking inhabitants of Ireland. There, again, one thinks about the people in the North. The advantages of talking about "Ireland," as a whole, rather than about "Eire," in that connection, are obvious.

I wish to support the amendment. I listened to the President's explanation and I appreciate the logic of making a distinction between the names of the nation and of the State. We are, however, surrendering a great deal in surrendering the word "Ireland." The word "Ireland," speaking pedantically perhaps is a most happy term to describe the nation as it is. It is perhaps a hybrid term but, as Deputy MacDermot said, it has a European significance and not merely an English significance. Every nation in Europe knows us as "Ireland" in some form or other and I feel that we are surrendering the word to the North. I am rather jealous of that. Strictly speaking, they are "Northern Ireland" but they will call themselves "Ireland." I should like the President to think over the matter. The difficulty could be got over by rewording Article 4. I am loth to surrender the word "Ireland."

The Irish text is to be the foundation text. In the Irish text, the name of the State will be "Eire." The question is whether you have necessarily to translate that — if you have a collateral text — into the name which, more or less, corresponds to it in English. The system I adopted here was to take the name "Eire," which is the name which will be given to the State in the Irish text, and give the State that name in the English text also, so as not to appear to be giving it two names. I agree that, in practice, the probability is that the names of the State will be translated as "Ireland" in common parlance but, as I pointed out, the whole system is more logical as I have it. It is definitely logical and it is worked out properly. If there is any strong feeling in the House that it should be otherwise, I shall have nothing to say against that, particularly if it is accepted all round. I should prefer to keep the name as "Eire" because the whole thing is more logical but, if anybody wants to translate that in the English text as "Ireland," I have no objection.

I am anxious, however, that the Irish term should be used on the same basis as we use "Taoiseach." Elsewhere, it is suggested that that should be "Prime Minister." The term "Ceann Comhairle" has now come to be used instead of "Speaker." It has come gradually into our speech and the acceptance of Irish words for our own institutions is desirable. This is one of those matters in which I should have imagined I would come in for considerable criticism from the opposite benches if I put in the word "Ireland" instead of "Eire." While we may argue and divide on amendments, my hope in connection with this Constitution is that it will be accepted as the fundamental law governing our political activities. It would, I think, be a very happy thing for the country if that were so.

Nothing is farther from my thoughts than that this should be an issue between one Party and another at the election. It will be necessary for us, who are positively anxious to see it enacted, to recommend it to the people but I should be very happy if, after we have passed it through Committee and offered it to the country, all Parties would advocate it. I should prefer that very much more than that we alone should be responsible for advocating it. My attitude generally will be that, if there is any strong view expressed by the Opposition and we can go any distance to meet it, we shall do so. I have no strong views in this case. It is not from the point of view of the Irish language that this was put in but from the point of view of having a logical system, properly worked out.

It is not from the point of view of getting an extra word in the language because I think that would come in any case. I shall leave the matter to the House independently to decide. I am willing to consider the point. I have not considered it with my colleagues, but if the view of the Opposition Benches is that we should change the name to "Ireland," I shall certainly consider the matter. Perhaps, we may leave the matter at that and bring the point up for full consideration on Report Stage.

Would the President not agree to accept it now?

I am only giving my personal view. There may be some objection to it, but I am quite willing to surrender on that point. There are two things that can be said in favour of using the word Eire. The first is that it keeps the logic of the whole system much more clear and definite. The second is that we are doing something beyond what we have done before, that is, getting Irish names accepted even in English when we speak English here. I would regard that as a small matter in this particular case compared to getting the goodwill of all Parties in the Dáil to even parts of this Constitution, if we cannot get it for all parts.

This is a point on which we feel rather strongly in principle. It is not so much on the question of whether or not we are using the Irish word or the English word, or whether the Irish text is to prevail or the English text. The Irish text is either a translation of the English text or vice versa. It really does not make any difference. If we are, as apparently we are, going to have this Draft passed into law both in Irish and in English, then I think we ought to get the Irish text separate from the English text. I have the strongest objection to using half-Irish and half-English in any document. I object to the system of starting a letter with “A Chara,” and ending it with “Mise, le meas.” This use of the word “Eire” reminds me somewhat of that, but my real reason for putting down this amendment is because I am interested in the status of this State internationally. In so far as we are known abroad as a nation internationally, we are known by the use of the word “Ireland.” If you put in the word “Eire,” then foreigners may think that there is some distinction between the State that we have here and what has been known for centuries as Ireland.

I will take the responsibility of agreeing to the amendment. My hope is that the Irish text will be made the fundamental text. The Deputy perhaps was not present at the start when I explained the procedure. I said that for the logical working out of the whole system I was anxious to have the name "Eire": that the Irish text is to be the fundamental text, and, therefore, the name of the State. If there is agreement from all sides, I am prepared to take responsibility for accepting the amendment.

I take it that involves all consequential amendments also?

What I am agreeing to is that in the English translation the name of the State is Ireland. As Deputy McGilligan has pointed out, its exact meaning may not be the same throughout, and I am accepting this subject to this: the right to look into this later. I do not want to bind myself in advance. It may be that because of agreeing to this I will have to fight harder for the Irish text than I would otherwise.

And we will have to fight equally hard against that.

The President has no one to interpret it.

We will see.

The question of possible consequential amendments to be looked into before the Report Stage.

I agree.

Article 4, as amended, agreed to.

ARTICLE 5.

"Eire is a sovereign, independent, democratic State."

I move amendment No. 4:—

To delete the word "Eire" and substitute the word "Ireland."

I suggest that we leave any of these amendments that are consequential over until the Recommittal Stage is reached. I would like to have an opportunity of reading carefully and seeing what the effect will be in every case.

If the amendment is withdrawn is it to be understood that it will be put down again without the intervention of the Deputy who moved it. There used to be a habit that amendments withdrawn were put down in the Office again, and the Deputy saved the trouble of reinserting it.

I understand from the Office that that was never the custom.

The Office has forgotten some of its own past as some people are trying to do all over the country to-day.

Perhaps the President will accept the amendment reserving to himself the right to move to delete it on the Report.

I will have to go through the text carefully to see whether the use of the word "Ireland" would cause confusion, and would not correspond with the intention here.

I move amendment No. 5:—

To delete the word "State" and substitute the word "republic."

I have put down this amendment for the purpose of eliciting the reasons which induced the Government to abstain from using this occasion to declare a republic. I gathered from the President's speech on my first amendment that his ideal Constitution is one which leaves us all in doubt whether we are a kingdom or a republic. Of course, if that is so I can fully understand that he does not wish to make any such declaration as is suggested in this amendment. I do want to point out, however, that the excuse the Government have given for a couple of years past no longer applies. That excuse was that we could not legislate for the North. Now in this Constitution we are puporting to legislate for the North, and it is just as possible to hold the actual application of a republic in suspense, so far as the North is concerned, as to hold the application of this Constitution in suspense so far as the North is concerned.

The Deputy does not mean this, does he?

He is trying to point out that you do not——

I mean what I am saying.

——and neither do you, and I doubt if you ever did.

We used to be told that it was an indelicate thing to ask whether the Government had any intention of declaring a republic: that it was the same thing, and that it was equally unfair and underbred as to ask a man, "Have you left off beating your wife?" because any answer would be misleading. I do not know whether that argument is still seriously put forward. For my part, I do not think it would be at all impossible for the President to give a "Yes" or "No" answer, or that it would be at all inappropriate or unpatriotic for him to give a "Yes" or "No" answer to that very relevant question. At any rate, the fact that I have put this amendment down gives the President an opportunity, of which I am sure he will be very anxious to avail himself, to provide the House with an elucidation of his viewpoint in connection with this matter.

I told the Deputy, when he put an amendment down here in quite the opposite direction, that the thing to be aimed at in this Constitution, in my opinion, as there is an acute difference of opinion of such a character that it would mean that we would not get acceptance of this Constitution by a large section of the people, was to leave this matter to be decided as a separate and independent question. Whether you take one view or the other view, you will have against this Constitution a number of people who, otherwise, would not be against it. In the same spirit, as we try to meet Deputies on the opposite side where it is at all possible, I think we ought to leave this matter also outside it. It can be decided outside the Constitution, and put as a separate and independent question. I think that is the proper place for it, and so I have to resist the amendment.

Unless some of the extreme Republicans over there object, or unless the Labour Party object, I do not propose to press this amendment to a vote.

A very good retreat.

Unanimously dropped.

I want to say a few words, Sir, on Article 6. On the Second Reading, referring to Article 6, I spoke as follows — I am reading from column 340 of volume 67 of the Official Debates of the 13th of May:—

"I do not go very far until I come to something which shows the extraordinarily bad drafting of this Constitution, and which, in my humble judgment at any rate, comes very close to if it is not entirely and completely a heretical statement."

I then read Article 6, and went on as follows:—

"That statement is not true. What does that mean? It means that all legislative, executive and judicial powers are derived from the people; that they are inherent in the people and exercised by the people under God."

That is what this Article does, in fact, state and mean. In reply to that, I received a very petulant answer, indeed, from the President. I am going to read it. Speaking about me, he reads the Article, and says:—

"He"

—referring to me—

"said that statement is not true. Just listen to that—‘that statement is not true.' What does that mean?"

The statement I have referred to is the statement contained in this Article that —

"all powers of Government, legislative, executive and judicial, are derived from the people."

"It means"

—he says—

"that all legislative, executive and judicial powers are derived from the people. Now, that is magnificent coming from a lawyer who has suddenly become a theologian. He read a document, and although it is explicitly stated in the document ‘derived under God,' the phrase ‘under God' is eliminated by him and you are to read it as if it were not there at all."

I did not eliminate the phrase "under God." I distinctly showed what the words "under God" meant in that Article. Then the President goes on to say:—

"The poor man must have got his information very quickly. He must have got muddled. He was possibly handed a document that he did not understand. Otherwise, I do not see why he went on in that line at all."

That is the courteous way in which my argument was treated. Now, take this as it stands:—

"All powers of Government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive under God from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State."

That is a clear statement that they are derived from the people. It is a clear statement that the passage of the power from the people to the rulers is under God. It means that and nothing else — that the power is derived from the people and passes from the people to the rulers under the power, or by virtue of the power of God. That is what that states. It does not state, and it cannot have the meaning the President endeavoured to put upon it, that all power is derived from God to the people. It is as clear as anything can be. It is derived from the people. Who derive it? The rulers of the State derive it, and they derive it under God. They are not deriving it from God, but they are deriving it from the people under God. That is the bad drafting of that Article to which I have referred, and that is the only meaning which those words can possibly bear.

The President put it quite correctly — and I suppose everybody knows what Catholic doctrine is — that disputed matter, as to how authority comes to the immediate rulers through the people, is not a matter that we need go into; although why we should not take one side or the other in a purely philosophical discussion, I do not know. However, it is perfectly plain that this Article does not mean that the power is derived from God, but that it is derived from the people, and surely it is not beyond the President's power to put this in a perfectly clear way. I know what he wants to put, but my point is that he does not put it.

I do not agree with the Deputy at all. Perhaps, in the text which I had, I did not notice that he had brought in "under God," but he has done the same thing in the explanation he has given now. He has stopped there, and says:

"All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive under God from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State."

We agree on that.

Yes, but it is a part of the whole sentence, and why he should leave out "under God" as if it were a meaningless parenthesis, I cannot understand. It is a clear recognition of the fact that political authority does come from God. What is more, this drafting has been very carefully done so as to leave the people of either school of thought to hold their views under it. In other words, it agrees with the doctrine in which it is held that authority, as everybody admits, does not come immediately and directly to the rulers, but that it comes immediately through the people who designate the rulers. There is a difference of opinion as to the manner in which it comes. This is open to either school of thought, and the interpretation does not hold for one rather than for the other. It is perfectly in accord with either of the two schools of thought. Consequently, I see nothing to amend in it. It has been most carefully drawn and carefully examined, and the more it is examined the more one will be satisfied that it is right. The Deputy is omitting "under God," and then there is the other part of it "whose right it is to designate the rulers."

Clearly, there is an indication there that there is a right on the part of the people to designate the rulers.

I am perfectly in agreement with the President that it is the right of the people to designate the rulers, but that has got nothing to do with my argument. The fact that the correct doctrine is stated in the Preamble is all the more reason why this Article 6 should not contradict the Preamble, as it does. It is a matter of the plain English language. Every single person in the House can form his or her own judgment upon it. The phrase is "All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive under God from the people."

Something happens under God. What happens? The derivation of power from the people happens. Is not that perfectly plain? Under God—Under the power of God, or by force of the power of God, if you like — all powers are derived from the people. Now, that is a perfectly inaccurate and wrong expression, and I do not see why the President clings to this extremely bad drafting, which does not convey the meaning which he wishes it to convey, but which conveys the very opposite meaning. It does not state that the powers come from God or derive from God. It says the powers derive from the people and that the act of derivation is happening under God. I do not see why the President does not put the matter more clearly.

I can only agree to differ with the Deputy.

The President says that this Article is written in such a way that it will be acceptable by all schools of thought. There are certain schools which go much further than this. This Article makes a certain statement. Does that purport to be a statement of natural law, true in all circumstances, in all times, and in all places? If it does, I would have to disagree with it. It says that "All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial derive, under God, from the people." Is the President's interpretation of that, that the power actually derives from the people? The Articles goes on: "...whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State." Is that right always and in all circumstances true? Does it override all other ways in which the princeps can pass authority? There are many who disagree with that. That, however, is not my point. The Article goes on: “and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good.” We have here a Government with law-making power, with power to bind under sin. The subject of authority is a unity. I do not see how this Government can claim powers of life and death, power to bind under sin, and say that there is a higher law-making authority in this State at the same time. I think myself that that is not holdable. For instance, Leo III in “Diuturnum illud” says:

"Many of our contemporaries walking in the steps of those who in the last century gave themselves the name of philosophers say that all power comes from the people, so that those who exercise it in the State do not exercise it as belonging to them, but as holding it from the people by delegation and under this reserve that it can be withdrawn from them by the will of that same people that has delegated it to them. Catholics have a different doctrine, and they make the right of commanding descend from God as its natural and necessary source. It is important, however, to point out here that those who should be placed at the head of affairs can in certain cases be chosen by the will of the multitude without Catholic doctrine contradicting or being repugnant to that. Then this choice designates the princeps, but it does not confer on him the rights of princedom. Authority is not given; what is determined is the one by whom it shall be exercised."

Later Pius X in condemning the movement of "Le Sillon" in France clarifies this point. He says:

"Le Sillon places the public authority primarily in the people, from whom it then derives to governors in such a way, however, that it continues to reside in it. But Leo XIII has formally condemned this doctrine."

What I am complaining of is that I understand this to mean that, although there is a Government in this country claiming to have authority, there is at the same time another authority, what I shall call the dispersed multitude. This word, "people," can be understood as a unity, but when you turn to the Irish text you will see that what the drafters of this document had in mind was a plurality. The drafters of this document refer to the people as a plurality, and authority is to reside in a plurality. If the President says that this is positive law — that it refers to a condition created by positive law — a Bill to become law may have to go through the additional form of passing through a referendum, then I think my objection will not hold, but it does seem to me that, as drafted, it conveys the idea that the real authority rests in the people, even when a Government exists. The second part of the Article goes on to say:

"These powers of government are exercisable only by or on the authority of the organs of State established by this Constitution."

Now, that is quite right, but note how it is going to work out. Here we are told that in the final appeal it is the right of the people to decide all questions of national policy. If the term "people" is understood as a unity, that is to say, a unity created by the operation of positive law, then something might be said for it, but I understand this really means a dispersed multitude of the people, a majority. It simply means that anything which that majority votes is automatically binding in law. Under this, what can happen? You may have an election some time this year. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the present Government is returned, that this Constitution becomes law, and that about a year afterwards you have an election for President. We know that the President, through the force of circumstances, must be supported by a strong political Party or organisation. In making an appeal to the people, there is nothing to prevent his proposing certain action. It may be declaration of a republic, the settlement of the economic war, or anything of that kind. If he is elected he can say, "I have been before the people just last week. I got a mandate from the people"— a phrase very popular with the President —"that such action should take place. I am now an organ of the State, no matter what Government was elected a year ago; the Constitution declares that the powers of Government are exercisable only by or on the authority of the majority of the people. The majority, in electing me, have indicated that certain action should take place, and I, acting as the law-making authority as declared by the Constitution, shall proceed to take that action." He is going, for instance, to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Army, you will say, should be submissive to the Government and act under the Government, but here we are told that no matter what Government is elected, the law-making authority, to bind under sin, resides in the majority, in the multitude in this country. Here is a man who has received a direct mandate from that majority, and when it comes to a point of argument as to whether the Army should obey him or the Government, this organ of the State who has received latest authority from the people, can, it seems to me, claim that this Constitution gives him the right to get up and say to the Army, "I have gone before the people; they have granted me a mandate to have this policy implemented. I require your services for its implementation. Speaking in the name of this Rousseaun entity, this sovereign people, I ask you to take certain action." Is this a statement of conditions which are to apply in all circumstances, and not one which arises from a convention of positive law? We are told that all questions of national policy are to be decided in final appeal by the people, but it is the decision of the organ, not of the people, as we gathered from the Irish text, as a dispersed multitude. In that case you have a position in which anybody who can claim to have the most recent mandate from the people, and who is an organ of the State, can claim the authority of the Constitution for implementing what he wants to have done.

There is nothing in the Irish text except a plural pronoun used with "pobal," just the same as you might use a word in the feminine gender to quality a noun, even though it does not refer to sex or anything like that. It is a question of grammar, and nothing more or less, as to whether "pobal" is distributive, or whether you should have a plural or a singular pronoun. That does not tell anything. When we come to the Irish text we can examine it from that point of view. Let us keep for the moment to the English text. Putting all that aside, there is one clear thing that is accepted by all philosophers, and that is first of all that authority comes from God. That is definite and fixed, and nobody disagrees with it. Secondly, there is the question that as authority does not come to any designated people, those people must be designated by the body which are to be the Government, and what you say here is that you have the right of the people to designate, by the system that they will have adopted, or the procedure that they will have designed, who are the people who are to exercise that authority. It is the province of the people to do that, and we have stated that here. They can also determine the form of government and the procedure by which they are to be appealed to in the final appeal. That is all there is in that. There is nothing difficult for anybody to follow. I cannot follow the Deputy in all the details through which he has come to "all times and all places." We are making a Constitution to be our Constitution, to be in the present circumstances our Constitution, to be accepted and, in so far as we can foresee the future to be accepted with the power to change that Constitution according as the people may want to change it to meet new circumstances. I cannot go into it any further. I hold that that statement there is a true statement. You have to read it all. You cannot read it without its parenthesis; you cannot read it without the second part; you have to read it as a whole. As a whole it expresses a truth which will not be controverted by any political philosopher.

The President ought to make it perfectly clear in this Article that power is derived from God.

I hold it is there.

I would read the words as meaning subject to the supreme authority of God, as already stated in the Preamble. It does not seem to me that that Article creates any ambiguity.

I cannot see any. If you wish, it is by the operation of the natural law.

I asked did this propose to create a condition, or to state what is true in all times and circumstances?

It states the truth as far as it is known.

Then it is creating a condition by the convention of positive law. I must say that, without reading that, the ordinary man would assume that it is a statement of an eternal and immutable condition. It does seem to me that it implies a peculiar form of government, in which, although you have an established Government claiming law-making power, at the same time instead of referring to certain items such as how matters would be referred to a referendum and so on, it says here "in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy." The Government comes along and can dissipate this idea which seems to be conveyed. It does seem to me that the people may here mean a perfect society, populus juris consenso. I do not deny that. It says here that the people are to decide, in final appeal, all questions of national policy. How are they going to decide? Is it by a majority vote? Even in that case any majority vote taken subsequent to the election of a Government is a decision by a law-making power in this country. That is how I understand it, and the President has not, to my mind, cleared that point. If it is a fact that, when the Government is elected, the sovereignty continues to reside in the people — and mind this; in a broadcast which the President gave a few weeks ago he said that the sovereignty belongs to them and is indefeasible and inalienable; notice it is there plural, the people — if it is inalienable, and belongs to you and to me and the aggregation of ourselves altogether, if that sovereignty is inalienable and belonging to that dispersed multitude, what authority can the Government claim?

In the interests of order in this country I want a Government which is going to be authoritative. I do not mind whether it is the present Government or another Government; I want to see its authority operated and maintained. I do not see how you can have a condition of good order and obedience to the Government — that Government necessarily using its coercive power to get that obedience from the multitude — as long as you assert that, in the final appeal, all questions of national policy are to be decided by this un-named, this many-headed monster, the multitude. I do not see how it can be said that, when the Government is elected, authority to decide all questions of national policy continues to remain in what is here called the people. The President says that you can have a feminine adjective with a masculine noun or something like that.

That is not what I said.

In Irish, as far as I know, "Is ón bpobal" and "ag an pobal" can be plural or singular. In English, "all powers derive from the people"; again, it can be plural or singular. Finally in the Irish text there is reference to that entity in the plural form. What was meant was not the people unified through the operation of laws exercised by authority, but that dispersed multitude which is merely an aggregation of numbers.

I still do not see what the Deputy is at. It is quite clear that the appeal to the people will be in accordance with the procedure which will be laid down in this Constitution. Obviously we are drawing up a Constitution by which various appeals to authority of one kind or another will be settled. The whole mechanism of this Constitution is to provide for those things. The final appeal is to the people. For instance, Deputy MacDermot was speaking about two rival policies. It may be that the people have to determine which is to become the national policy. Clearly it is the people who are appealed to finally to do that, but the method by which the appeal is to be made is to be provided for in this Constitution. Therefore, there will be no question of somebody at some time resisting authority on the grounds "You must come along and appeal to the people." There will be definite times and circumstances under which the people can be appealed to. We are providing for that here. This Constitution has to be read as a whole. We are clearly providing a referendum in certain circumstances when the people will decide questions of national policy, either by having frequent elections or at certain times, or in the case of certain measures, appeal by way of Referendum. Clearly that is what is intended. With regard to the Irish word "pobal," I did not say that it was a feminine adjective. What I said was that as a noun it might be of masculine or feminine gender. I am not sufficient of an authority on Irish to determine with regard to collective nouns, whether when regarded in a distributive sense they would be plural. We can go into the Irish another time.

What about the scholarship and the Irish text?

What I say is that I am not sufficient of a scholar to determine in this single instance, and, naturally, I would get expert opinion.

Is not the aim to have this eventually determined by Irish-speaking lawyers in the courts operating on Irish texts?

It is.

It will be grand then.

Meantime, these people will help their interpretation.

The originator of the text cannot explain whether there should be a plural to a particular noun.

Steady a while.

If it is going to lead to another argument, I will withdraw.

The point is a petty one. The same thing happens in English, that there are delicate points on which it may be necessary to get expert opinion in order to be satisfied.

The man who introduced the text would not make the confession that he did not know what it meant.

That is not so. I hold this is all right.

But you cannot explain it.

Because the Deputy knows nothing about it.

You said you could not explain it.

I did not.

It was an interesting confession. It was the first honest thing said about the Irish text since we started.

What I said was that I did not think myself a sufficient scholar in Irish to determine the question. I would say the same thing if there was a difficult question with regard to English — to determine exactly whether the use of the plural pronoun would suggest that the noun was used in a distributive sense.

I move amendment No. 6:—

To delete Sections 1 and 2 and substitute the following new section:—

The Irish and English languages are recognised equally as national and official languages.

I am moving my amendment because to call the Irish language the sole national language is to fly in the face of facts. Why not let us be honest?

You will have to define "national."

You would want to define "honesty" in this Constitution.

If there was an amendment to amendment No. 7 it would change the Deputy to blue.

To put it no higher, there is at least as much of Irish culture, history and tradition embodied in the English language as there is in the Irish language. A far larger number of the inhabitants of Eire or Ireland is able to speak in the English language than in the Irish language, and this artificial and mischievous Gaelicisation does not do a single thing to advance the prestige or the culture of our country, but serves as an extra and unnecessary barrier between ourselves and the Northern Unionists.

I do not know that I need speak about the question of what is intended by the "national language." It is the language that is most associated with this nation; the language that is in accordance with the traditions of our people. We are a separate people, and our language was spoken until little over 100 years ago generally by our people. The English language was the language of those who came as invaders. Therefore, I think there is no question at all about the meaning of "national." It must be obvious that the Irish language is the national language, and we have Irish as the first official language.

Does the President maintain that Anglo-Saxon is the English national language?

There is no Anglo-Saxon spoken in the primitive form. Anglo-Saxon as such is not spoken.

I admit there is that difference. The main point is that we are not legislating for the country as it was 500,200, or even 100 years ago. It is for the country as it is to-day we are legislating. Absolutely nothing is going to be gained by this sort of thing. If the time comes when Irish is spoken solely by the greater part of the population then we can begin to call it the "national language." The only effect of taking this line now is to alienate Northern sentiment and to make ourselves ridiculous.

Is dóigh liomsa go laguigheann an aidiacht "príomh" comhacht na Gaedhilge i nalt a haon, d'Airteagal a h-ocht. B'fhearr, im thuairim, dá léigfí mar seo an fó-alt san mar is mó a chuirfeadh sé in úil an smaoineamh atá lastiar den dtairiscint: "O is í an Ghaedhilg an teanga náisiúnta, is í an teanga oifigúil í. Agus maidir le alt a dó, molaim go rithfeadh sé mar seo: "Glactar an fhaid is gadh leis an Sacs-Bhéarla mar theangain oifigúil eile."

We will have to decide now what we want. That is the intention. I am satisfied that this meets the situation, as well as it can be met. We have put in the Irish language as the "national language," but I cannot hope to convince the Deputy that that is right. I think it would be a misuse of terms to put in anything else. Irish is the national language, and, consequently, we put it in the first place as one of the two official languages. Unfortunately, at the moment we have to use English as the second official language. I do not think we could meet the facts of the situation better than that. The fact is that we have to settle our differences by voting when it is controverted that Irish is the national language. I have no doubt that the majority of the House will support that view.

As regards the suggestion of Deputy Breathnach, we have to say that we have two official languages. You cannot say without qualification the word "first" whether in Irish or in English. In the same way, we have English as the second official language. I do not think we can, in present circumstances, do more. I do not wish to deal with the Irish text piecemeal. So far as I understand it, that is quite accurate. We are dealing with the English text. I stand by it.

I should be quite content as a compromise to have the amendment read, that the Irish and English languages are recognised equally as official languages and make no allusion to "national" at all.

That is what the Irish text really does.

I have no objection to Irish being called the national language, provided English is also called the national language, because English has an equal claim to be the national language of Ireland to-day. It would perhaps, avoid any hard feelings on the subject if we avoided going into that almost metaphysical point as to what is or is not the national language, and said that Irish and English were recognised as equal as official languages.

I am standing by the text.

Why is this being pressed? Is it on the point of Irish being the national language? That only appears in the English text.

What only appears?

The first section.

Not at all — as being the official language. I suppose if you have the first mentioned, and another official language, it is the second.

It would appear from paragraphs 1 and 2 that Irish is the official language, and the English language is next as an official language.

As another official language.

That is the translation of paragraphs 1 and 2.

Are the words "national language" left out?

Literally, the translation of the Irish text is that Irish is the national language. It is the first and principal official language.

And the second is English?

English is accepted as another official language.

As another? There is no second.

I do not desire, unless other Deputies wish, to press the matter to a division, but I wish to be put on record as opposing the section as it stands.

Amendment put and negatived.

There is one point on paragraph 3 of Article 8 to which I should like to direct the President's attention. If it is passed into law as it stands, it may have an effect which the President does not intend it to have. The clause provides:

"Provision may, however, be made by law for the exclusive use of either of the said languages for any one or more official purposes, either throughout the State or in any part thereof" ...

and therefore the word "exclusive" may possibly lead to a very extraordinary situation and possibly injustice. The President is probably aware of the case that occurred during the year where a prosecution was conducted entirely in Irish against a person who did not know Irish. It is conceivable that a law might be passed legalising that state of affairs and clearly contemplating injustice. I do not think that it is intended by the use of the words that appear in the paragraph to bring about a situation of that kind, but I think the paragraph is open to that interpretation and it ought not to be left in that way.

Has the Deputy an amendment?

I was directing the President's attention to a possible interpretation of paragraph 3, which might allow a law to be passed which will cause grave injustice.

I am afraid that this Constitution as a whole will not prevent laws being passed which may be unjust laws. You cannot possibly prevent that, as Deputies I am sure will agree, by any Constitution.

You could try. It is possible.

I quite agree that you should, if it is possible to do it. If the word "exclusive" were left out I do not know that there would be very much sense in what would be left. However, I will look into it, if that will satisfy the Deputy.

Will any harm be done if the third section of the Article is left out?

I think so. I think it is necessary for it to be there.

If it is not there in the Article nothing can be done by law. Constitutions prevent us from passing laws, but do not enable us to pass laws.

That is true. I will consider that.

I move amendment No. 7:—

Before Article 9 to insert the following Article:—

"Citizenship shall continue to be enjoyed by persons of Irish birth and Irish descent in accordance with the laws in force at the date of the enactment of this Constitution."

I put down this amendment in order to raise the general question of citizenship and nationality as conceived in this Draft Constitution. It seems to me that, in introducing a new Constitution, we ought to declare who are Irish nationals and on whom citizenship is and can be conferred. But in this Draft Constitution we give no indication as to what persons are Irish nationals or on what persons nationality may be conferred. We make just the negative declaration that, "The acquisition and loss of Irish nationality and citizenship shall be determined in accordance with law." That seems to me to envisage the possibility that a law may be passed under this Constitution, when it is duly enacted, to create entirely different categories of nationals and citizenship from those in existence to-day under the Nationality and Citizenship Act. This Draft Constitution seems to presuppose that nobody is entitled to be called an Irish national to-day and that we have not conferred citizenship upon anybody. It proceeds to deal with the whole position as if the State had not regulated its nationality and citizenship laws through legislation in existence prior to the introduction of the Draft Constitution. I, therefore, want to regularise the position in, I think, a much more satisfactory way than is done under the Draft Constitution.

My amendment seeks to declare:

"Citizenship shall continue to be enjoyed by persons of Irish birth and Irish descent in accordance with the laws in force at the date of the enactment of this Constitution."

That would give to those who already possess Irish nationality or who have had citizenship conferred upon them, a definite guarantee that their minimum rights in respect of nationality and citizenship are those enshrined in the Nationality and Citizenship Act. But, if an amendment of that kind is not inserted in the Draft Constitution, it seems to me to be possible, under the Draft Constitution, for the State to enact an entirely new set of laws dealing with the acquisition of nationality and citizenship and the laws of nationality and citizenship, as if it had no commitments and no responsibility whatever to those on whom nationality and citizenship had already been conferred.

It is true, as the Deputy says, that we do not definitely and immediately, on the face of the document, indicate who are the body of citizens. Indirectly, we do, of course, because we are taking over the body of statutes, amongst them our citizenship law, and inasmuch as it is being provided, at the start anyhow, that this will not affect in any way the citizenship of any of those classes who are covered by the citizenship law. But the Deputy would seem to make it imperative by his amendment to continue exactly in the same law. I do not think that we ought absolutely to bind ourselves to hold by the law as it stands. First of all, it may be possible to simplify it. Under certain circumstances, it would be possible to simplify that law tremendously. It was because it was not easy, in the circumstances in which we found ourselves, to define in a simple sentence the body of our citizens that we have done it in this particular way. This has been done in other Constitutions, where perhaps the body of citizens were not exactly in the same position as ours.

The opposite is also done in other Constitutions.

And much more often.

That is true. It is much more frequently done, but there are three or four Constitutions that have this provision in them. You have it in the Constitutions of Portugal, Belgium and CzechoSlovakia. These are three Constitutions, as far as my memory goes, in which they have this provision. I would prefer to leave the matter as it stands. It is better to leave it in that particular form. To meet certain fears we may have to put in some sort of an amendment to prevent people from thinking that all sorts of invasions of their rights are intended. I think that on the whole it is better to leave it as it is now.

I am willing to hold the amendment over until the Report Stage if the President will, in the meantime, look into the matter. But this is unnecessarily bare and it is likely to raise doubts on the part of those who have rights under the existing legislation and who have grounds for believing that this is an attempt to interfere with their rights. I am satisfied to leave it over if the President will look into the matter again.

I will look into it again. I may tell the Deputy that there was a real difficulty in defining it. On account of Article 3 of the Constitution being repealed it will be necessary, as a matter of fact, to amend the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act.

So it is worse than Deputy Norton thought. The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act will have to be amended.

It will have to be amended. I had originally intended to define a class of citizens here but it was not easy and I could not get a simple, satisfactory statement without having a very long form of words, the sort of thing that you would hate to see in a Constitution. It was because of the difficulty in doing it that way, that I abandoned the attempt and accepted this form, a thing that is not unusual.

The President says it is not unusual.

They have a simpler set of circumstances to deal with than we have.

That may be true but we ought to declare certain basic fundamental principles which give basic nationality to Irish citizens. It may be that certain difficulties peculiar to this country arise, difficulties which do not make it possible to decide the matter in a short and tidy way. There is a lot of matter in this Constitution which could be well cut out to make room for such a provision as this. There are declarations here in this Draft Constitution which are not cognisable by the courts. They mean nothing to anybody, they are pure verbiage and I suggest that the space occupied by this verbiage might well be occupied in clarifying this unsatisfactory position and not leave it in this manner. I do not want to cause any difficulties by my amendment but I do think that another effort should be made to arrive at more definiteness than there is under Article 9 at the moment. If the President will undertake to look into the matter on the Report Stage I will hold over the amendment.

Yes, I will do that.

Let us understand where we are. At the moment Article 3 of the existing Constitution lays down a fundamental law of citizenship for this country. We are now proposing to pass a new Constitution and Deputy Norton has stated his case in favour of his amendment in a very mild way. There is no proviso to render unconstitutional in any way the effect of the Citizenship Act. But there is a danger in Article 9 of the proposed Constitution that a citizen's rights might be taken away. Article 3 of the existing Constitution and the effect of the present law of citizenship could be carried forward as a constitutional right by Deputy Norton's amendment. What would then happen? That amendment of Deputy Norton's could be changed by such ordinary legislation as the President has in mind. There is provision to change Article 9 in the first three years. Rather than do that the President prefers to clean out nationality and citizenship entirely out of the Constitution. That is a bad thing.

I am withdrawing the amendment with permission to re-enter it on the Report Stage.

If we are going to deal with Article 9 again on the Report Stage, it is better not to bring in this amendment, in any case in the form in which I have it myself. In that form it seems quite misleading. There is a suggestion that there is some sort of a threat there. If people are afraid, or if they want to have certain assurances, so to speak, even though their fears are altogether without foundation, I am prepared to meet them. There has not been any suggestion of depriving people of their votes or political rights since this State was established, and long before it as far as this country is concerned. As long as we have any part in making our own laws, the question of woman's right to hold any office has not been in question from either side. It is a matter upon which there is agreement, and upon which there will continue to be agreement. However, if people think they are in danger, and they want to have some safeguards by an amendment such as I have put down here, I am prepared to put in that amendment, but I do it under protest. The amendment suggests a danger which is not a real danger. There has been no movement in this country on any side to interfere with the political rights of women.

That is not the question. Is not the question the possibility of making such a thing impossible? Why talk in terms of danger?

All right. If we had time to make a Constitution to meet all impossible things that might arise, then we would have a very strange Constitution. However, I am prepared to meet people who have those fears, and to put in an amendment in that form. It would be better to leave the whole matter of Article 9 over for the present.

I do not want to speak on this matter in view of what the President has said, but I think the President ought to ponder on the difference between a constitutionally guaranteed right and a right which may or may not be given by law, as distinct from a constitutional right. There is no question as to whether women's rights have been dealt with adversely in this Constitution or not. The question is, hereafter may they possibly be dealt with adversely? That is a distinction which, apparently, the President does not sufficiently appreciate between an ordinary law giving rights and a constitutionally guaranteed right. May I make this last observation? The President's amendment will not carry out, in the form in which it is on the paper, what he intends it to carry out. Perhaps he will consider that, too, in the meantime?

With regard to the amendment in my name, I would like to say that while I appreciate the President's amendment which, in a way, tends to meet mine, at the same time I would like the words "class or religious discrimination" to be inserted. If we are not going to discriminate against women, and if we are not going to have religious discrimination in this country, I think it would be just as well that it should be made clear in the Constitution. I should like to urge on the President to accept my amendment as it stands.

Would it not be better to leave amendments Nos.8, 9 and 10 over until we see the President's new amendment, which will enable us to see the whole matter more clearly?

Perhaps it would be better to leave over any amendments to this Article, because there would be no use in amending an imaginary Article, as it were. Until we see this Article in its final form, it might be better to leave over all amendments. With regard to Deputy Mrs. Redmond's amendment, relating to class or religious discrimination, I think the question of religion is sufficiently safeguarded elsewhere. Nobody has suggested safeguards in relation to religion. I think, possibly, there is no suggestion that such a safeguard is necessary. I think that matter is covered elsewhere.

With regard to class, I have a great difficulty about that word, because a class to me seems to be a group of any kind. There is a suggestion of a meaning which cannot apply to our present society here. I do not see a class here except in the sense of groups. You might have functional groups, groups according to their social functions. We all have a sort of rough idea of what we mean by class. For instance, you talk of the employing class and the employed. That is one group of society which you can bring close to this idea of class. I find the word "class" almost impossible to deal with in this connection. We had it in the text as it was issued. It was put in because it happened to be in the previous one and the omission seemed to suggest some definite purpose on our part. I put it in very reluctantly. If I could have got an equivalent I would have put it in. I think the word "class" is objectionable. It is not a thing that could be defined. The moment you talk of a group you immediately have a class. Bankrupts are a class; people of unsound mind are a class; people guilty of corrupt practices at election times — these are a class.

Oh, now!

Surely they are a class?

They are very numerous.

The point about it is that you will find it very difficult to define the word. I will give Deputy Norton the task of defining the word "class."

I am not the author of this amendment.

I know, but we are the people who have to do it, and will the Deputy say what he means by "class" in this direction? That is one of the objections I have to Deputy Mrs. Redmond's amendment. You could not exclude people in anything that could be defined as a group.

Like the criminal class, for instance? Is that what the President is looking for? He could hardly include them.

They would not necessarily be the criminal class; they might be lawyers — they are a class. The word "class" beats me, at any rate. With regard to religion, I think it is covered, but we have to examine it to make sure that it is covered. I suggest we leave this Article over for further discussion on a later stage. I have indicated my mind and Deputies will probably be ready for their amendments.

I suggest that the President should consider deleting sub-section (2) altogether. It is quite out of place there. You indicate earlier that the State is sovereign. It follows at once that implicit obedience is due to it by the individual, and I suggest those words "fidelity" and "loyalty" are ambiguous. It may all be nicely expressed, but I do not think it is in place here. I am not questioning the correctness or the morality of the statement, but I say it is not in place in a Constitution.

I think it is very desirable to have it, all the same.

Does the word "citizens" in paragraph 2, Article 9, cover resident aliens?

It would not, directly, I would use "persons" if I wanted to do that.

Are resident aliens, then, free from the obligations set out in the paragraph with regard to citizens?

They have to obey the laws, certainly. But loyalty in the sense of the loyalty of a citizen to the State is not required of a resident alien. They have to obey the laws, but that is not quite the same thing as loyalty to a State.

So these Articles are for the real native stock?

I do not know whether the President has any objection to adding the words set out in amendment No. 10. It seemed to me they were rather needed to complete the moral instruction. My amendment suggests that after the word "State," in paragraph 2, we should insert the words "as well as subordination of class and individual interests to the general welfare."

What is meant by "class?"

Here again we run against "class." I do not know if the President it attracted by any of those ideas?

I am not at all attracted.

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. The main provision of this Bill is Section 5 (2), which provides that the local government elections, which are due to take place between 23rd June and 1st July of this year, shall be postponed to a day to be appointed under Section 5 (1) of the Bill, which shall be a day not later than 30th September, 1940.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted, and 20 Deputies being present,

The postponement is necessary, as a general election is to be held during the course of the present year. It would not be in the public interest to hold both elections this year. Local elections are normally held every three years. The Bill, therefore, provides for a postponement of elections for a full triennial period, that is, up to the year 1940. The actual date to be fixed for the holding of the postponed elections can be considered at any time within the period of three years. If it is decided to hold the elections next year or the following year, it will not be necessary to hold triennial elections in the year 1940. When a date is appointed for the holding of a triennial election under the provisions of the Bill, subsequent elections are to be held in every third year thereafter. A new triennial period will thus be determined. The provisions of the Vocational Education Act, 1930, and the Agriculture Act, 1931, are brought into conformity with the provisions of this Bill by declaring that the election year fixed under this Bill will be the election year for the purposes of these two Acts. The remaining provisions of Part II which deal with the periods of office of members of local authorities and the filling of casual vacancies are consequential.

Special provision has been made with regard to the Borough of Cork in Part III of the Bill. Under the provisions of the Cork City Management Act, 1929, the Borough of Cork is one electoral area; and one-third of the membership of the council is elected annually. This Bill does not alter the existing system of annual elections. It provides that the members whose term of office would expire this year will remain in office until the fifth day after the appointed day, that the members whose term would expire in 1938 will remain in office until the fifth day after the first borough election held after the appointed day, and so on.

Special provision is made with regard to dissolved local authorities. Whenever a local authority is dissolved under Section 72 of the Local Government Act, 1925, and its powers and functions are transferred, an election of members to such local authority must be held within three years after the date of dissolution. This limit of three years will not apply as regards any elections due to be held before the appointed day, but it will be within the discretion of the Minister to cause an election of members to be held to a dissolved local authority before the appointed day, if he sees fit.

It has come, I think, rather as a surprise to everybody in the country that there is to be a postponement of the local elections for a period of three years. It is quite reasonable that there should be a postponement this year, in view of the coming general election, and so far as that is concerned, I am in entire agreement with the Minister, but the Minister has offered no justification whatever for the proposal that the elections need not be held until 1940. One is sent searching for reasons, and unless the proposal is the first taste of what we might call disturbance of public business and public authorities, possibly through the election of a President by referendum, or something else, I do not know what it is. The Minister ought to tell us why, in his opinion, this Bill should set out a postponement until 1940. Why does the Minister not say "This is the year of a general election and it is not advisable to have elections for local authorities in the same year, but we will have them next year?" Why does he go as far as 1940? Is it for the reason I have stated? If it is, it is just the first taste, as I say, of the disturbance we are going to have in public life by reason of too many elections of different types. We are opposed to the principle of delaying local elections until 1940. There are very many reasons why there should be an election for local authorities next year, at least, and, in fact, there are very many reasons why it should be held this year, were it not for the general election, and why there should be a postponement until 1940 is a puzzle to us. The Minister's opening remarks disappointed me in that he gave us no reason for it.

There seems to be general agreement that the local elections should not be held this year, that it would be inconvenient to hold them considering that the general election will probably be held round about the time — before or after, I cannot say which — they would be held. As to the Deputy's other point, I am of a conservative turn of mind. I looked for precedents in this matter and I found that, when, in 1931, I was sitting where Deputy Brennan is now sitting and the then Minister for Local Government was here, his Bill proposed to do what I propose to do in this Bill and I found that I made a speech somewhat like that which Deputy Brennan has made now, protesting against the elections being held over for so long. It is not my intention to hold the elections over for a period of three years. I agree with Deputy Brennan that it is wise to have these local elections held at regular intervals and that the intervals should not be too prolonged. I should like to see local elections held next year and, round about the time they would be held, the end of June or the beginning of July, perhaps they will be held. I think, however, that a certain latitude is necessary, particularly in view of the fact to which Deputy Brennan adverted, that we may have an election of some kind about that time next year A little latitude is necessary. I assure the House that I should like to see the local elections held next year. If nothing happens that would make the holding of the elections awkward next year, I should hope that they would be held then.

The next item on the Orders of the Day is the Committee Stage of Bunreacht na hEireann (Dréacht)

I am afraid that Deputies who are members of the Opposition may be under a misapprehension as to the time the consideration of the Dreacht-Bhunreacht would be resumed.

If the President wishes, we can adjourn until 7 o'clock.

I am ready to proceed, but I am afraid that Deputies on the opposite side went away under the impression that the Committee Stage would not be resumed until 7 o'clock.

It would be a great convenience to everybody if we could have an adjournment until 7 o'clock.

Agreed accordingly.

The Dáil adjourned at 6.15 p.m., and resumed at 7 p.m.

If it be found that the word "Ireland" changes the effect, it may be necessary later to make some changes in this text.

On Report Stage?

Yes. In that case, I take it there will be no objection.

Agreed.

Article 11 agreed to.

ARTICLE 12.

1. There shall be a President of Éire (Uachtarán na hEireann), hereinafter called the President, who shall take precedence over all other persons in the State and who shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law.

2. 1º The President shall be elected by direct vote of the people.

2º Every citizen who has the right to vote at an election for members of Dáil Eireann shall have the right to vote at an election for President.

3º The voting shall be by secret ballot and on the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.

3. 1º The President shall hold office for seven years from the date upon which he enters upon his office, unless before the expiration of that period he dies, resigns, becomes permanently incapacitated, or is removed from office, and shall be eligible for re-election.

2º An election for the office of President shall be held not more than 60 days before the expiration of the term of office of every President, but in the event of the removal from office of the President or of his death, resignation, or permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office established to the satisfaction of the Council of State, an election for the office of President shall be held within 60 days after such event.

4. 1º Every citizen who has reached his 35th year of age and is not placed under disability or incapacity by law, is eligible for election to the office of President.

2º Every candidate for election, not a former or retiring President, must be nominated either by

i. not less than 20 persons, each of whom is at the time a member of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas, or

ii. by the councils of not less than four administrative counties (including county boroughs) as defined by law.

3º No person and no such council shall be entitled to subscribe to the nomination of more than one candidate in respect of the same election.

4º Former or retiring Presidents may become candidates on their own nomination.

5º Where only one candidate is nominated for the office of President it shall not be necessary to proceed to a ballot for his election.

5. Subject to the provisions of this Article, elections for the office of President shall be regulated by law.

6. 1º The President shall not be a member of either House of the Oireachtas.

2º If a member of either House of the Oireachtas be elected President, he shall be deemed to have vacated his seat in that House.

3º The President shall not hold any other office or position of emolument.

7. The first President shall enter upon his office as soon as may be after his election, and every subsequent President shall enter upon his office on the day following the expiration of the term of office of his predecessor or as soon as may be thereafter or, where his predecessor was removed, died, resigned, or became permanently incapacitated, as soon as may be after the election.

8. The President shall enter upon his office by taking and subscribing publicly, in the presence of members of both Houses of the Oireachtas, of judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court, and other public personages, the following declaraation:—

"In the presence of Almighty God I do solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will maintain the Constitution of Éire and uphold its laws, that I will fulfil my duties faithfully and conscientiously in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and that I will dedicate my abilities to the service and welfare of the people of Éire.

"May God direct and sustain me."

9. The President shall not leave Éire during his term of office save with the consent of the Government.

10. 1º The President may be impeached at the instance of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of Seanad Eireann for treason as defined in this Constitution, or other high crimes or misdemeanours.

2º The charge shall be preferred before Dáil Eireann, which shall investigate the charge.

3º The President shall have the right to appear and to be represented at the investigation by Dáil Eireann.

4º If, as a result of the investigation, a resolution be passed supported by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of Dáil Eireann declaring that the charge preferred against the President has been sustained, this resolution shall operate to remove the President from his office.

11. 1º The President shall have an official residence in or near the City of Dublin.

2º The President shall receive such emoluments and allowances as may be determined by law.

3º The emoluments and allowances of the President shall not be diminished during his term of office.

Amendment No. 11 is ruled by the decision on amendment No. 1. I take it that amendments Nos. 12 and 51 are complementary?

Yes. I move amendment No. 12:—

At the end of Section 1, page 12, to delete the words "and by law."

The extraordinary proposition that is put forward in this matter of dealing with the President and his powers is that the President is given here in the Constitution itself certain powers and functions, but, as I pointed out on the Second Reading, there is no way of coercing the individual who will be selected into the doing of any of the things which it is ordained by the Constitution that he should do, and in a variety of circumstances, where he is given powers, there is nothing to prevent this individual acting contrary even to the orders and advice that will be given to him by a variety of people. As regards the matters that are precisely laid down in the Constitution, an attempt can be made to meet them by trying to think out some machinery which will leave the President open to the persuasion of the courts, or else will have him overridden if he refuses to exercise the powers which the Constitution says he should exercise in certain circumstances. The most alarming feature of the whole Constitution is that by a section of Article 13 additional powers and functions may be conferred on the President by law, the opening words being "Subject to this Constitution." As the Constitution is only a binding document in so far as it says that certain people, and no others, may do certain things, it would only be a safeguard if those words were put in as a safeguard in relation to whatever powers are explicitly to belong to people other than the President, and are not capable of being taken away from them.

In so far, however, as a matter is left, say, nominally to somebody, but not nominally to some authority, and not prohibited as to the taking away of it by the Constitution, then the change can be effected by a process of ordinary law in accordance with the Constitution. In that way, a variety of matters could be handed over to the President for him to deal with. The second clause of it sets out that, in so far as any new power was conferred on the President by law, that power was to be exercisable either on the advice of the Government or after consultation with the Council of State. So long as it was capable of being determined by law that whatever new power was given to him was exercisable after consultation with the Council of State, then it was clear that it was under his absolute discretion, because the Council of State was just a collection of Yes-men, and was meant to be such, because the President is given power to nominate a certain number to the Council of State from day to day or from week to week and to dismiss them without reasons given. Accordingly, the apparent safeguards that are supposed to be in this Constitution, with regard to the new powers that may be given, are illusory. First of all, it is stated that certain powers and functions are conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law. I suggest that that only means that the only things that are prohibited from being handed over to him by law are such as are fixed on other people by the Constitution and declared to be immovable from them. Outside of that, the only other safeguard was to be governed by either the Council of State or the advice of the Government.

In analysing this Constitution, I prefer always to take this test: What could a man, ambitious of power, do, who had succeeded to this office and who, at the end of its term of years, had a subservient Government about to face the people with a certainty of being defeated? In such circumstances, what could they do to block their successors from being allowed to take over the ordinary powers of government in the country? There is no other way of getting this matter properly considered except by thinking entirely in terms of that. If you are to go on the principle that they will be always elevated, high-minded men, and that there is no possibility of their going bad, then I say that no Constitution is necessary. If you are going to direct your Constitution-making entirely to a future in which everybody behaves reasonably, then there is no necessity for a Constitution at all. Constitutions, however, are founded on the principle that men go bad when in power and have got to be coerced and prevented, as much as possible, from going bad.

In so far as the President has certain functions given to him by the Constitution, and in so far as he is not either coerced effectively into doing what he is supposed to do, or prevented effectively from doing what he should not be allowed to do, we propose to put a check on a President, anxious to run amok, so far as the Constitution would allow him to do so, where he has the help of a subservient Government anxious to impede their successors in office. With a view to that, we have tried to visualise the things that might occur and to see what impediments might be put against a man getting such power. First, as I have said, there are powers conferred on the President by the Constitution, and we want to work out the things that might occur with a view to seeing what impediments might be put in the way of a man getting too much power, but when we are faced with this peculiar view in which the President may have further powers given to him by law, then there should be a stop, and the only stop is to cut out this phrase. That does not prevent any new powers being given to him, but it does ensure that any new powers that will be given to him will be given by means of Constitutional amendment. New powers might be conferred on him inside a period of three years by way of ordinary legislation, subject to whatever checks are in this document, but outside that, they have got to be done by Constitutional amendment, and I suggest that that is a good suggestion in comparison with what is here.

As I said already, I would like to try to see how far we can think alike and get on common ground on this. I should like to start off by deciding whether the intention has been carried out or not. I, myself, believe that it has, but we are prepared to meet the Deputies in any reasonable point. Now, what was the intention? The intention was that the President should get powers which were not inconsistent with the general plan of this Constitution, which puts authority in certain bodies, in the Government and in Parliament. The President is given certain powers under the Constitution, and the idea was to give him by law, if it were necessary and if it were found to be expedient, further powers or functions which would not be inconsistent with the Constitutional system as laid down here. The Constitutional system, as laid down here, can be taken to be like this: The President acts on the advice of the Government of the day. If we are to take the stand that Deputy McGilligan has suggested, and to suppose that the Government goes bad and that the Parliament goes bad at the end, goodness knows how you can prevent the whole thing from going bad altogether.

I referred to a Government which is going out of office and which can be coerced.

The difficulty I see is that even your own amendments will not deal with that situation. I do not think they can. I think it would pass the wit of man to deal with a situation where the whole Parliament and the President go rotten and where the people are left in the position that the machinery of Government is running contrary to the popular will. If such a situation should arise, I do not know how long the people would remain patient under it, but it is clearly a situation in which the whole spirit of democratic government would disappear and we would have a revolutionary state of affairs. However, I agree with Deputy McGilligan, and with Deputy Costello also, that, in so far as a Constitution can prevent bad laws from being made and unjust things from being done, we ought to try to get such a Constitution. I fully understand that view, but do not let us set ourselves an impossible task. Let us be reasonable in what we demand of the Constitution. Now to get back to what I was saying — what was the intention? The intention was that the President should act in certain cases — in all important cases — on the advice of the Government and that he would have no will of his own in the matter. He has to act on the advice of the Government. That was the first position. The next position is that in which he would act on the nomination or authority of somebody other than the Government. We had the case where the President shall, on the nomination of Dáil Eireann, appoint the Taoiseach. That means that an authoritative body representing the people would have the right to nominate the Taoiseach and, on that nomination, the President would appoint him. There, again, the President has no will of his own. So that, in the case where he has no will of his own, there are bodies who have a will, and the President must accept that will, and the bodies in these cases are bodies with which, I think, nobody on either side of the House would find fault.

Now, the President has discretionary power in certain cases — the second class of cases. He has absolute discretion in certain cases, in the sense that he can do certain things without consulting anybody. Such cases are very rare, and it is open to question whether he should have absolute discretion in such a case or not. We have the case where the President may, in his absolute discretion, refuse to act on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dáil Eireann. That is a case where the President is not required to consult the Council of State. However, when we come to that point, we can argue it. The third case is where the President still has power to act on his own discretion, but after hearing people who are of a type who should make him aware of the consequences that might follow from whatever line of action he was going to take. Now, I think the intention of it should mean that the Constitution system cannot be interfered with by giving powers to the President which would be repugnant to the Constitution as it stands.

The next thing is that, if he gets these extra powers, he would take these powers and perform these functions only on the advice of the Government or after consultation with the Council of State. I agree that it might be possible — that was not the intention, but it might be possible — for the Parliament to make a law which would give the President power to act on his own discretion, after consultation with the Council of State, in a case where, in accordance with the general plan of the Constitution, he should act only on the advice of the Government. However, my view of that was that Parliament was going to settle the law, and that it was most unlikely that it would give powers away from itself to the President. I think that the passing of such a law is almost unthinkable. However, let us take it that such a law could be passed. I tried to meet that point and tried to make the position safer by saying that if any further powers are given to the President, they must be exercised by him on the advice of the Executive Council.

That in my opinion prevents anything happening such as Deputies apprehend. I think that that saves that situation. The question is whether we can get agreement on this matter. I think, on the whole, it is wise to make it possible for Parliament, for the sake of uniformity, to give by law to the President powers in addition to those that are here stated, provided it is made clear that he can only exercise these functions on the advice of the Executive Council. The parliamentary system is better carried out in that way. That is the net point between us. I would hold that Parliament should have the right to give certain functions to the President in addition to the functions he has here, but that they must be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council or on the advice of the Government of the day.

What type of additional functions?

Here is what I had in mind. There are two functions. The first one occurred to me the other day when I was asked if there were to be visitors to the university. The appointment of visitors, which was formerly one of the nominal powers which the Governor-General possessed, was transferred to the Executive Council. In accordance with the whole scheme of this, it would be better that a purely nominal authority should be given to the President in that matter and that he should act on the advice of the Government. That is one type. Later, somebody pointed out — I think it was Deputy Costello — the question which arose in connection with external relations. If the people wished to change that Act, or to repeal it, and to transfer the powers or functions that are at present, by the Act of last December, being performed by the King in connection with our relationship with the British Commonwealth, they can repeal that Act or change it and provide that these powers or functions, such for instance as the signing of letters of credence, should be transferred to the President. That is a relatively big function. It is always done on the advice of the Government and it is quite clear, and only right, that that function should only be performed by him on the advice of the Government. The function could not be performed except on the advice of the Executive Council so that to meet a position in which there might be a Parliament that might be willing to hand over powers to the President — and I say that is most unlikely; it is not in the nature of these institutions to hand away powers from themselves——

Why not think of the instance I have mentioned, a Government anxious to take powers from its successors?

That point has been put to me, and I am quite willing to apply it to a test. The Deputy's own amendments will fail against that test. Let us be clear about the intention. I want, and believe it is right, to have in this Constitution a provision providing for the right of Parliament to give to the President extra functions if necessary, functions in relation to external relations or in relation to matters like the appointment of visitors. I want to make it possible by law to give the President these functions but to prevent the possibility of Parliament — which is, I think, unlikely — giving him these functions and the right to exercise them on his own discretion. To remove that possibility we shall say that if there are any further functions given to the President, these must be exercised by him on the advice of the Government of the day. I should like if we could agree as to what we should do, and we can consider the details of the Draft later, as to whether the Draft does in fact do what we intend. I have indicated my intention.

Surely the President is over-rating the value of this provision? I do not personally share some of the apprehensions I have heard expressed in regard to it, but I can see that it might give cause for alarm to many people. I cannot see that the President has said anything really to prove that it is of any great value. I would suggest that the balance of argument is in favour of leaving it out.

I think it is very important for the whole scheme.

In endeavouring to justify the giving of additional powers to the President by law, the present President has indicated that Parliament would not be keen on parting with certain powers to which it attaches considerable importance at present. I think the President is using the term "Parliament" to explain something which does not really convey the idea of a comprehensive Parliament acting as a single whole. If it is proposed in this Constitution to give the additional powers by law, it may be true that he can only get these powers through Parliament passing that law, but when we come to look at what a Parliament is, for the purpose of passing a law, we find that it is the Government Party of the day with a majority of perhaps only one. You may say that that is a majority of Parliament, but it is, for all practical purposes, a purely political Party with a majority of one. Perhaps it does not even command that majority by the aid of its own Party. In these circumstances, such a Parliament may confer upon the President powers vastly in excess of the powers which this Constitution was normally intended to give him. The President will say that of course he can only exercise these powers on the advice of the Executive Council or that he can only perform these functions on the advice of the Executive Council. There is no effective safeguard in that.

Let us take a position such as exists to-day to see what is possible in relation to that position under this Constitution. The Government may come in here with a Bill to give additional powers to the President. He may be President by virtue of the support which he is able to get from the Fianna Fáil Party. He has been, perhaps, one of their own active Party men. He has been elected by the use of the Government Party machine. He knows he is indebted to the machine for being President. The Government machine may feel that Parliament is a handicap and a drag upon many of the things which it would wish to do, that Parliament takes a long time to enact legislation and that there is criticism in Parliament which it is desirable to avoid. What is to prevent a Government Party holding these views, coming to the House and passing a Bill designed to give the President the power to take away from Parliament the right of examination or the right of criticism which up to that it had enjoyed? That is the danger that I see in this provision which purports to confer certain powers upon the President by law. I do not think it is any safeguard to say that these powers are exercisable on the advice of the Executive Council, because the Executive Council may well be acting in collusion with the President to take these powers away from Parliament. As Deputy McGilligan said, it would be quite an easy matter for a Government going out of office, and with a President in power on whom they could rely, to take away from Parliament functions which properly belong to Parliament and give those to a President of their own political complexion, so as subsequently to cause difficulties for an incoming Government. Nothing that the President has said or the terms of his amendment provide any effective safeguard in that particular connection. It is because a safeguard is not provided that I am opposed to giving the President new powers by law, those powers being got by a single majority vote in this House.

If I may intervene for a few moments, I should like to say a few words. This is really a residuary clause. It embraces everything which is not ruled out by the Constitution. Unless it is definitely ruled out by the Constitution, powers which we have not even thought of but which may occur to any Government may be given to the President.

What are they? Give us an idea.

They may turn up from time to time.

The whole field of external relations, as the President himself said.

When the President was first asked to give an instance of this kind, all he could think of was visitors to universities, and here to-day he explained that that power being in the hands of the Executive Council, they generally appoint exactly the same class of person that the new President would appoint, namely, a set of judges. For the sake of uniformity we are to give this vague power; we do not know what may be in it. It may be giving to the President extreme powers over the liberty of the individual; it may be giving powers that at present even Parliament may not have. Parliament would not have power to question those powers. The President's actions cannot be questioned. He is exercising powers which are given to him. He cannot be indicted. He cannot be impeached. He is using those powers according to law. He can get any powers which are not absolutely ruled out. This is a kind of residuary clause: all the rest can be given to the President. Every other power which you have not now the foresight to see and provide for can be given into the hands of the President. The powers may have far-reaching effects, as the political situation of the moment dictates. Undoubtedly, at a time when a Parliament is going out of office, there will be a temptation to give such powers. There is no reason why a Parliament, having themselves lost the confidence of the people, may not do that sort of thing. Again, the President cannot be indicted. His exercise of those powers cannot be questioned. He cannot even be impeached for any conduct of that kind. The objection to this is that the extent of the powers is so extremely vague. It is like making a will and giving somebody £10 or £20 and the residue of the estate to somebody else, imagining that you are giving £100 and finding that you are giving more.

First of all, let us be clear on this: There is always the question, "Who will guard the guardians?" That is always there, and we have to make up our minds that there is a certain place at which we cannot make further provision. Somebody has those powers already, either the Government or the President. The powers are existing. We have come at last to the stage, after a long period of experience of representative institutions, at which we have a fairly rough idea of the powers that may be exercised. The residuary powers are very few. At any rate, we come to this point: First of all, no Constitution can adequately meet the question, "Who will guard the guardians?" Ultimately the people themselves are the guardians of their own liberty. You cannot possibly go behind that, so far as any system you will set up is concerned. No matter what provision you may make, somebody will say: "If he goes wrong, what will happen?" The whole theory of this is that Parliament is going wrong. But the Parliament has the power already. All the powers necessary for the government of this country are contained here in this Constitution and left with the Parliament, which can enact laws to make it possible to use those residuary powers. Therefore, they exist at the moment and will exist in the Parliament. If the Government goes wrong and the Parliament goes wrong, then they do not need to hand it over to a President or anybody else to deprive the people, through it, of their liberties. The only other argument which I can see might possibly be put up from the opposite side is, "The President's period overlaps."

And may be made perpetual.

It cannot be made perpetual.

Why not? I will prove it to you.

I will be very glad if the Deputy can make that clear. I do not see how he can. What is provided for here is this, that in relation to external affairs we exercise all those functions definitely prescribed and limited, and the manner in which they are to be exercised is limited. It is possible, if the people so desire, in regard to functions that would be in the existing situation performed by the King, to transfer those powers ultimately to the President. If the scheme that is here is to be carried on you must make provision for that. Secondly, you have this question of uniformity in operation, and I for one cannot see what danger there is to be apprehended. Of course, when persons tell us to look out on the vasty deep, with all the monsters and so on that can be conjured up before our minds to be afraid of, we can say nothing to them, but I would ask those people who object to this to tell us what powers they have in mind. Deputy O'Sullivan talks about vast residuary powers, and mentions powers over the liberty of the individual. The liberties of the individual are safeguarded to a certain extent against Parliament itself, and will therefore be safeguarded against the President. I should like some examples from the opposite benches. Let Deputy O'Sullivan use his imagination and give us a single example of a power which might be given to the President, even in the circumstances which Deputy McGilligan has suggested. I think we are talking away from the facts, and the facts are that the powers are at the moment, and will continue to be, in the Parliament itself. If the Parliament is bad it can exercise its powers wrongfully in its own regard as well as by transferring them to the President.

Would the President consider as a compromise limiting the section to a case where there was a two-thirds majority of both Houses desirous of giving extra powers to the President? Does he not think, for example, to take the instance he mentioned, that the duties at present performed by a certain organ might be transferred to the President in connection with external affairs—does he not think that that is something that ought to require more than a majority of one?

I think no Government would do it without consultation with the people.

There is nothing to prevent them from doing it. As a matter of fact I understood the President to be arguing against its being compulsory to consult the people. After all, if there were no special provision such as this, powers of this kind could not be given to the President except as an amendment to the Constitution. He does not want that. He wants Parliament, by a transitory majority, to be able to give such powers. I wonder whether there is any real case for that. The only case that is mentioned, apart from this matter of the King, is the very trifling one of the visitors to universities. It seems to me that the section as it stands is creating great alarm. It surprised me. I would have thought that it would be bad electioneering. Bad electioneering or not, it is not surprising that the section does create alarm, and it is difficult to see that its value is such as to be worth while maintaining at the present time. I really suggest to the President that, if he cannot go further, at any rate he might compromise so that the additional powers could only be given to the President when there is a two-thirds majority in favour of it in the Dáil and the Seanad.

I object entirely to the compromise suggested. The two suggestions to bear in mind are these, that the President might have certain functions and powers given him in the Constitution, and have it clearly understood—which would not be the case if this amendment were carried— that nothing else could be given except by way of constitutional amendment. To meet that suggestion I said that after three years that could be done by amendment of the Constitution. If new powers are going to be given, and if three years is regarded as a reasonable time, it must be done in a constitutional way. That could apply to the new President. Three years, or whatever period is allowed—I suggest it should be longer—for the altering of the Constitution by way of amending legislation should apply to the President's powers the same as anything else.

The President is very keen to have this done by law. I suggest that the President can be perpetual in this country and I sought to limit his chances by way of a series of amendments. A President gets elected and thereafter can nominate himself. The only thing in the Constitution about anyone else is that he must obtain nomination by a certain group of county councils or members of the Dáil. By law that can be made 100 per cent. of the Dáil or of the county councils, and that being the case, no one else can get nomination. The retiring President may be nominated for ever. That may be a fantastic suggestion but it is quite possible under the Constitution. If it is not possible, I want to see the weakness in my argument. You may have a President, who, because the nominating body is raised very high by the Government which is going out, will be in office during the whole period of their successors' lifetime. Two presidential elections might raise the nominating numbers to such a point that nobody would be able to get nomination.

Leaving that aside, supposing you had a Government in office that had reached its last year, that there is a presidential election and that Government stock is sufficiently high still to carry the President of its choice. He is in for seven years. The Government is about to go out or is going out the next year. The President is in for six years, thus overlapping the Government's successors. It is certainly open to them to hand over any powers to him. The only impediment is that they cannot do anything which would constitute a constitutional amendment and which would have to go through the ordinary referendum process. In the first three years, changes in the Constitution might be made by ordinary legislation and all sorts of powers given. The method of passing legislation can be achieved without constitutional amendment so as to give far more powers to the President than is outlined now. I say, regarding the Constitution as a whole, where there is no prohibition, this is passing over powers of the Legislature to the President. We have an Article which says that no legislation shall be passed except by the Oireachtas, but the next one says that provision can be made by law for separating the powers and functions, these to be determined by law. Supposing you have as a Council of State, a group of "Yes-men," behind the Prime Minister of that time, these legislative powers can be handed over to the President. Let us take the example the President gave. When this question was discussed before, whether deliberately or not, the President misled the House. He talked of rather informal matters such as appointments to universities. Speaking afterwards, when the point was made by Deputy Lavery as to whether it would be lawful for him to deal with foreign states at his own discretion, the President seemed to think that impossible but to-day he seems to think it all right. It is possible still to have all external relations of this country operated through a dying Government.

That is always possible.

How could it be done? A Government has to face the country and they leave behind them a President for six years. There is a time lag. Make it five years or four years. The presidential elections are coming on and cannot coincide with the Dáil elections. There is going to be overlapping. The President suggests as a safeguard this phrase: "Powers to be exercised on the advice of the Government." If we knew what that meant in the Constitution and that the Government was going to impose authority, we might take that phrase to mean something. The President spoke about the principles of government. A popular election throws up a Party which, like this Government, is in for a certain number of years and when finished faces the people again. When the new people come in, they may be the same Government or a group from different parties, but, whatever they are, they are untrammelled. If this Constitution sets out to make a complete division, and if the people elect an Executive for a number of years outside the legislature, then they know what is in front of them. But there is the pretence in this Constitution that the Government is elected by the people. You have it shot in here for the first time after all the fights against Kings and their great powers. Let the President put into the President's powers some way in which a Government once elected will have that President entirely under their control. Then I do not care what powers he gives.

What about a rotten Government that is going to go mad?

They will walk the plank. What I am concerned about is that a Government that is going to face the people will have a President in power for five or six years and they can give him powers which they would not think of operating against themselves, but would leave free against their successors. Let us know where we are. It may be, as indicated at the Árd Fheis by the President, that he is going to have as President a man who would have considerable powers which he would operate at his own discretion. That was his promise. I know the President's difficulty. The presidential paragraph in this Constitution would give a lot of powers and a good lot of ceremonial powers. The President cannot have them because they are in the External Relations Bill.

The gap has to be filled up somewhere, and hence we have this business of commander-in-chief and officers holding commissions from him, partly vanity and partly to hide the gap in the paragraph that would appear by comparison with the same person in other Constitutions. In any event, let us stick to one or other principle of government. Let us have the clear position in which people are going to elect an Executive who will boss the Legislature, or let us have the idea that the Government is elected by popular election through the Party, and that the Government rules. Give us the position through the Constitution in which the Government—I do not care how bad it is, because it will have to face the populace within a limited period—puts its thumb on the President at any time he tries to move, and let them take responsibility for every act of government.

I am a little surprised at some of the arguments. I thought that Deputy McGilligan in particular and the Opposition in general were strongly in favour of a system of checks and balances.

So we are.

I am sorry that we could not have continued the discussion on the level on which it was commenced. It might be helpful. But we have gone into another atmosphere altogether, and there is no use trying to follow it. Is it not obvious to any thinking person that if a Government gives to a person certain powers, a new Parliament when it comes back can take these powers away?

No.

Of course it is. Why can they not? What is there that a Parliament want to-day that they cannot enact if the people are willing? Has it not to be referred to them? The President has no veto over the two Houses.

He has.

He has not—none whatever. It was hard at times not to intervene when the Deputy was speaking. I tried to restrain myself, because I believe that in the long run we will make some progress by each one of us saying what we have to say. My view is that powers of government exist at the present time. They are fairly well defined here. The things in the way of government—the powers and functions—are fairly clearly laid down here. I ask people to show what is this residue. It is not as if we were starting for the first time in an unknown field. The powers and functions of representative government are pretty well known after a very long period of time in different parts of the world. I ask them in challenge, instead of talking about vague things, to mention a single power that could be given to the President of a dangerous character. If the President, particularly, was to have external relations functions, they would have to be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council. If there is a wrong Government that wishes to hand over to him powers so that he might possibly interfere with a new Government, the new Government has got the whip-hand, because it can pass any laws it wants to and he cannot veto them. He has no power whatever to stand in the way of a measure to which Parliament agrees—none whatever. If he tried to do anything, there is the ultimate way of appealing to the people and you can get a constitutional amendment without the President's consent. The constitutional amendment can be put to the people over the President's head.

Therefore, it is all nonsense to say that the President is given all sorts of power—that Parliament can give to the President all sorts of controlling power. It cannot. The same system that we have been accustomed to operate in all its main essentials is preserved. There is only one place where the President comes in effectively and that is for these checks and balances for which the Opposition have always been asking. Time after time we have been told that there was a dangerous position because there was no Seanad. Now we have given a limited power of check to the President, who is to be elected by the people, to say, if there is a difference of opinion between the two Houses, but only in that case: "This matter has to be resolved by the people themselves." So that, so far as I can see, this question of extraordinary powers being given to the President by this clause is all moonshine. If there are any further functions given to the President, to make sure of Parliamentary democracy these powers will have to be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council. I think that that meets any reasonable case. I say we cannot possibly meet the other: "They may do this, and this, and this; representative government is impossible, because in the period of years between one election and the next the Government can do as it pleases."

I personally consider that the President is rather unwise in standing over a document such as this and taking up the attitude he has just taken up—that every suggestion made with regard to abnormal powers that are sought to be given to the President is all moonshine. I would prefer to think that the President was sincere earlier in the discussion this evening. I should like to think that he was sincere when he said it was his desire to have this organ in its final form go to the people as an agreed document which had been fairly, squarely, and sympathetically examined by all Parties in this House. I should like to think that that was a sincere expression of his desires. On that assumption, I should like to meet that; and I ask the President at least to accept it that I am meaning that when I utter this warning. If there is one clause or one portion of this draft Constitution that is viewed with suspicion, uneasiness, anxiety and distrust by the ordinary people of this country, it is unquestionably that Article which suggests giving extra powers by law to the President. My experience is that that uneasiness and anxiety does not take a political line; that you will find just as much of it on that side of the political line as on the other; that it is perfectly sincere and genuine; that there is a kind of historical and traditional explanation of the fear in the hearts of the Irish people of giving powers, real or implied, to an individual over the Parliament of the people.

Unquestionably, so far as most people can read and study this document, there is a definite reluctance, at all events, to limit the powers of this new functionary. There is a very determined legislative attempt being made to limit and define the powers of Parliament. That is sticking out in this document. There is an equally determined attempt to be indefinite with regard to the powers of this new functionary. I think that is unwise, and that a general acceptance of this document cannot be got along these lines; that just as there are certain responsibilities on the Government, there are also responsibilities on the members of the Opposition. One of those responsibilities is to consider and to voice the uneasiness of the people with regard to proposed legislation. Whether a Constitution containing those powers may, or may not, be machined through the people by the vigour of an up-to-date political machine, it will never be acceptable to the people in the ordinary popular sense as long as there is a suggestion of any individual being in a position to throttle the Parliament and to strangle it in any set of circumstances.

The President makes great play with "Who will guard the guardians?" I would rather have nobody to guard the guardians but the plain people down below, than have any individual presuming to be a sort of super Irish guardian angel. Who will guard the guardians? Where are you going to find a man who would be more trusted by the people than the majority Party—than the ten or 12 members of the Executive thrown up by a majority of the people, elected by the people or a majority of the people? The suggestion who will guard the guardians is that the whole 12 may be wrong, but the individual higher up, it is to be presumed, will be always right. The President does not agree with that interpretation of the Draft Constitution. It is mine and it is the interpretation of a number of others. This Draft Constitution was introduced and got a special introduction as a simple document in the simplest language. We have come up against no section or sub-section yet about which honest men did not differ as to its meaning. Certainly, I cannot congratulate anybody on the clarity or simplicity of the language.

I would ask those opposite to accept this much—that when we are expressing uneasiness and distrust of the proposals contained here, we are speaking on behalf of well-intentioned people of all shades of political opinion. There is a dislike for giving an individual the powers it is suggested to give to him here. The more we explore how extensive those powers may be, or to what extent they may be abused, the more the feeling of alarm will spread. We will have either one of two situations, because we must presume that nobody is going to occupy the position of President who has not been a very prominent political leader. Nobody else could get the services of the great political machine, and without the services of a great political machine nobody could ever hope to fill that position. So we will have a political leader of one of the great political Parties elected as President. Then we will have arising after that one of two situations, or probably both, during the seven years of office of any President. We will have, first of all, a Government politically the same as the President, the members of which, perhaps, owe their seats on the Front Bench to his successful leadership in the past—a Government anxious to pay a tribute to the man that led them successfully, and made that Government. The only way they can give expression to their appreciation of his services is by legislating to give more and more power to him. Ordinary human gratitude will direct that they should give expression to their gratitude by increasing by law the powers of that individual. Then before his term of office is up there is elected a new Government, and then we have a Premier and a Government who had spent years campaigning against the man who is over them as President. Human nature being all it is, and giving everybody credit for trying to make the best of a difficult situation, does anybody think there can be either trust, understanding, co-operation or harmony? All these qualities are definitely essential in the direction of the State. Now, every one of these factors will be absent and there will be distrust and suspicion, and the guardian of the guardians will be watching that new Executive as a cat watches a mouse; that new Executive will be viewing the President with suspicion and distrust. Even if in a perfectly genuine way he regards a Bill as being a violation of the Constitution and he proposes to hold up that Bill, there will be controversy, bitterness and an outcry throughout the country.

Now in all seriousness why go out of our way to bring about such a situation? Let us cease to regard him functioning as either a Fine Gael or a Fianna Fáil President, and the others as either a Fine Gael or a Fianna Fáil Government. Let us think of a time when political divisions are along other lines—the towns versus the country, tariffs versus free trade, when very big political issues divide Parties, when you have close distinctions between Parties and you have a President representing one political Party, because he will represent a political Party, with the Government representing another political Party. Do you think that is a sound or healthy headline?

Apparently, it has not been really decided whether it is a ceremonial head we are throwing up in this Constitution or an Executive head. The Executive head of the Government should be the Taoiseach, whoever he may be, or whatever type of Government it may be. If that individual is required to act with power and authority, that individual should be the head of the Government, the mouthpiece and spokesman of the Government and nobody else. In addition to him, unquestionably, a ceremonial head is required, and that ceremonial head, no matter what Party he comes from, should get the respect, support, and, as far as possible, the friendship of all political Parties. If he is to get that from all political Parties in his own interest and in the interests of the high office we are creating, give him no powers whatsoever. Give him no powers by law, and no powers by the Constitution. Create him a really high ceremonial head, but as far as powers go, make him as powerless as the Governors-General were in this country or as the King is across the way. It would not be possible to have elevated kingship to the very high position it occupies over there in the eyes of the people of England if that King had power to interfere with Parliament. It is because he is powerless that he can get the respect and support of all. We are starting out on a new venture in this country. It is unwise to start on the line of giving excessive powers or even appearing to give excessive powers to any individual no matter where he comes from or what Party he comes from. Giving these excessive powers, or appearing to give them, will make for trouble in the future. We are thereby making for friction in the future, and we are making certain that this document cannot be an agreed document. I agree with the President that I would rather see this document go forth in some agreed form. But if there is insistence on giving powers by law to the ceremonial head, then you will definitely make certain that this document cannot leave the Dáil as an agreed document.

At an earlier stage of the proceedings here to-day the President expressed his very earnest desire that, so far as possible, there should be the greatest measure of agreement to the provisions of this Bill. The powers and functions and duties of the new functionary, who is to be called the President, are the most important and vital points of this Draft Constitution. To the extent to which our views in connection with the President and his functions and duties and the functions and duties of the Government are met with, can there be any hope of any measure of agreement? I gathered from the President's statement after Deputy McGilligan's speech on this amendment that he was prepared to concede that any of these new powers that would be imposed by law upon the President should only be exercisable by him on the advice of the Executive Council. I think I understood the President correctly. That would involve, of course, an amendment of Article 13, paragraph 10, sub-section (2), which provides that no power or function that would be given by law to the President should be exercisable except on the advice of the Executive Council or after consultation with the Council of State. It would mean, of course, that the words in the sub-section, "or after consultation with the Council of State", would have to be deleted.

That is provided for in amendment 53.

If I am correct in my interpretation of what the President's statements were earlier, it would go to some extent to meet my objections on this Article. When first I heard the President making the offer that he would be prepared to provide that these additional powers to be imposed by law upon the President would be only exercisable on the advice of the Executive Council, I thought that that almost, if not quite, met the situation. It appeared to me to put the President in somewhat the same position as the Governor-General was in, acting on the advice of the Executive Council. On reflection, I think that that position is not at all analogous to the position when the Governor-General was here, acting on the advice of the Executive Council, and I think the President, if he will give the matter impartial consideration, will see that.

Before I develop that very shortly, I would like to deal with a point that the President threw out rather casually, because the words were put into his mouth by Deputy MacDermot. Deputy MacDermot said he thought that the Fine, Gael Party were in favour of a system of checks and balances. It shows how little Deputy MacDermot knew about the Fine Gael Party, or, indeed, about constitutional matters at all, when he said that our policy, which has been well known from 1922 right up to the present moment, was one in favour of unlimited checks and balances in a constitutional system. We have made our position perfectly clear here, and beyond all possible dispute. We stand for responsible government; that is to say, a Government elected from the Deputies who are elected by the people, a Government responsible to the Parliament of the people. That is the fundamental basis of our system of government in accordance with our policy. The Parliament of the people will be the paramount authority in this State if we are to have our way and if we ever have our way. We do not want anybody to be in any way superior to the Government of the people. We do not want any President, any king, any Governor-General, or anybody else to be superior to the Government elected by the people's representatives in Parliament. That is our policy.

We have made our position clear again and again on the question of the Seanad and other matters. We have pointed out that we are in favour of certain constitutional checks on the unlimited exercise by the people in their Parliament of their supreme power as the sovereign authority. The check for which we have always stood is the Second Chamber, and the next check that we have insisted upon— and that we will always insist upon so far as we can—is the safeguard of an independent judiciary to whom is entrusted the safeguarding of the constitutional rights enshrined in the Constitution of the people. That is our system of government, and checks, and nothing else.

The fundamental objection we have to this Draft Constitution is that there is a new functionary introduced over and above the system of responsible government that I have outlined, and to which we have been accustomed here for the last 15 years. There is a new functionary called the President, with new powers. Some of those powers are of no particular importance, because they must be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council. Some of them are of very grave concern indeed, because they are, in essence, absolute powers, powers exercisable in his complete discretion. The powers that are exercisable by him after consultation with the Council of State are, in essence, absolute discretionary powers. The Council of State is a body of no consequence whatever and with no power, and the expression "after consultation with the Council of State" means, in effect, nothing. I do not know whether the President is aware of the history of that particular phrase, "after consultation" with a certain body. The President, if he looks into the history of that phrase, will find that, in effect, it was devised by the late Kevin O'Higgins, in consultation with me, for the purpose of meaning nothing. It is in this Draft Constitution now and if the President will look it up in the Courts Officers' Act of 1926, where it appears for the first time——

It is clearly set forth here that the consultation with the Council of State does not compel him to take their advice.

That is just what I am objecting to, and therefore the use of the expression "after consultation" is merely a pure piece of humbug and hypocrisy.

Oh, no.

We have here a body that has no powers. It has the right to be heard, the right to talk with this great high functionary, the President, who need not listen to them and, as the President himself now says, is not under any obligation good, bad or indifferent, to take their advice or to do as they tell him. Therefore, where you find in this draft the donation of powers to the President after consultation with the Council of State, in effect it means that the President may do it in his absolute and uncontrolled discretion. Every member here has the greatest objection in principle to the giving to this new functionary, the President, of any such absolute powers, and this Constitution will not leave the Dáil and will not be passed by the people of this country with our benediction or approval as long as these powers remain.

I have explained in outline the system of government for which we stand. We stand for responsible government, with the check of a Seanad and an independent judiciary and, if you want it, a ceremonial head of the State, who will have no real powers under the Constitution. That is the system of checks and balances which we believe would work for this country. We see in the provisions of this Draft Constitution in reference to the President, particularly in reference to this very wide power of giving him authority by law, a very serious menace in the future. The President smiles. The President asked for examples, and I will give them to him, but, before I do that, I want to develop the point I mentioned at the outset of my remarks, that, when I heard the President's offer made first, that these powers would be exercisable only on the advice of the Government, I thought that, in effect, that was the same position as that with respect to the Governor-General. Unfortunately, there is a difference, and, if it were not for that difference, I would unhesitatingly accept the President's offer.

This new functionary is to be elected by the people. He is, therefore, in this position, that he can claim the same authority for his actions, legal or illegal, as the Government of the day can for their actions. The source of both their authorities is the vote of the people. Now, I will give an example to the President. Suppose a law were passed providing that the President should sign all inter-Governmental agreements, and should do so on the advice of the Executive Council. Assume that this present Government was in power when that law was passed, and that the President was in existence. We can call him the mythical A B. This Government, which is at the moment or which pretends to be, in conflict with the Government of Great Britain in the so-called economic war, passes that law providing that all inter-Governmental agreements shall be signed by the President, on the advice of the Executive Council, and suppose the Government, whose majority in this House passed that law, go for a general election and are defeated at that general election. A Government from this side of the House, which has declared its intentions of ending that so-called economic war takes up office, and an inter-Governmental agreement is made between this country and Great Britain, and that inter-Governmental agreement is perhaps given the force of law and presented for signature to the President. Suppose he refuses to sign it? What is to compel him? How is that agreement to be carried out? How is the money to be lawfully voted, if there is money to be paid under that agreement or expenses to be incurred under that agreement, if he refuses, during a period of six and a half years, to sign it, or to sign a Bill giving effect to it? He is above the law. He cannot be brought to court, by mandamus or otherwise. It is not a high crime or a misdemeanour, and he cannot be impeached. The President has asked for a concrete example, and I have given him one.

It does not hold.

I could give numerous other examples. I admit that, on the President's new offer, they would not be as serious as they would be on the existing draft. I said, in my Second Reading speech, that the President could be authorised by law to raise taxation. So he could, and without coming to the Dáil. He could be authorised to issue lettres de cachet, and so he could.

No.

And without contravening the provisions of the Constitution.

I should like to see him try.

The President asked me whether I could give him examples of laws that could be passed and I am giving them. It is not a question of liking to see him try or not. I challenge the President to say if that law could be passed and, if passed, whether it would in any way contravene any single word, line or article of this existing Constitution. Of course, it would not.

I do not agree with the Deputy at all.

If the President does not agree with me, perhaps he will bring up one of Deputy Aiken's chapelgate men to show me where I am wrong. I have not found any lawyer to tell me. One of Deputy Aiken's chapel-gate men may tell me. I do not think the President will tell me I am wrong, because I think he will get better advice than that. I want the President to tell me if a law were passed by the Oireachtas enabling the President by letter under his hand to order my detention at his will and pleasure, in what respect would that in any way contravene one article, one line or one word of this Draft Constitution.

Parliament could do it, so it is only a question of whether you are going to do it through the Government, or through the President on the advice of the Government.

The President is there for seven years.

And responsible to no one.

One at a time.

The President will have ample opportunity to answer these points. He has asked for examples and I have given them. I particularly rely on the example I have given with reference to a settlement of the economic war and I want him, if he can, to give me an answer to that. I can see no answer to it. The real fundamental objection to this proposal is the fact that both the Government and the President will try to justify their respective actions from the authority they derive from the people. That is the real trouble in connection with all this scheme in this Draft Constitution—that you have the seeds of conflict sown, if this Constitution is passed in its present form, by reason of the possibility of conflict between the President, claiming a direct mandate from the people, and the Executive Council, or the Government, as it is now to be called, also claiming a direct mandate from the people. If the President happens to be a particular type of man, he will refuse to do these things or will thwart the Government in certain things. He cannot be touched by law. He will resort to highfalutin' talk about his being the guardian of the Constitutional rights and liberties of the people, the direct representative of the people and the direct appointee of the plain people, and the seeds of conflict will be sown. The President, of course, was right when he said that you cannot in a Constitution legislate for every impossible contingency and provide the guardians for those who are supposed to be the custodians, but at least you can do this: you can say that so far as it is reasonably and humanly possible, no new institution of the State will be set up which may be used, under the cloak of democracy, to undermine the people's rights.

It is perfectly possible to support this amendment and yet be in favour of a system of checks and balances, and it is perfectly possible to oppose the creation of this functionary, the President, and yet be in favour of a system of checks and balances. I suggest that the speech we heard half an hour ago from Deputy McGilligan did not sound like the speech of a person who was in favour of a system of checks and balances.

Did it go against the judiciary or the Second Chamber?

There was no specification of the judiciary or Second Chamber, but there was a clear implication that the Government of the day should be unchecked by any authority whatever.

I never said it and never meant it.

I said it was implied, and it is within the recollection of the House whether I am right in that or not. In my opinion, that was the whole tenor of the speech. The speech of Deputy O'Higgins and the speech of Deputy Costello travelled a long way from this amendment. They have attacked the whole principle of creating such a functionary as is proposed in this Constitution, and, from what they have said, one would imagine that nothing of the sort had ever been tried elsewhere. A great deal has been said about the seeds of conflict that are sown by the concurrent existence of two authorities deriving their sanction from the people, but there is exactly that objection, whatever force it has, to having two Chambers. If you have two Chambers, each purporting to have some authority from the people, directly or indirectly, you may say that you have the seeds of conflict. Similarly, if you have a President elected by the people or elected by Parliament, you may say that you have sown the seeds of conflict. Of course, there is something in such a statement, but I do suggest that the objection is by no means a fatal one. It is an objection which has been overcome elsewhere. The President of the French Republic is more than the ceremonial head of a State. He owes his position to election by the Parliament—not by the people— and he is often of a different political Party from the Government which happens to be in office. Nevertheless, it has not been found in practice that he is so lacking in sense and so lacking in patriotism as to be constantly obstructing the Government of the day.

Give us an example of anything the French President can do.

In the first place, he has the power to decide whom he should invite to form a Government. That is often a very considerable power.

Every act of the President must be countersigned by a Minister.

Suppose it has to be countersigned by a Minister?

Is not that Ministerial responsibility?

That is what we want. He is under the thumb of the Government.

Of the whole Government?

You are thinking of one man acting against the wishes of the rest of the Government.

When a Government goes out, is Deputy McGilligan suggesting that the President of the French Republic has to get the permission of some member of that Government before he decides whom to invite to form a new Government?

I shall read you the Articles dealing with that, but I tell you that every act of the President must be countersigned by a Minister. The only thing he can do is dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, if he gets the assent of the Senate.

I repeat that in French Ministerial crisis after French Ministerial crisis—there have been plenty of them, not arising out of any conflict with the President but arising out of the peculiar system of French politics—the French Presidents have played a most important part, and it has never been suggested that the functions of the French President are purely ceremonial. As a matter of fact, the choice of President is taken very seriously, and Parties in France take a very great interest in the selection of the particular individual who is to be put into that post—an interest that goes far beyond the mere question of who is going to be the ceremonial head of the State. Then you have the Republic of Finland, where the President is elected by direct popular vote of the whole country. The Government of Finland has an excellent reputation and has worked along very well ever since its creation. I have argued with the President in favour of his——

Every act of the Finnish President has to be counter signed by a Minister.

I confess I am not prepared to take Deputy McGilligan's word as to the position of the Finnish President, for this reason: I was informed about two years ago, when I inquired apropos of Second Chambers into the position in Finland, by somebody high up in the British Foreign Office that the person who counted for more than either chamber in Finland was the President.

Better read the Constitution.

I am referring to the personal influence of the man who held that post.

Article 34 of their Constitution is pretty explicit on that matter.

I admit I have not come armed with the Articles of their Constitution.

Deputy McGilligan has.

As regards the actual working of both the French and Finnish Constitutions, I state confidently that the Presidents of both countries are more than ceremonial heads of the State. In the present case, we have launched out into a discussion of whether or not it is desirable to create such a functionary in this country. Deputy Costello has given us hair-raising suggestions as to the powers that might be conferred upon him. Is it quite clear that this Parliament at the present moment could not confer hair-raising powers on somebody if it chose so to do? If we chose to pass a law authorising somebody to issue lettres de cachet, is there anything more in our present Constitution to prevent us doing so than there is in this proposed Constitution? I suggest that there is not. When you come down to an examination of what really is in the Constitution and look at what are the really substantial powers it is proposed to give this President—the powers which will be exercisable at his own discretion—what do they amount to? Is not the one power given him that really matters, the power in connection with reference of Bills to the people? Is not that the one power given him that really matters? Under what circumstances is that power to be exercised? The majority of the members of the Seanad and not less than one-third of the members of the Dáil must, in the first place, have addressed a joint petition to the President in order to secure a referendum. That having been done, the President has to consult the Council of State. Having consulted the Council of State, he is free to take a decision as to whether the matter is one that, in his opinion, warrants a referendum or not. I am not, of course, referring to constitutional matters in which there has to be a referendum but to matters other than constitutional matters.

I speak as one who is keenly in favour of a referendum. I should like the referendum to be a permanent part of our political machinery here and, while I do not think it ought to be used every second day or that there is any danger of its being so used, I think it is a very valuable thing to have. If you are putting something there that is new—I know there was a referendum in the present Constitution at an earlier date, but what we are doing now is, nevertheless, something new—and making the referendum specially available as a means of settling possible differences between the Dáil and Seanad, it is not unreasonable that some discretion should be allowed to the head of the State in deciding whether a matter is sufficiently important to warrant a referendum or not. I do not say I cling desperately to his having that power, but if he does not have that power, some other machinery must be devised for deciding the question whether a referendum should be held or not. That machinery might be found by the Opposition to be, at least, as unsatisfactory as the machinery suggested in the Draft Constitution—namely, the discretion of the President.

I put forward these considerations because I honestly believe they are relevant to the case, and I am sorry that there should be any heat aroused by this sort of discussion. I see no reason for it. I intervened with perfect calm and politeness with regard to the subject of checks and balances, and an outburst of rage immediately proceeded from the Front Bench of the Opposition when I dared to remind them that they had been in favour of such a thing, and suggested that what Deputy McGilligan was saying rather implied that checks and balances ought not to exist. Having gone through this Constitution very jealously—none of us is in a position to get up and dogmatise and claim to be infallible; we do the best we can with such brains as we have—to see if anything approaching a dictatorial position was being accorded to the President, I came to the conclusion that there was not, and I am only sorry that, by the section we are now discussing, the President seems to me to have given an opening to the creation of all sorts of fears which, I think, are not justified. I would repeat to him the suggestion that anything he gains by having this section in is more than counterbalanced by the misunderstanding and alarm that it will create.

I, for one, have felt a very considerable anxiety in relation to this particular matter in Article 12 which speaks of the powers given to the President by law, and more specifically in relation to Article 13, Section 10 (2) where it is said that:—

No such power or function shall be exercisable or performable by him save only on the advice of the Government, or after consultation with the Council of State.

I think the objection which has been taken, in so far as it is taken to the Constitution as it is written here, is an objection which may properly be taken. Now, I do not think that it adds anything to the merits of the case to use any such expression as Yes-men, or any of the wild suggestions that have been made, but there does seem to me, or there did seem to me, to be a residual difficulty here, and that that residual difficulty should be met.

The President has defined the powers of the new President as being powers which he would exercise within the conventions of this Constitution: that he was not to receive powers outside the conventions of this Constitution, and to the extent to which that is so, then, personally, I am not disturbed. The question which has arisen, however, is, whether or not in the written word of the Constitution power to extend those powers is limited to powers within the convention of this Constitution. The only powers that can be given to the President are to be given either by the Constitution—by a change in the Constitution which, of course, will go through all the ordinary checks and have to be considered in exactly the same way as any other constitutional method—or they are to be given by law. Now, no stream can rise higher than its source, and no authority can go higher than its source. The power that makes a law is precisely the power which can repeal a law, and, in theory—leaving out the question of time elements and time lags and, they are important matters—it is perfectly clear that any power that is given to the President, whether to be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council or, under what I regard as the illusory check of "after consultation with the Council of State," is a power which is given by law, which is regulated by law, which can be withdrawn by law; which is given by an authority, which is maintained by that authority and which is withdrawn by the same authority. Up to that point, and apart from the question of time lags and so on, there does not seem to be any question in theory, but where the difficulty arose was that, in relation to powers which the President exercises on the advice of his Ministers, he exercises those powers under the continuous check and control and authority of this Dáil: the continuous day to day and hourly check of the authority of this Dáil through its Executive Council and its President. The power which is given to him to be exercised "after consultation with the Council of State," or the power which he could exercise, independent of this Dáil, during the interval of time in which it would be necessary to withdraw the authority under which he exercised it—in my opinion that power should go, and that difficulty has been met in amendment No. 53 which the President is moving to Article 13. That amendment reads:—

In section 10 to delete sub-section 2º and to insert a new section as follows:

11. No power or function conferred on the President by law shall be exercisable or performable by him save only on the advice of the Government.

When that amendment is incorporated in the Constitution it means that any power whatever which is given to the President will be exercised by the continuous authority, and under the continuous control, of this Dáil. The Dáil has no power to give an authority that it has not got itself. It cannot do more through the President than it can do itself directly. Any power which it delegates under the clause as it now is it delegates under its continuous control. That, in my opinion, is a safeguard which is introduced in this particular amendment of the President's. That is one of the points that was raised. I want to say definitely that that was a gap which required to be filled and which, I think, has been filled.

Another rather extraneous point has been raised which I think could probably be better discussed on another portion of the Bill. I will only allude to it because I want to recognise the extent to which there is some validity left in it. It is suggested that you may have a conflict of authority under the operation of a clause of this kind between the Taoiseach and the President. To the extent to which there is any conflict of authority founded in any power he receives, it can be dealt with under the law, and if the President is not prepared to bow to the decision of the Executive Council, then, under amendment 54 which is put forward by the President, the authority is definitely placed in an effective commission to see that it does carry out this power. Now, that again is technically perfectly sound and clear. As far as mere technical law is concerned, there is no gap. There is, however, just this residual difficulty.

Assume for a moment that there was a conflict between the President and the Taoiseach in some matter in which the President thought, or claimed to think, that his was a better and more adequate expression of the people's will than that of the existing Dáil and the existing Executive Council. That is where the real risk comes in. Say, for instance, that the President were to go to a general election himself, and assume that he were to say: "I disagree with the Executive Council and I am prepared to resign my position as President; I am prepared to go and be re-elected by a direct ad hoc vote of the people.” If you had such a position as that, you would certainly be creating a position of difficulty. That, in my opinion, is the only residual difficulty which remains, and it is one which certainly requires to be considered.

I do not know if the President has derived any encouragement to persist against this amendment by the benediction given to his point of view by Deputy MacDermot. Perhaps, however, if the President reflects that that benediction was based on a discussion of other Constitutions, and that it was based entirely on hearsay, he may not derive much encouragement or comfort from it. Deputy MacDermot tried to draw a parallel between the case of the French Constitution and the one before the House—or rather, he used that against Deputy Costello's argument.

I urged the President to accept the amendment.

He referred also to the Finnish Constitution, and Deputy McGilligan pointed out to him that those two Constitutions contain a provision which the Opposition here would be perfectly satisfied to accept if it were introduced by the President in regard to this section. Now, the Deputy referred also to the system of Dáil and Seanad—the two-House system—as being parallel in some respects to the position created here as regards the powers of the Government and the powers of the President, and he said that some such conflict could arise there as was suggested by Deputy McGilligan could arise here: a conflict, that is to say, between a popularly elected Dáil and a Seanad, who could say that they also, in some form or another, had derived their authority from the people. Now, we have had a Seanad in fairly recent times in this State, and surely Deputy MacDermot realises that there were very effective checks on the Seanad, even in its first days in this State, and that there were very effective means of dealing with any unreasonable or unduly prolonged opposition to the will of the Dáil.

The President, on this question, himself said, as an argument against Deputy Costello's point, that you might have this conflict between the Government and the President, and that you might have the President refusing to sign a Bill that was passed by the Oireachtas, that he would like to see him try. Now, is not the implication of that simply this: that it is highly improbable that a President would act unreasonably or in such a way as might conflict with the popular will? We are standing here, however, for a Constitution in which that position cannot arise. Without having in view any particular living individual in the office of President, we must contemplate that some time, perhaps, a President will be elected in this State who will run counter to the wishes of the people. It has happened in other States, and what we wish is that a safeguard should be put in the Constitution which will make it impossible for that situation to arise. Do not let us be left to depend on the principle "We would like to see any President try to do that." We might get a President who might try to do that, and we wish to safeguard against that by means of this amendment.

It seems to be inevitable, Sir, that on this section we should have another series of Second Reading speeches, and I suppose that, in order to reply effectively to the speeches that have been made, I would have to repeat a Second Reading speech also. However, I do not think we should do that. We have decided on a principle by a majority. It is true that we did not get agreement—I forget the numbers, but I think the Opposition went in opposition—but we decided by a majority that this was a principle that was going to stand. Clearly, we have to have some method of resolving the differences of opinion, and no matter how far I should like to go to meet the views that have been expressed on the opposite benches and to meet any points of detail in so far as they can be met, I clearly cannot be asked to meet the Opposition to the point of completely surrendering the fundamental principles that are here. If the speeches were confined, as I think they ought to be confined, to this particular amendment, in this particular case, we should make some progress, but now the debate has ranged around the whole circle that we had on the Second Reading Stage. We have a lot of phrases such as "an individual being enabled to throttle Parliament." Now, in the name of goodness, where is there anything in this Constitution to justify the use of such a phrase as "an individual being enabled to throttle Parliament"? Certainly we can make no progress if phrases of that sort are to be used. I ask anybody to read that Constitution and see if phrases of that sort are justified in any way by the Constitution.

At a matter of fact, the President is limited and confined, and the powers that he can exercise are very definitely set out in every case except this one case, and it was suggested in this one case that, because these extra functions might be given by law, extraordinary functions, such as those mentioned by Deputy Costello, could be given. Now, they could not be. These powers could not be given, because they would conflict directly and immediately with the Constitution, and they could only be given to the President by amendment of the Constitution. In relation to these external functions, even if these powers, which are nominal powers, were given, it is clearly set forth that they are exercisable only on the advice of the Government. Now, this particular thing, in itself, as far as I can see, cannot cover a wide field. It only covers one thing of importance, and that is the possibility of having a situation in which the people decided that it was advisable to transfer these particular functions in regard to external relations—the signing of letters—to the President. That is the only thing that it is essential to provide for, and we think that you have to provide for it in the Constitution as, otherwise, the Constitution is left in a position in which it cannot meet all the things that might possibly occur. I am anxious to provide for it in case Parliament should come to that decision. I do not think that any Parliament would do it, but when we come to that particular point we can examine it in detail. I do not think a Parliament would make that transfer unless they had definitely the authority of the people to do it, because it would be one of the biggest political acts that could be taken by Parliament. It would be immediately a question in which the people would have to be consulted.

If we leave that aside, there are these minor matters which were only put in for the sake of catching in the net any small things that might arise. That, however, is the only purpose for which that section was put in, and it seems to me that, if Deputy Costello had followed out the line on which he began, we would have arrived at an agreement. He seemed to think very definitely that the amendment I have down would meet the case. Undoubtedly, as it stood, I was thinking, in putting it down, of this: that there would be certain functions which might be transferred which, in accordance with the whole scheme of this Constitution, should be exercised by the President on the advice of the Executive Council.

There was another set of things, such as the simple case I mentioned, which need not necessarily be exercised by the President on the advice of the Executive Council, but which he should exercise after consultation with the Council of State. Now, let nobody on the opposite side of the House put it into my mouth that I regarded consultation with the Council of State as binding on the President. I made it quite clear that consultation with the Council of State was for one purpose only. That was to hear views before he took action. He would be hearing views expressed by people of diverse political parties, men who would be of a type likely to foresee the consequences of any line of action which he proposed to take. Therefore one of the purposes of the Council of State was that when he took action on his own discretion, he did so after having been fully informed of the position and of all the possible consequences of that action by people who would be in a position to inform him properly. He need not take that advice, but, at least, he would be getting the benefit of an advice which should have a very great influence on him in making his decision.

It was just possible, as it stood in its original form, that in performing his functions in accordance with the general scheme of the Constitution, the law might give him power to do these things without consultation with the Council of State. That was not intended, and the moment I saw the possibility of that I immediately agreed that it should be amended. That is the value of a discussion such as this, that an interpretation of a draft springs up to a person who has not been dealing very much with the draft more quickly than to the person who has been dealing with it. If a person is dealing with a draft and tries to express an intention, it is possible that he might express it in a form different from that which other people could consider proper, and it is well from that point of view to have people considering a draft who had nothing whatever to do with the preparation of it. I welcome every criticism of that kind. In so far as it seems to be at all founded on logic or commonsense, or to have a good foundation, I am willing to meet it, but I cannot meet suggestions from the opposite side which go to the foundation of the whole principle of the draft. There are things upon which we could get an amalgam of all sorts of views, but they would not be worth the paper upon which they were written.

I believe myself that the majority of the people and the majority of the Dáil will support the general principle of this Constitution. If I am wrong, the vote of the people will show that. To repeat what I have said, I think it would be very well for us to get the widest measure of agreement on this matter. I am anxious to get that but there is a line beyond which I cannot go. I have to make up my mind and I should like to consider whether the residuary powers are, under any circumstances, other than the one which I have in mind, worth having a difference of opinion about. Deputy MacDermot suggests that they are not. If it were not for one definite circumstance, which this Constitution should be able to meet even in its present form, I would agree with Deputy MacDermot that there is nothing that I can see coming up under it which would make it worth while having a difference of opinion. Bogeys have been raised about this matter but there is no justification for them. At the moment I am meeting these bogeys to the point of saying that if by law, by full legislation passing the two Houses, there are to be any powers given to the President, these powers must be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council, that is, that the Government will have the same responsibility for them as they will have for any other action of the President which he will take, according to this Constitution, on the advice of the Government.

There were a few points raised in some other speeches to which I might refer. One of these was that we had no power to coerce the President. Everybody seems to have passed over an important little word on page 24 of the Draft, Article 14, Section 5, which states: "The Council of State may make such provision as to them may seem meet for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of the President under this Constitution in any contingency in which the President or a commission appointed under this Article fails"— that word "fails" has some significance surely—"or is unable to exercise and perform the said powers and functions or any of them and which is not provided for by the foregoing provisions of this Article". In other words, we have here in this Constitution as it stands, a way for performing these functions. If the President should fail to perform them, they will be performed without him.

It seems to me that you want no coercive powers to compel the President to perform certain functions which it should be his concern and his obvious duty to perform, if you have a provision by which, if he fails, you can get these things done. You can get a law signed; you can get a number of other things done. You have a provision in this Draft by which if the President were to take up the position of saying "I will not sign that law," you can say to him: "Very well; there is a certain time within which it must be done and a certain procedure laid down for having it done if you do not do it." You have got a body of people who will perform the act on his behalf. If there is anything else that anybody wants inserted to make sure that the President will perform his constitutional functions, I have an open mind with regard to it, but it seems to me that that provision was designed to meet a situation of that kind and that it will work.

There was another matter raised by Deputy McGilligan—the question of a counter-signature. We have ourselves since we came into office been counter-signing certain documents. My view is that it is a matter of procedure and that the Executive of the Government of the day should give advice to that effect. This advice should refer not merely to the matter but to the form. Consequently, this question of a counter-signature is a matter which may be provided for under the Constitution by simple advice. The Government of the day has only to send up to the President a document and say: "This is the form in which we think it should be done." The document can appear with the signature already of the responsible Minister. The President will, in fact, be very anxious to get documents that are sent to him authorised and verified in advance, bearing the signature of a responsible Minister, so that there is no need to remove this provision in the Constitution. It is a matter that is provided for already and I am myself in favour of such a procedure.

Before I sit down, I want to repeat that I cannot, obviously, meet the Opposition on matters of principle which we shall have to settle by division. On matters of detail, to get the widest possible acceptance of this Constitution, I am anxious to go as far as I can. In regard to this particular word, I will not agree to the elimination of it, now at any rate, because I want to consider how it would leave us in regard to a situation for which I think this Constitution should provide. I hope this Constitution will be able to meet any possible contingencies that may arise in regard to policy—any policy that may appear good to any particular Party in the country.

I think it is right to allow for these things. It may be suggested, at a later stage, that certain safeguards should be put in. When we come to deal with any of those, I am prepared again to consider any suggestions on that line. The basis of this Constitution is that the people as a whole are to have a deciding voice in big matters of national policy. You can have that done either by election or referendum.

The further thing I want to say before I sit down is this: I think that from our side we have at no time suggested anything that would lead anybody to believe we were anxious to see a dictatorship of any kind set up. We stood firmly on democracy. Many speeches have been made by me against the Opposition because it seemed to me, from their policy at a certain period, that they were abandoning that principle. I may have been wrong; I may have misinterpreted them. At any rate nobody can show on this side of the House any tendency whatever to get away from the fundamental basis of democracy and representative government. This Constitution, I maintain, is based on the principle that the people are the ultimate authority for deciding questions; that during the period between elections Parliament is supreme. The only question where the President comes in is that in a certain set of circumstances where there is a division between the two Houses of Parliament he has the discretionary power to say: "Very well; this is a matter which the people themselves must decide." When you give a person no further power than simply to state: "This seems to me a matter on which the people will have to be consulted," you are not making him a dictator. You are simply putting him into a position in which, having been elected by the people, he says: "Very well; there is a difference of viewpoint between the two Houses of the Legislature. This is a matter of fundamental importance for the people, and the people themselves should decide." In other words, it is a safeguard for democracy.

All the arguments of Deputies on the opposite benches, since we came into office anyway, have been directed in the contrary direction to that in which they are now going. Now it is that Parliament must be supreme, and there must not be any check. Formerly it was that here we were here with enormous powers, and therefore we had to be restrained; now it is going the opposite direction. In regard to this, I will give further consideration if the Dáil wishes to take it at that, to see whether it is necessary for the whole scheme here to make this Constitution sufficient to meet all the circumstances—whether we will take out the words "and by law." My own belief is that they are not very many. There is only one thing which really matters that can be provided for. If that can be provided for otherwise——

I should like to ask the President why he wants to provide only one way. Apparently he wants this House or Parliament, as a whole, to be able to go outside the Commonwealth, if they want to, to give up using the King and use the President instead as our organ for external affairs. Supposing Parliament wanted to do the opposite? Supposing they wanted to turn the President into a representative of the King? Supposing they wanted to adopt the King as an integral part of our Constitution? If they are to be allowed to do one thing without going to the people, why should they not be allowed to do the other? I suggest that there should be an appeal to the people about both.

There is a lot to be said for that, perhaps. I will consider the whole question about "and by law," if you wish to leave it at that. At the moment I believe I am meeting the thing fairly fully in amendment No. 53.

The President says that his intention is to confer on the President just one other function.

That is the one that leaps up.

Or that possibly is the only other function which it may be necessary to confer on the President. Unfortunately, the President's assurances in this respect are of no value whatever, and convey no safeguards to any other body administering this Constitution.

Would the Deputy suggest what are the powers?

The President says that, so far, he can only discover that he wants to confer one other function on the President. As I said, the President's present assurances are of no value and provide no safeguard in that respect. The President may not be President for ever. He may change his mind and say, "A new set of circumstances has induced me to do so." Consequently, the people are thrown back into the position set out in this Constitution, namely that it is possible for the President to exercise powers and functions conferred on him by this Constitution and by law.

Subject to this Constitution.

Subject now to the condition that those powers and functions are exercisable and performable by him only on the advice of the Government. But it has already been pointed out in the course of this debate that the Government may well, as part of a purely political manoeuvre, give power to a President to do things, because through the President, through the Government, and through the Party caucus they can manage to get things done much more smoothly and with less publicity than by bringing a proposal through a legislative assembly. At one time it used to be thought that the very name of President of a country automatically carried the badge and hall-mark of democracy. But we have seen, in the past 15 years, Presidents in European and South American countries arrogate to themselves powers much more tyrannical than were ever exercised by a king. We have seen Presidents in European countries, in collusion with a political machine in their respective countries, manage to manipulate affars in such a way that the President, with the aid of the political machine which was behind him, was able to legislate by decree, was able to abolish Parliament, was able to perform all the functions which were formerly performed by the legislative assembly. I, for one, want to endeavour to ensure that, so far as this country is concerned, we are not going to create a President who, through a political party machine, may be given power and ultimately reach a dictatorial position akin to that occupied by many Presidents in Europe to-day. If the President thinks that it is likely to be necessary to give the new President this other function, what is the difficulty in the President agreeing to accept this amendment now, and coming back at a later stage and getting the Constitution amended in order to provide that the President might get additional powers of this kind? What is the difficulty about the President accepting amendment No 52 which I have submitted, which would ensure that no additional powers or functions might be conferred on the President unless legislation purporting to confer them was passed, (a) by not less than two-thirds of the members of Dáil Eireann, or (b) by a referendum. If the President is suggesting to give the President in this Constitution formal and ceremonial functions, a law can be passed enabling the President under the Constitution to exercise these formal or ceremonial functions.

You could not by law, if you do not provide for it here.

I am offering amendment No. 52 as an alternative, leaving in the words "and by law". By the adoption of that amendment we could ensure, under proportional representation, that a Government cannot arm a President with unreasonable and dictatorial powers, and that no collusion with the President would enable a Government or a President to exercise functions which properly ought to belong to a legislative assembly. As it is, it may be possible for any Government within the next three years by law to confer upon the President very definite powers, and these powers may be an invasion of the rights of Parliament, and even of the rights of the people. Under this Constitution as drafted it is possible for the Government of the day, by a majority of one vote, to confer on the new President to be elected under the Constitution, powers which will enable him to exercise very wide authority within the country. I have seen nothing during the past 15 years, particularly in eastern European countries, which justifies me in assuming that the President we are going to elect here is going to be a paragon of virtue, seeing that with prototypes the experience of many other countries has been the opposite. We may, in this Constitution, drawn in this way, find that particular powers are given the President, and new functions created, which, in the course of time might mean tyranny and dictatorship. I want to be assured that there is no possibility of that happening.

There is not that possibility.

There is not that possibility if one is prepared to say the President is speaking from the book of truth and revelation; that he is infallible, and that nothing is likely to happen when the President says it will not happen.

It could not happen under the Constitution.

If this Article is passed as it stands there is nothing to prevent him coming along at the end of 12 months and passing a Bill in this House giving to the President powers to prolong Parliament for 20 years, if the President likes.

There is.

Is there anything to prevent a Government coming along next year and amending portion of this Constitution and saying that the maximum life of a Parliament shall be seven years?

There is.

It might provide that while the maximum life of Parliament was to be seven years the President on the advice of the Executive Council might prolong Parliament for 14 years.

He could not do it.

Will the President explain?

Because it is contrary to the Constitution.

It could be amended.

Next year.

That will be dealt with when we come to that particular Article.

You are putting on the shackles here. Our hands are out for the handcuffs here.

How will you have a difficulty with regard to this Article for three years?

The President will admit that it is possible for a Party— it might be his own Party—after the forthcoming general election to say: "We have got a new mandate. We have a handsome majority. In fact it is really unnecessary to trouble the people every four years with elections. What we will really do is: we will look up Article 12 of the new Constitution and pass a new Bill giving the President under that Article powers to prolong Parliament beyond the normal seven years provided for under the Constitution and give him powers so that, on the advice of the Executive Council, Parliament can function for 14 years instead of the normal seven years.

And 27 months after.

When the three years is almost up the President might discover that after all Parliament was a nuisance.

Why can we not do it at present?

Does the President want me to make a case and present it to him? He asks why the Government does not do that at present. We have a Government here that at all events we can still criticise, but we are creating a precedent in a position to be occupied by one man who, incidentally is commander-in-chief of the Army, and that is the person we have to deal with in the future. He is the one we have to tell that he ought to walk the chalk line provided by Parliament. I have seen that kind of thing tried on by other political parties in Europe, and by other presidents, and it did not work out in the nice, easy, democratic way that the President wants us to believe it will work out here. It is because I am afraid of the additional powers that may be conferred on the President that I am opposed to these powers being conferred by law, or if given by law, that they should only be given by an overwhelming majority of the House or by a referendum to the people. If the President is prepared to accept the position in which a President gets these powers by an overwhelming majority of the Oireachtas, I am satisfied. If he does not accept that proposal there is a way out, namely, the President can go to the people and get a referendum for the additional functions which he is to discharge. Those of us who are prepared to oppose the giving of these functions and powers to the President can then take to the hustings and ask the country to reject such a proposal. If the President is only thinking of giving the new President formal functions there ought to be no difficulty about accepting amendment No. 52, which would satisfy my point of view. In the absence of an assurance that he will accept amendment No. 52, I am in favour of taking out the words, "and by law," because I think there is a potential danger which might ultimately expand, and that we will have the same difficulty here as was experienced by the people with other political parties in European countries.

I presume Deputy Norton is quite clear that even if the President accepts these words that only deals with the particular powers we are discussing. This does not at all deal with the general powers of the President, but only removes one obstacle in the way of dictatorship, as far as we are concerned. We had the usual tribute to democracy from the President. He said that he stood firmly on democracy. It is not the first time he stood firmly on democracy— stood very firmly on democracy; trampled on it very firmly. We learn now that the purpose of this Constitution—the principle of this Constitution on which the President cannot give way, because it goes to the principle— is these powers of the President. These are the President's own words. He said he was quite willing to meet the Opposition. The real purpose of the Constitution as now revealed by the President is the powers of the future President. The idea that it is to protect the liberties of the people or anything else must apparently go, but anything that proposes to limit the future powers of the President goes to the principle, and on the Second Reading he got a mandate for these powers, as far as Parliament is concerned. Therefore, I think the Opposition was quite right, in regard to this Constitution, in concentrating on the powers of the President. In that we are justified by the President's own speech. His speech, as far as I could follow it, would seem to be an argument to remove any objections he might have in accepting our amendment.

On the Second Reading, in dealing with this particular matter, he spoke of nominal powers. To use his own phrase, the only thing that leaped up at that time was visitors to universities. In the course of the Second Reading he adumbrated, in answer to Deputy Lavery, the possibility that other powers are concerned—grave powers, as the President will admit.

Not at all.

If the President will follow me for once. Grave powers, so far as the status of this country is concerned, can be given by a mere Act of Parliament. He admits that that should not be done without the people pronouncing on it. I presume he means that it should not be done without appealing to the people, without the people being consulted. Why, then, does he take this particular power? Why does he want to give that particular power now to ordinary legislation, seeing that he can carry it through by appealing to the people by an ordinary amendment to the Constitution? What is the difficulty? Surely from that particular portion of the President's argument we should expect him to accept this amendment, if that is the only case he can think of. The other cases mentioned to him were pooh-poohed. Lawyers were asked to give him their help. What use are lawyers anyhow? If they agree with the President they are not necessary; if they disagree with him they are wrong. They are like Second Chambers. Deputy Norton said the President was like the Book of Holy Writ. He is much more like the Koran, if I may say so. He will remember what the Caliph Omar said about the books in the Alexandrian Library: if they agree with the Koran, they are not necessary; if they are in contradiction with it, they are wrong. When lawyers tell the President that the law means so-and-so, they are wrong!

There are other lawyers, as I said before.

There are, but the thing cannot be so clear if there is such a division between lawyers. This is the matter that the people are to decide upon, the plain, simple language that the people are to decide upon, things are so clear! Here in this House the President asked for instances, and when they were put up by a lawyer he said that the lawyer was wrong! I did not notice that the President went out to consult the Attorney-General when the case was put up to him. He knows what the Attorney-General is going to tell him, because that Attorney-General is a good lawyer—he will agree with the President. That is his function.

It is the same way with Parliament. As Deputy Norton pointed out, he was taking bouquets because he had not abolished Parliament. What is his conception of Parliament? To agree with the President. What is the function of the Opposition? To agree with the President. If they discuss a measure they are going beyond their function; that is not the way in which he wants them to discuss it. He wants to tell them the method in which they ought to discuss it. If they agree with the President, they are superfluous; if they disagree with him, they are wrong. Is not that plain logic, as the President would say, even commonsense? That is what it amounts to. This is a great principle of the Constitution, namely, the powers of the President—he himself has said it. Even he himself had not thought of important things like external relations, apparently, on the Second Reading, because it was strange that he only gave us formal things, such as visitors to universities. But so jealous is he of the powers of the future President that the smallest diminution of them will not be tolerated. The Opposition is not discussing the amendment in the way he wants them to discuss it! They are unreasonable because they criticise!

This is one more of the many powers in this Constitution that will enable one of two things to happen—a serious clash or else, in a certain crisis, a step towards dictatorship. There is no good in the President overlooking it; he cannot do so. It has occurred again and again in different countries in Europe; it has occurred in history. When you have two popularly elected authorities, one a House of Representatives representing different bits of the country, a constituency here and a constituency there; when there is a conflict between this House and a man elected by the whole people, the man elected by the whole people will do what he has often done; he will say: "You are mere representatives, not of the people, but of bits of the people, fractions of the people; I am the representative of the whole people; it is my will counts." Remember, he takes an oath not merely to obey the Constitution but also to guard the interests of the Irish people. He may take that oath seriously. He may not regard that oath as a mere formula. His duty may compel him to run counter to the wishes of the Executive Government, because he is the representative of the whole people. The President says that in the Draft there is the word "fail"—"if he fails to do so-and-so". I am sorry that these much despised lawyers are not present to tell him whether "fail" could really have the interpretation the President pretends, namely, at his discretion refusing to do a certain thing. Deputy Costello put forward a very definite case as regards the question of the annuities, that an outgoing Parliament could legislate so as to say: "This agreement must be signed by the President." Supposing he refuses to sign.

He is failing to do his duty.

That is not failing to do his duty in the legal sense. I do not believe a word of that.

Of course, it is.

There is no good in getting vexed because people disagree with you. That is not democracy. Democracy is calmly and patiently listening to what the other side has to say, even though you happen to disagree with it. They are rash to disagree with the President. But that is democracy. That is what the President ought to get into his head. That is what he has never got into his head. He is giving an example of it at present. There is no good getting vexed on this particular point.

I could not get vexed with the Deputy if I tried.

You were making a very good attempt until you recovered yourself. As Deputy Norton pointed out, there are various other provisions right through this giving what we want to set out, what the President ought to set out if he believes in Parliamentary democracy. I do not know if he does. But, if he believes in Parliamentary democracy, he ought to set out to limit the powers of the President and be glad to limit them. There is nothing in the next three years, so far as I can see, to prevent a Parliament, by a mere majority, giving, as Deputy Norton pointed out, absolute powers to the President in nearly everything. And that is the Constitution, that is guarding the rights of the people! The main purpose is the power of the President, not the liberty of the people. Let the President remember that dictators, wherever we find them, usually base their power on a plebiscite. I wonder will he tell me one who in recent times has not done it— not one, so far as I know. Where you have had, as you have had on various occasions during the last 100 years, a transition from a republic to an autocracy, you have it generally on the part of a man who had a plebiscite of the people behind him.

You are asking for that trouble. There is no good in getting up, as the President does, and saying, "I am reasonable; I will accept anything you say but do not say anything important; if there is anything unimportant I will accept it, but if it is important I will not." Then when we get to the real business the President says: "I had a mandate for the Second Reading; this is not capable of discussion; this is not capable of amendment because the Bill received a Second Reading." No curtailment of the powers of the President is possible because we gave a Second Reading to this Bill! That is not displaying any sense of the responsibilities of Parliament and any sense of the functions of Parliament. We see that type of mind running through this Constitution. But we object to these powers and we look with great anxiety at these powers. I find it very hard to get my mind—much as I should like to do it—to accept the position that what the President is aiming at is merely this question of the transfer of powers dealing with external relations. If that is so why not be satisfied with the power to amend the Constitution? The President admits it is such an important change in the Constitution that the people should be consulted. Therefore, he admits that it should not be done by ordinary law. There are much more important things so far as the powers of the President are concerned in the Constitution. The wishes of the Opposition ought to be met so far as this amendment is concerned. The Article will not get rid of the powers of the President leading to autocracy. I see that too many of the powers in this Draft lead to autocracy, not to have a general fear that this may lead to it also. The President tells us that no wise man will abuse these powers. If everybody were wise, if everybody even in high positions were wise there would be no necessity for these written Constitutions. The President must legislate precisely against that danger. We know it may be possible that the new President may be one of those obstinate people who thinks he knows everything better than anybody else, one of those people who thinks he knows better what the people want than the people's representatives. I know that sort of thing can occur. I know very well that the President finds it hard to envisage such things occurring! But he ought to make an effort to see there is a danger of such a tendency. That is a matter that should exercise the President's imagination; it is a matter that he should make an effort to guard against. The President speaks of deception practised on the people. Therefore, he says it is his duty to save the people from the deception that is practised on them by the elected representatives. I think that the manner in which the President has met this amendment is most unreasonable and, if it is an instance of his sweet reasonableness on more important matters, what are we to expect?

I do not know where there is any use in talking further on this amendment.

Hear, hear.

In designing and going through this Constitution I have put myself not on these benches, but on the opposite benches. I have been anxious to see provisions in this Constitution so that if the people, who for the considerable period of time we have been here as a Government had been showing a very definite tendency towards the totalitarian State and towards dictatorship, happened to get over here on these benches, this Constitution would not give them any loophole to do what Deputy O'Sullivan suggests might be done. I have gone through this Draft Constitution, as Deputy MacDermot says he did, and not merely gone through it, but I have designed it with jealous care, so that, if there should be a change of Government at any time, the people who showed such a tendency towards dictatorship at one time should not have the means of giving effect to such tendencies. There is nothing in this document which would make it possible to set up a dictatorship here. The powers given to the President are definitely limited.

I am compelled again to go over those powers because of the wild statements made in connection with this amendment. The President's powers are directly circumscribed. The powers are, by this Constitution, in the hands of the elected Government. Where the President comes in in an executive capacity, he acts on the advice of the Executive Council and he cannot act otherwise. In regard to legislation his powers are confined to two things, namely, that he refers to the Supreme Court a measure which appears to be one which is contrary to the Constitution. The other power he has is to refer to the people a measure on which there has been disagreement between the two Houses. The President has no power if the two Houses agree. In the case of a measure in which there is disagreement between the two Houses the disagreement is resolved if the President considers it is a matter that ought to be referred to the people. That is the way in which disagreement between the two Houses is resolved. What is the good of talking about this?

It is nonsense.

Yes, it is absolute nonsense.

I have as good a right to express an opinion on this as the President.

It is absolute nonsense to say that this Constitution enables a dictatorship to be set up. It is suggested that the words "and by law" enables a dictatorship to be set up, and that the extra functions that could be given by law would open the doors to the giving of dictatorial powers. That is also impossible. That Article that we are discussing now gives no powers at all. It says "shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law." The Article that gives the President functions is Article 13, and that article says "subject to this Constitution." And this Constitution says that the sole legislative authority for the country shall be the Parliament. That cannot give the President any legislative function. No executive function can be given to him because it is not given to him by the Constitution, and no judicial function is given to him.

I put it as a challenge to the Opposition side to tell us how it is that, even by law, the President could get under this Constitution dictatorial powers or dictatorial functions. It is not possible under the Constitution. The Constitution has to envisage two sets of circumstances, one in which this country would be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth and the other in which this country might not be associated with the British Commonwealth, that association having been changed by the will of the people in their own interests. It is important that the Constitution should be capable of meeting either of these two alternatives. I do admit that if I were at present in opposition I would say that before that change was made the people should be consulted. But a situation might arise in which the matter might have to be handled over-night, and while a permanent solution would certainly have to be referred to the people, there might be a situation which might have to be dealt with immediately and it might be necessary in the interests of the State to transfer those powers for the time being to the President. But what are they? They are of a nominal character. The responsibility for their functioning would be altogether on the Government of the day. I repeat that there is not in this Constitution a single particle of foundation for the assertion that the President can get dictatorial powers. None whatever. I cannot see the arguments from the opposite side——

Hear, hear.

——with regard to matters of that kind. The same opinion was expressed on the Second Reading, and if we are not to go on interminably with this discussion we have to come to a decision. I hold that we have, on the Second Reading, come to a decision on this matter. The case put up by the other side was that this put the President in a dictatorial position. This side took up the attitude that it did not. We voted on it, and that was decided and accepted. We have to go on the general principle, therefore, that this Constitution is accepted by this side as not being the Constitution that the other benches would represent it to be.

The main principle is the dictatorial powers.

The main principle is that the Deputies opposite, without any particle of foundation and for purely political purposes, make this out to be different from what it is. That is my conviction.

That is not the point.

If Deputies on the opposite benches are going to deal with the Constitution on that basis, we will accept it. We would like to have it dealt with on the other basis, but if that is not possible, and knowing that the Opposition want it the other way, we will have to take the gauntlet if it is thrown down to us. This Constitution is not, and cannot be shown by any reasonable person who approaches the matter in a proper spirit to be, of a dictatorial nature. It does not put the President in a dictatorial position. You may go to the people and do your best. The people understand perfectly well, and they will not be misled.

Hear hear. And you are finding that out!

We are prepared to meet you, if you want that. But if you wish to adopt the other attitude, we will meet you on the hustings. What the President wants to insist on is that this Constitution is what it is on the face of it and not what Deputies opposite represent it to be.

It is just what the President says it is.

I have been anxious to meet Deputies and I was prepared to go a certain distance, but there are limits to the point at which you can meet them. If they want it the other way, the people will judge and all the power of the Deputies opposite to misrepresent this Constitution will be in vain. Now, in regard to this, the view I take of it is that you cannot under this, by law, give to the President any powers either on the legislative, executive or judicial side, and the only thing of importance left over and possible to be given is that he might operate as the organ for external affairs instead of the King, according to the present Act, the Act passed in December. If anybody can show me, with all his imagination, if anybody can get up a single case in which powers of a dictatorial character can be given, and substantiate it, then I am willing to withdraw, but not until that is shown to me. I am not willing to meet the views expressed in connection with this particular section. In any event, we would have to deal with this at a later stage, where actual powers are being conferred in Article 13. That matter would have to stand by our decision on Article 13. If Deputies want to have a vote on the matter at this stage, they can do so, but I am not going to give way at this stage.

With regard to my amendment No. 13:—

In section 2, sub-section 3º, to delete the words "proportional representation by means of"—

someone has suggested—this is purely a small point of wording—that you cannot have proportional representation when there is only one person in question, but the system of election by the single transferable vote you can have. As there has been a question raised about this as to its precise wording, perhaps it would be better to leave it over until Report Stage. The point at issue is that in the case of the election of a single person, it is not proper to speak of proportional representation, but it is quite sufficient to set down the method of the single transferable vote. The exact wording, I am informed, is not quite satisfactory, and I should like to bring it in again on Report.

Is this amendment No. 13?

Yes.

Is the amendment being moved?

I said I was withdrawing it to present it again on Report Stage. The point in question is that proportional representation can hardly be properly applied to the election of a single individual, but the method of the single transferable vote, which is associated with that system, can be applied and the question is what is the more accurate way of expressing the idea. There is a question as to whether this particular mode of expression is the more accurate way of doing it. As the question has been raised, I am anxious to get further opinions and to bring it in on Report.

I would suggest for further consideration that the proper phrase to be used is "voting shall be on the principle of proportional representation" and that the latter part should be dropped.

This is in connection with the election of the President.

Yes, and I suggest that this amendment should be made through the whole Constitution. wherever proportional representation is set down.

I cannot accept that because there are various types of proportional representation.

Why should we bind ourselves to this one?

That is a matter on which we may have to have a difference of opinion, but there is no question of a difference of opinion here, or perhaps there is. When a single person is being elected, the system of a single transferable vote which has been used is available.

It was always held that with regard to proportional representation, which this country adopted, we had adopted the worst possible system.

That may be the Deputy's opinion.

It is not my viewpoint, but one held by a number of people, and it is a matter that might be argued.

We can argue it when it comes up again.

Is it not peculiar that on Committee Stage, which is the Stage for argument, we have nothing before us?

I move amendment No. 14:—

In section 3, sub-section 1º, line 1, to delete the word "seven" and substitute the word "five."

This is to reduce from seven years to five years the period of office of the President. Seven years seems a very long time, and I suggest that five years is more moderate and reasonable.

The length of Parliament is five years, and I think the period set down is a very common term for a Presidency. If you are going to have election by the people, the term of seven years is not too long. It is the term in the case of a number of Presidents in other countries, and consequently it seems to be a reasonable term.

In the United States, I think it is four years.

That is a different system, as the Deputy knows.

Undoubtedly, but it is four years, even with great executive powers and direct election for those special powers.

Is it withdrawn?

I do not wish to withdraw it unless nobody else is in favour of it. If the Opposition are in favour of it, I should like to press it to a vote.

The period can only be properly considered and argued when we have the powers clearly before the House. Until we know the extent of the powers and the check there will be in the way of Government control, it is impossible to determine what the period should be. Perhaps Deputy MacDermot would defer his amendment until we see what the powers are to be?

Am I limited to withdrawing the amendment?

The Deputy can withdraw it and reintroduce it at a later stage.

We are making no real progress because we are simply putting off our decisions.

Who is responsible for that?

That is all right but you can carry it too far.

I move amendment No. 15:—

In Section 3, sub-section 1º, line 4, before the words "be eligible" to insert the word "not".

The object of the amendment is to make certain that a person who has occupied the position of President for such a long period as seven years shall not be eligible for re-election. There is a fundamental principle behind this amendment. I have already expressed my dissatisfaction with the method of election of the President by direct vote by the people. I have pointed out the dangers that lie in that system. If the system is persisted in, these dangers can be minimised by providing that, during the tenure of office of President by a particular individual who has attained to office by direct vote of the people, he will not be subjected to political influence. If the provisions of the Draft Constitution, as they stand, are persisted in, the President will be eligible for re-election on his own nomination. Having occupied this office for a period of seven years, he will go before the people for re-election. During that period of seven years, all his public actions may be directed towards the one aim of being re-elected at the end of his term of office. A period of seven years for any public office is rather too long. In the case of the office being created under this Draft, it is entirely unjustifiable. He is being given very extensive personal discretionary powers.

In order to get elected at all to the office, he must be a politician. He must have behind him a political party—a machine of some type whether it belongs to one of the existing parties or is created by himself. Whether the machine he uses for the purpose of securing election is that of an existing party or one set up by himself, the results may be—it is not necessary for me to go beyond saying they "may be"—disastrous from a public point of view. Having secured election through a party machine, the President, if he desires to be re-elected at the end of the seven years, must perform the functions of his office during those seven years with the ultimate object of re-election. That is not in the public interest.

It is very undesirable that a man occupying a responsible office of this kind should be subjected, in any way, to political influences or should have to look to the political effect of any of his official acts on his electorate when he comes up for re-election at the end of this term. It is not in human nature that he should omit to direct his actions towards securing re-election. If there is any justification whatever—I see none—for the creation of this office of President, elected by direct vote of the people, then the only justification is that the person so elected will be impartial and above political parties. If he belongs to one or other of the political parties striving for power in the State or even if he has a party of his own, it is not going to work to the public advantage. His actions will be directed to his own political advantage. The only way we can minimise the evil effects which will result if this system of direct vote for the President is persisted in, is by providing that there shall be only one term of office for each individual. I should be glad to hear from the President any justification he can offer for providing for the re-election of a man who has occupied this position for seven years. It may be that a particular man will have so conducted himself during that period that the people would like to have him again. That may be a justification but the disadvantages of having a person fulfilling the functions and responsibilities proposed to be placed upon him under this Draft will be obvious unless, so far as we can effect it, he be above politics and beyond party influence. That must be done if there is to be any sort of respect for this office or the holder of it. We can only minimise the evil results which may flow from this system by providing that once a person is elected, he will have security of tenure for seven years and that, during those seven years, he can fulfil his functions impartially without consideration of politics and without having to think what his fate will be politically at the end of the seven years.

I support this amendment. I do so on the grounds that we are setting out to create a new State functionary who will perform very important tasks and who may have some additional tasks of an important character transferred to him for exercise. It seems to me to be eminently desirable that the person who functions as President should be as independent as it is possible for the legislative machine to make him. We have got to remember that, under the system of election proposed in this Draft Constitution, the only person who stands any chance whatever of being elected is a reliable party camp-follower. A person in the country of high educational and intellectual attainments and of high cultural standing, possessing all the qualifications which might be regarded as virtues if we were looking solely for virtues in a President, would not have the ghost of a chance of being elected as President of the State under this Constitution. All that man's intellectual and scientific attainments and all his virtues would avail him nothing unless he had a good party machine behind him.

How do you know that?

I have sufficient experience of political parties to know that the party managers will make sure of the type of person who will be elected to the Presidency, and I imagine that Deputy Kelly would probably confirm my fears in that respect.

I shall not be a candidate.

What is going to happen in the beginning is that political parties will find the best camp-follower they can with the strongest possible appeal to the people. He will have been a rabid party man. He is going to be selected at a party conference and he will be dressed up in all the virtues it is possible to bestow upon him for the period of the election. That is the kind of person the people will be asked to elect. He will go into office with a definite political tag around his neck.

He has got into that exalted position because of the manipulation of the party machine and its capacity to sell his virtues politically to the public, and that is the kind of President that we are going to start off with. Inevitably, that man will be reminded by those who worked for him during the period of the plebiscite, and by the Party machine that found him, that he would not be there were it not for their efforts, and the temptation in the way of the new President to do the things that the Party machine expects of him is going to be very great indeed.

I can imagine a situation developing under this Constitution where the President, having been elected by the political Party which forms the Government, will be very anxious, in return for his elevation to high office, to please the political Party in power. I can imagine all kinds of references being made to his past Party loyalties, to the esprit de corps that existed between them and to the difficulties that would be caused to the Government if the President did not see eye to eye with the Taoiseach under this Constitution. All that makes for the absence of independence or the want of independence. If the President is eligible for re-election at the end of seven years, it seems to me that all his actions during his period of office will be designed to ingratiate himself still further with the political machine on which he must depend for re-election at the end of the seven years, and in his effort to ingratiate himself with the machine he will be less of an independent President than those, who want to see the President function as impartially as possible, desire. I am in favour, therefore, of putting the President in a position where he can exercise his independent judgment during his period of office: where he will not be afraid to annoy the local branches of the Party that put him there, where he will not have to make representations to get a person, for instance, into the Guards or into the Army or to get a person appointed as a peace commissioner, that he will not have to make sure that he is to be answerable to the Party machine for all that: that, having been once elected as President, he will know that at the end of seven years he cannot be re-elected. I believe that knowledge of that fact on the part of the President would ensure that during his period of office he would behave as an independent President and not as a rubber stamp for the Executive Council, or as one who finds jobs for those who supported him at the last election.

Could the Deputy not imagine a man of an altogether different character being elected?

The question that occurs to my mind is whether the President will be given a pension when his period of office has expired.

If the period is made four years, he could get two pensions under this.

If he is not, and if he is not a man of independent means, then the knowledge that he cannot be re-elected President will not secure him against the feeling that he has got to please a particular Party. In fact, it may make things worse if it is essential to him to be provided for at the time that his period of office expires. Indeed, it may make him more a partisan during his period of office than if he had to submit himself to the judgment of the people. I agree that it is most desirable that the President should not act as a partisan. Mind you, I think that his opportunities for acting as a partisan are limited, but it is desirable at any rate that he should not take such opportunities, but should discharge his office impartially.

I think that perhaps Deputy Costello and Deputy Norton are unduly pessimistic. I think I know the Irish people well enough to say that a man's chances of being re-elected to the office of President would be increased by his discharging the duties in a worthy, in a dignified and in an impartial manner. I suppose it is true to say that a man can never be elected without the assistance of a political machine, but I am not convinced that, as Deputy Norton has said, the political machines would choose rabid partisans. I think that, probably, if the two political Parties at the present moment were putting up candidates, they would select somebody from among their members who was rather of the quieter type than of the aggressive type of partisan.

We have to guard against every risk.

The question is, how best to guard against risks. If I could see a sure way of guarding against partisanship I would be all in favour of adopting it, but I am not at all certain that to forbid a man to have more than one period of office may not make him more of a partisan during his period of office. I do think that seven years is a long term, and 14 years, it seems to me, is an altogether inordinate term under this Constitution. In fact, the term may be 21 years. There is really no limit to what it may be, and I am of opinion that there ought to be some limit. That is why I put down an amendment suggesting five years, and a further amendment suggesting that the new President could not be re-elected more than once. Deputies know that is the rule followed, although not laid down by law, in the United States. The President there is never re-elected more than once.

And not for more than eight years in all.

I would still urge on the President that the period of office should be less than seven years. I think that on the whole it would be a good thing and not a bad thing, provided the period is shorter, that there should be the opportunity of one re-election. I think a man would probably conduct his post all the more worthily for knowing that he has got that opportunity of testing the feelings of the Irish people again.

Again, the difficulty occurs of discussing either the length of the period of the Presidential office or whether the occupant should be allowed to offer himself for re-election more than once after the first time without having some fairly clear idea as to the powers. I view the Presidential office in a completely different way from the attitude adopted with regard to it by Deputy MacDermot. I see in this a completely new office. The people of this country, so far as they have political points of view and political sympathies, have been definitely on the side of all those in the neighbouring country and in every other country where people fought for representative Government, and, having secured that, fought against anyone being put in authority over that Government whether it was King, Governor-General or anybody else. That being the situation here, it is now proposed to set up a completely new functionary. It is proposed to give him almost unlimited powers, and these may be enlarged. Right through the Constitution there are certain loopholes by the use of which he may get extreme powers for himself, and, with the aid of a willing and a subservient Government he could, when the point of retirement from office arrived, get legislative power: he could get the whole of the external matters thrown over to him. There is no way of coercing him to do what he is supposed to do under the Constitution. That being the situation, I can see grave danger arising from the circumstances of his appointment.

The man to be elected will undoubtedly be a Party man, a chief, who will have the whole aid and support of the Party and its friends behind him. That will not be given except for a consideration, a consideration not merely in the past but promised in the future. In this situation, if you are going to have a man vested with a certain amount of powers which are open to abuse, and no way of coercing him into their proper use, then I say it is a bad thing to have a political head permitted to be elected a second time. There will be a grave temptation to him to play at politics during the whole period of his office. Deputy MacDermot appears to waver in the view as to whether a man is more likely to play politics if he knows that he can have but one term of office than if he knew he could go forward for a second term. The Deputy seemed to argue in favour of two terms of five years. He referred to the United States. The people in the United States know what they are voting for. They vote for a President who is given enormous executive powers. His period of office is limited to four years and the convention there is that he is not re-elected more than once after his first term, so that the longest period he can fill the office is eight years. The people of the United States know, as I have said, what they are voting for. We have not that system here but we are camouflaging it.

I move to report progress.

asked the Minister for Defence if he will state the names and addresses of persons in County Clare who have been awarded disability pensions under the Army Pensions Act, 1932, and the amount of the pension awarded in each case.

The list is being prepared and will be forwarded to the Deputy in the course of a few days.

asked the Minister for Defence if he has received an application for a military service pension from Mr. Seán O'Sullivan, Minroe, Michigan, U.S.A., and if he will state the present position of Mr. O'Sullivan's application.

An application for a service certificate under the terms of the Military Service Pensions Act, 1934, has been received from Mr. Seán O'Sullivan, Minroe, Michigan, U.S.A., and has been referred for investigation and report to the referee and Advisory Committee appointed under the Act.

asked the Minister for Defence if he has received applications for military service pensions from Messrs. Peter Donovan, 5 Hartland's Row, Cork; Liam Murphy, Fairlea, Fairhill, Cork; John McCarthy, 20 Garranalraher Avenue, Cork, and Seán Crowe, 25 Bandon Road, Cork; if the receipt of the applications in question were formally acknowledged in December, 1935; if 300 applicants from Cork City were since called before the Investigation Board; if applications are being considered in the order in which they are received, and when it is proposed to deal with the cases of Messrs. Donovan, Murphy, McCarthy and Crowe.

Applications for service certificates were received from Messrs. P. Donovan, 5 Hartland's Row, Cork; Liam Murphy, Fairlea, Fairhill, Cork; John McCarthy, 20 Garranalraher Avenue, Cork; and Seán Crowe, 25 Bandon Road, Cork; and were formally acknowledged in January and February, 1936.

Over 400 applicants from the Cork No. 1 Brigade Area have been called before the referee and Advisory Committee.

The order in which applicants are called is a matter entirely for the referee's discretion.

The applications of Messrs. Donovan, Murphy, McCarthy and Crowe will be dealt with as expeditiously as possible.